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This thesis is an examination of the relationship between the institutional and
practical workings of the late Apartheid state's Chemical and Biological Weapons
Research Programme, code-named Project Coast. It is written against the background of
the changing nature of the South African state in that period, and presents a partial picture
of that change. The greatest part of the thesis, however, is a history of the Research
Programme itself. The Programme's institutional structure was developed around the
charismatic figure of Dr Wouter Basson: following Weberian arguments, it is clear that
his charisma was used, within the bureaucratic structure of the Programme, to legitimate
the scientific research projects undertaken. Two of these projects are examined in the
body of this thesis: the first of these is an attempt to develop a new form of tear gas, the
second is the attempt to develop a new form of contraceptive. The animating ideologies
of these research projects are compared to each other, and to the supposedly hegemonic
ideologies of the changing state, revealing discrepancies between these grand structures
and their local workings. The importance of Basson's charismatic authority is
emphasised by the rapid dissolution of Project Coast following his withdrawal from his
leadership position at the end of the 1980s. By the end of the thesis, then, it seems clear
that, within the legitimating aura ofBasson's authority, the scientists at Project Coast
developed a set of racial and political ideologies that more little to no substantive
relationship to the seemingly hegemonic ideologies of the late Apartheid state, of which
Project Coast was an organ.
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The Productive Uses ofViolence
This thesis is an exploration of the late Apartheid state's chemical and biological
weapons research programme. Despite its recent visibility in both the national and
international press, the programme -- code-named "Project Coast" -- has not attracted a
great deal of close attention. Instead, the programme's production, both intellectual and
material, has been obscured by a public fascination with the "madness" of the research
work conducted within its laboratories. The appeal of "Apartheid's Mad Scientists" has
also worked to conceal the institutional structure of the programme by presenting its
head, Or Wouter Basson, as having single-handedly masterminded the programme's
operations.] And while some scholars have attempted to redress the simplicity of this
portrait, even their work does not go far enough into the programme's operations to
explain either how it worked, or why it was begun in the first place.2 These two
questions structure my exploration of the programme in this thesis.
I The phrase comes from the title of a website that compiles links to many of the published articles on
Project Coast, hosted at [http://www.geocities.comlproject_coastlindex.html] A selection of the newspaper
articles I refer to would include: A. Duffy, '''Peace' scientist's shady past," Electronic Mail and Guardian,
14 November 1997; G. Evans, "The man with the deadly past," Mail and Guardian, 28 August 1998; P.
Thornycroft and S. Sole, "SADF used chimps in project to curb black fertility," The Sunday Independent,
19 April 1998; B. Mabandla, "Sucking out the poison of apartheid science," The Sunday Independent, 21
June 1998.
2 I return to these works later in this Introduction, pp 11-15.
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My focus is on the connections between the workings of the late Apartheid state
and the workings of its chemical and biological weapons research programme. I am
concerned with the relationship between the institutional order of the research
programme and the institutional order of the late Apartheid state. This order is in part
expressed through the practice of scientific research as conducted within Project Coast. I
intend to argue that both the institutional order of the research programme, and the
practice of scientific research as it was conducted within its laboratories, derived much of
their specific nature from the particular historical circumstances of the programme's
founding and operation. The changes in the structure of the Apartheid state that occurred
through the period in which Project Coast functioned helped to determine the nature of its
institutional order, research practices, and physical products.
More broadly, then, the exploration of the chemical and biological weapons
research programme that I am undertaking in this thesis must include an exploration of
the particular nature of the South African state between 1978 and 1991. The first of these
dates was the year in which Project Coast was first proposed. The second date that
frames this thesis takes its significance from the that fact that 1991 was the year in which
Project Coast's institutions were finally separated from those of the South African
Defence Force. 1978 is also the year in which PW Botha replaced B1 Vorster as the
country's Prime Minister, and 1991 is also the year in which Botha's successor, FW de
Klerk, began to conduct serious negotiations with the previously banned black liberation
movements, the African National Congress, Pan Africanist Congress, and others. These
years, the years that bracket the operations of Project Coast, also bracket some of the
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most violent years in South African history -- six of which were spent in a State of
National Emergency. The relationship between this bloody context and the institutional
operation of the Apartheid state thus lies behind my study of Project Coast in this thesis.
This work builds upon the foundations laid by my previous dissertation, a
historiographical analysis of the ways in which various sources of historical production
had confronted the role of violence in the formation of the nation-state.3 In that work I
juxtaposed pieces of public and political history (such as the statements ofthe African
National Congress that the Apartheid state was influenced by Nazi Germany, and the
attempt by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to produce an equable history of the
country's transition from Apartheid) beside the writings of.professionalised historians,
both liberal and radical. Violence -- as a historical problem, as a political problem, as a
means of both enforcing and resisting state power -- was absent as a serious object of
historical study.4 And yet it saturated the history produced through political statements,
court documents, and Truth Commission's hearings.
At the time, I attempted to account for this discrepancy through identifying the
pivotal moment at which the two histories finally diverged: the moment soon after the
Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 in which Leonard Thompson, amongst others, chose to
3 Julian Brown, "South African Historiography and the Representation of Violence, 1960-2000."
Unpublished BA(Hons) Dissertation. (Historical Studies, University ofNatal, Durban: 2000)
4 An exception to this rule remains a Special Issue of the Journal ofSouthern African Studies: W. Beinart,
(ed) Political and Collective Violence in South Africa. JSAS (18/1: 1992) See also Keith Breckenridge,
"The Allure of Violence: Men, Race and Masculinity of the South African Goldmines, 1900-1950," JSAS
(24/4: 1998) Despite these and other exceptions, the general historiographical rule remains unchanged for
the period after 1960.
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reject completely the form of history associated with Afrikaner Nationalism.s This was
the form of history taught at school throughout the period of Apartheid governance, and it
was also the form of history adopted by the liberation movements in exile when they
attempted to produce their own oppositional histories. In place of its grand narratives of
heroism and struggle, of sacrifice and vengeance, Thompson and the other liberal
historians associated with his Oxford History ofSouth Africa placed anthropological
narratives, cultural accounts, and the archaeological history of the deep past at the centre
of South African history.6 The historical movement that succeeded this, influenced by
Marxism, replaced these terms with economic and social analysis but was either unable
or unwilling to break with the form of history -- objective, scientific, and rational --
pioneered by liberal historians.
I argued that this process ultimately resulted in a rejection of the political
functions of historical narrative that, in turn, resulted in a growing chasm between the
concerns of South African society and those of South African historians. The rejection
was in part explained by the lack of sophistication in secondary school history teaching,
much lamented by professional historians in the 1980s and 1990s. This lack was also in
part the explanation for the absence of the discussion of violence in history writing. And
while a certain distance from political concerns might not necessarily be a flaw in history
writing, the absence of any serious engagement with what the Truth Commission's
investigations had revealed as the single most pervasive aspect of the Apartheid state in
5 Leonard Thompson, "Afrikaner Nationalist Historiography and the Policy of Apartheid," in the Journal of
African History (1962:3) stands out as the clearest statement of this rejection.
6 Leonard Thompson and Monica Wilson (eds) The Oxford History ofSouth Africa. 2 volumes. (Oxford
University Press, Oxford: 1969, 1971)
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the period under my study, was clearly a crippling problem. The conclusion of my
dissertation then called for a politically conscious history, produced from within the
academy as well as without, that dealt squarely with the violence that saturated -- and
continued to saturate -- South Africa.
When I began work on this thesis this injunction was fresh in my mind. Through
my readings of the Truth Commission's various hearings -- the Human Rights Violation
Hearings, also called the "Victims' Hearings" and the Amnesty Hearings in particular -- I
came to see violence as more than merely a political problem. It was also the medium
through which the state communicated with its subjects. The authority of pain inflicted
upon an individual's body is absolute in a way that a state's discursive authority never
can be: relying heavily on works by Elaine Scarry and Alien Feldman, I argued in my
earlier dissertation that the Apartheid state attempted to use the absolute authority
conveyed by violence to buttress its own failing bureaucratic authority.7 But violence, as
with power in Foucault's analysis, is not as easily co-opted.8 "The very act of violence
invests the body with agency," according to Feldman, and this agency could be used
against the state's attempts to claim absolute authority, and absolute agency.9 One only
needs to think of the two hooks at the ends of Father Michael Lapsley's arms -- an iconic
image of the Truth Commission's hearings -- to realise the political force such a
7 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking ofthe World. (Oxford University Press,
Oxford: 1985) and Alien Feldman, Formations ofViolence: The Narrative ofthe Body and Political Terror
in Northern Ireland. (University ofChicago Press, Chicago: 1991)
8 Of Michel Foucault's many relevant works two perhaps stand out here: Discipline and Punish: The Birth
ofthe Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (penguin, Harmondsworth: 1977) and The History ofSexuality,
vo!. I: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1978) The third volum~ of
the Essential Works ofFoucault, 1954-1984, vol. 3: Power, edited by James D. Faubion (penguin:
Harmondsworth, 2000) is an important source.
9 Feldman, Formations of Violence, pp 7.
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reclamation of agency can hold. In my attempt to begin to write a history that could
address that struggle for agency through the medium of violence, I returned to the Truth
Commission's enormous compendium of history and sifted through it for a case to study.
The Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare
seemed to provide such a case. It provided a clear example of the Apartheid state
attempting to develop a set of technologies of violence that could only be used by its own
forces. Unlike rifles, for example, sophisticated chemical weapons could not easily be
operated or stolen by the state's opponents within the country's townships. It also
provided an example of the way in which the state's use of violence failed -- chemical
and biological weapons unlike rifles, electric shock devices, hand grenades and so on,
were not, in the end, used by the state in any meaningful way. In fact, the only thing
missing from this case study when I reviewed the original 3000-plus pages of transcribed
testimony was a clear example of how the subjects of such violence could co-opt its scars
to mark their own agency. At the time, I thought that this problem would be
surmountable.
It was not. Instead, my original plan for this thesis has had to come to terms with
this central absence: this thesis could not be about the way in which violence was used as
a medium of political communication between the state and its subjects. Instead the
thesis has come to be about the way in which the state itself has accommodated the
practice of violence in the form ofa chemical and biological weapons research
programme. The subjects of that programme were entirely imagined -- by the state, the
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· programme's administrators, and the programme's scientists -- and never fully actualised.
As such, the imagined subjects of the use ofchemical and biological weapons were never
able to co-opt that use in the service oftheir own agency. The ways in which they could
have been able to do so must remain, for now at least, as much within my own
imagination as their very existence was within the imagination of those who worked for
Project Coast.
This has necessitated a move in my own work away from the writing of a history
influenced by Feldman's anthropology and Scarry's psychology, to the writing of a
history more influenced by the sociology of state institutions. The limits within which
this thesis was constructed, and the final conclusions which it draws, however, are both
- derived from my earlier--- and continuing - interest in the productive uses ofvioltmce
within South Africa's history. Even the sociology that I use in the course of this thesis is
limited by my own working history: most of the sociology used in this thesis was either
derived from, or discovered in, my critical readings of other South African histories.
Of the works I read, the two that have had the most influence on this thesis have
been Deborah Posel's The Making ofApartheid 1948-1961 and Dan O'Meara's Forty
Lost Years. 1Q Both of these works make certain use of sociologies to articulate and
texture their histories of the Apartheid state. Each approaches that study of the state from
different perspectives, which are perhaps reflected best in the different debts each owes to
classical sociology. For O'Meara, this debt is perhaps most significantly owed to a
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tradition of Marxist sociology that places social interactions within an economic
framework. The changes in the economy that occurred during the period of his study
stand out as the most significant factors in his close-grained portrait of the internal
politics of the National Party, the party of governance in the Apartheid·state. The internal
politics of the Party, and the external politics of the state that it led, are both embedded in
an economic framework and in class conflict. While I accept much of his analysis, his
lead is not followed in this thesis.
Instead, much of the direct inspiration for the path that I tread in this thesis comes
from Posel's study of the workings- of the institutions that made up the Apartheid state.
In her book she examines the way in which complex debates (shaped by the political
economy of the day, but not determined by this) within and around the normative ideals
of Afrikaner Nationalist ideology powerfully influenced the way in which the new
institutions of the Apartheid state came to be structured. She juxtaposes ideal structures
next to actual structures and attempts to explain both the extent to which they diverged
from each other, and the extent to which they in fact converged. She ends her book with
the conclusion that by 1961 the early Apartheid state had completed the task Afrikaner
Nationalism had set it and had put into place the institutions that would form the
foundations for the Grand Apartheid state. After 1961, the first phase of Apartheid was
over and its second phase was beginning. That second phase, continuing to be defined by
the way in which it structured and operated its bureaucratic institutions, has been the
10 Deborah Posel, The making ofapartheid, 1948-1961: conflict and compromise (Clarendon Press, Oxford:
1991) and Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics ofthe National Party,
1948-1994 (Ohio University Press, Cleveland: 1998)
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focus of several of her more recent articles. 11 Many of the assumptions that underlie her
analyses in these works, and in mine by extension, are derived from that of Max Weber.
Across a range of works, Weber attempted to meld together a form of the history
of ideas with a sociology of institutions to create a history of the ideas that influence the
ways in which a social group, institution, or community structured itself. His studies
ranged across the globe and across history, but the body of his work that is most relevant
to this thesis is his study of the ideals inspiring modem institutional structures.12 In this
body of work he traced the ideological roots of these institutions to the transformation in
ethics and economy that occurred during the Protestant Reformation in Europe during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The ideal work ethic that emerged from this process
was concerned with the articulation of a scientific rationality, economy, and order. The
ideal institutional expression of this ethic was the modem bureaucracy: rationalised, de-
personalised, and thus incorruptible. 13 This faceless bureaucracy was only an ideological
construct, an "ideal-type" expressed through the religious and political discourses of the
day. Nonetheles~, it was through striving to achieve that ideal that the real, imperfect,
institutions found their actual structures. In Posel's work, the Apartheid state's quest
11 Deborah Posel, "Whiteness and power in the South African civil service: Paradoxes of the South African
state," Journal ofSouthern African Studies (25, 1: 1999) and Deborah Posel, "A mania for measurement:
statistics and statecraft in the transition to apartheid," in Saul Dubow (ed) Science and society in southern
Africa (Manchester University Press, Manchester: 2000)
12 Weber's works diverge in their interests and concerns, although all derive from the same basic principles
of research. His work on modernity and modern institutions can be found in several sites. The ones that I
have used for this thesis are: Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism, translated by Talcott
Parsons. (Alien and Unwin, London: 1930) Also: Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,
translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, and edited by Talcott Parsons. (Oxford University
Press, Oxford: 1947) And: Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt.
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1968)
13 For a very different history of how impersonality and incorruptibility came to define a certain kind of
political modernity, see Michael Warner's The Letters ofthe Republic: Publication cmd the Public Sphere
in Eighteenth Century America. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1990)
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towards an ideological ideal type of state structure helps define the nature of the
Apartheid state's institutional development. It is this part of Weber's historical sociology
that also influences the way in which I attempt to explain the Apartheid state's chemical
and biological research programme's institutional structures.
But the introduction of a specifically scientific, researching, institution into a
study of the state's development requires a second sources of ideas -- ideas which were
expressed in Foucault's brief examination of the discursive history that shaped the
practices of modern governmental power. 14 To Weber's analysis of the ideological role
of rationality in creating the modern bureaucratic ideal, Foucault added an analysis of the
role played by the ideologically scientific practice of gathering information through
questionnaires, censuses, statistics, and measurements. This information was used to
constitute the new object upon which the modern state could act: the population. To the
. traditional objects of state power, territory and economy, the modern practice of statecraft
added population; and the distinct stated purpose of the modern state was to serve the
ends of this same population. Those ends were defined through the collection and
collation of information by the state -- in its questionnaires and censuses. The ends were
to be reached through the bureaucratic apparatus of the modem state, such as the
population control bureau.
My analysis of both the Apartheid state and that state's chemical and biological
weapons research programme is thus anchored in the space formed at the nexus of
14 Michel Foucault, "Govemmentality" in Essential Works, vol. 3: Power (1978) pp 201-222. See also G.
Burchell et al (eds) The Foucault Effect (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1991)
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Foucault and Weber's two descriptions of the ideals of modern state practice. Posel has
gone the furthest ofany South African historian in addressing these issues, but my
research differs from hers in several ways, the most pressing of which is the most
obvious: even her more recent articles do not extend beyond the end o{the 1960s and the
beginning of the 1970s. My work begins in the middle of the 1970s and continues up
until the early parts of the 1990s. It begins where Posel's analysis ends -- and when the
state which she describes begins to undergo another major shift, from what Posel terms
Grand Apartheid to what I have termed late Apartheid. To explain the significance of
this shift, a brief narrative overview of its historical context, and contingencies, is
required.
The Apartheid state in 1961 was the product of thirteen years of internal conflict
and compromise between the National Party government and the institutional legacy of
the state bureaucracy that had developed in the decades after the 1910 Act of Union. IS
The exclusivist essentialism of Afrikaner Nationalist rhetoric had come to an
accommodation with the impersonal and impartial rhetoric of scientific governance that
had structured the bureaucratic state before 1948. One result of this accommodation was
a state in which the boundary between bureaucracy and government was fatally blurred:
most of the civil servants were Afrikaans-speakers who had been appointed by the
National Party through a form ofaffirmative action and who owed their allegiances not to
the bureaucracy but to the government itself. A second result was a state practice that
bound together the obsessions of both Afrikaner Nationalism and modernist bureaucracy:
IS WilIiam Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa (Oxford University Press, Oxford: second edition,
2001) is a masterly summary ofthe century's events.
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the subjects of the state's power were essentialised populations, defined statistically. The
Apartheid state's public rhetoric defined its own right to govern through its concern for
the welfare, not of the country's singular population, but of its many, various, and
separate populations. All of which were scientifically, statistically, deflned. 16
The mechanism for the collection and interpretation of this self-consciously
"scientific" information was the Department ofNative Affairs, which later gave birth to
the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, originally under the political
leadership of W.M. Eiselen and the bureaucratic leadership of Hendrik Verwoerd. This
department was responsible for collecting and collating data on all non-white subjects of
the South African state. It was through the interpretations of this data offered by the
Department that the state claimed both to identify the boundaries of its various subject
populations, and also to identify the welfare issues that animated each of these
populations: whether it was a separate form of education, development, or geographical
location. It goes almost without saying that these separate welfare needs were defined by
the state's practice of information collection rather than by the expressed desires of the
population as a whole: the way in which this statistical data was collected and collated
served to obscure the ideological politics behind the state's acts. I?
After Verwoerd graduated from heading the Department of Native Affairs to
becoming the Prime Minister of the country in 1958, the Department's statistical practice
16 Posel, The Making ofApartheid, is the definitive work on this period.
17 See Posel, "A Mania for Measurement," as well as Keith Breckenridge, "From Hubris to Chaos: the
makings of the Dompas and the end of documentary government" Unpublished seminar paper (University
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became ever more important in the running of the country. Indeed, it became the single
most important pillar of Grand Apartheid: the ideological attempt to segregate the many
populations of the country, defined through racial, ethnic, and linguistic measurements,
from each other. Grand Apartheid rested on a rhetoric of "separate development" which
in turn depended on a modernist rhetoric of scientific information, and on the modem
convention of the population, and its welfare, as the object of the state's acts of power. It
is arguable that, despite the presence of this discursive foundation, Verwoerd's Grand
Apartheid would not have been practicable without the economic boom that buoyed the
South African state in the 1960s.18 Regardless, this was the way in which the state
rationalised its own exercises of power for as long as that boom continued, even after the
assassination of Verwoerd in 1968 and the resultant succession of BJ. Vorster.
By the middle of the next decade, however, that economic boom was deflating.
At the same time, the South African trade union movement began to spread to the black
majority population, achieving a degree of public political mobilisation unheard of since
the state's violent repression of the black liberation movements in 1961. One of the first
clear signs of the increasing militancy of this movement were the Durban Strikes in 1973
which sufficiently disturbed confidence the Apartheid state at a time of economic
instability. In 1975 the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola achieved a
sudden independence, bringing two black socialist governments onto the borders of the
ofNatal, Durban: April 2002) Also: Heribert Adam, Modernising Racial Domination (University of
California Press, Berkeley: 1972)
18 Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, covers this period clearly.
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South African state and its protectorate, South West Africa (Namibia). 19 And in 1976
school students took to the streets of Soweto in protest against a particular aspect of the
state's separate education policy. The South African Defence Force had to be called in to
control this Uprising, leading to the use of live ammunition against massed crowds.
Within the space of three years the economic, military, and political context within which
the Apartheid state had operated had changed almost beyond recognition. More than any
other factor, however, the Soweto Uprising had utterly discredited the rhetoric of separate
development, and thus of the scientific management of populations, within the National
Party itself. A succession battle soon followed. In 1978 Vorster lost the battle.2o
His successor, P.W. Botha, had been Minister of Defence in the last years of
. Vorster's government and brought his affinity with the state's military institutions· to his
administration. The immediate effect of this was a new rhetoric of statecraft. The self-
proclaimed responsibility of the state was no longer the welfare of its various
populations, but rather their protection against a "Total Onslaught"; its means ofensuring
its responsibility was no longer a policy of separate development, but a "Total Strategy."
If the Department ofNative Affairs, throughout its various name changes, had been the
definitive institution ofVerwoerd's Apartheid state, the South African Defence Force
now became the definitive institution of Botha's Apartheid state, what I have chosen to
call the "late Apartheid state." Its statecraft was no longer that of a scientific
19 Robert M. Price, The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990
(Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1991) opens with a compelling summaries of these events. See also
O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, for the impact of these events on the National Party itself, as well as for details
of the "Information Scandal" and the internal power struggle.
20 Much ofthis is covered in O'Meara, Forty Lost Years.
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bureaucracy. It now derived its rhetorical language and institutional structure from that
f h '1' 21o t e ml Itary.
An immediate effect of this shift in institutional orders was the centralisation of
state power into a strong executive analogous to the General Staff ofthe Defence Force.
By 1983 Botha had transformed the constitutional order of the government, as well as
that of the state bureaucracy, by replacing the position of Prime Minister with a far
stronger executive position, that of State President. His Cabinet also came to hold an
authority unaccountable to the Parliament -- which itself was constitutionally weakened
through the creation of a Tri-Cameral Parliament, an uneasy compromise order that
attempted to co-opt the Indian and Coloured populations of the country by granting them
each a separate franchise. In addition to these constitutional changes, Botha also
instituted a State Security Council that reported only to him, as the State President. This
Council was not accountable to any other body, and co-ordinated the use of the combined
forces of the South African Police and South African Defence Force to combat unrest and
insurrections within the country. There was a perceptible need for such an institution: the
years between 1976 and 1989 were the bloodiest years ofthe Apartheid period as one
community after another revolted against the state's authority. Each insurrection was
suppressed, but with increasing difficulty. This instability and insecurity defined the late
Apartheid state during its period of operations, the long 1980s.
21 Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan (eds) War and Society: The Mi/itarisation ofSouth Africa (David
Philip, Cape Town: 1989) describes the development of this rhetoric across several spheres.
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It was during this transformation in the nature of the Apartheid state that the
chemical and biological weapons research programme was first proposed, in 1978. It
was institutionalised in 1981, began operations the next year, and continued to function
throughout the 1980s. It reached its end in 1991, after the policies of late Apartheid had
failed to prevent the necessity of a negotiated transition of power away from the National
Party and to the previously banned black liberation movements. Project Coast's history
places it firmly within the ambit of Botha' s Security State, as does its institutional
location within the South African Defence Force itself. But it would be a mistake to thus
assume that the research programme's institutional order simply followed that of Botha's
state.
There is a certain inertia built into institutional orders: as the Afrikaner Nationalist
ideals of the early National Party government had to come to an accommodation with the
modernist bureaucracies of the previous state order, so too did the militarist ideals of the
late Apartheid state have to come to an accommodation with the bureaucracy of the
previous order of 9rand Apartheid. I argue in this thesis that it was the tensions
generated by this process of institutional accommodation that drove Project Coast.
But this, or any other similarly detailed institutional history is missing from the
two major works about the South African chemical and biological weapons research
programme, both published recently, as well as from the growing body of works that use
the programme as an example within a broader encapsulation, either of global chemical
and biological warfare or of the period of Apartheid power. The result, for all these
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works, has been that none of them have been able to provide an explanation either for the
research programme's existence, or for the form which it took. Each of these works,
however, reaches that point in its own way. Some examples may make this clearer.
Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg's Plague Warriors can stand as an example of
the kind of work that attempts to describe the South African chemical and biological
weapons research programme in the context of other such twentieth century
programmes.22 It is also the book with the largest proportion of its length devoted to the
programme. Its flaw -- beyond its lack of access to resources, and uncritical acceptance
of the description given to them by its military Project Officer, Or Wouter Basson -- lies
in its inability to use the array of material gathered to contextualise the South African
programme, either with the country's history or with the history of chemical and
biological warfare. This results in a description of Project Coast as simultaneously
threatening and unfathomable. The book is thus of use more as an early example of the
historiography of the programme than as a history, explanation, or accurate depiction of
its operations.
A parallel description would hold for An Ambulance ofThe Wrong Colour, by
Laurel Baldwin-Ragaven et ai, which locates its, far briefer, discussion of the programme
within a broader study of medicine and medical research in Apartheid South Africa.23
Like Mangold and Goldberg's work, the few pages of analysis are based almost entirely
22 Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Warriors: A True Story ofBiological Warfare (St Martin's
Press, New York: 2000)
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on newspaper articles contemporary with the Truth Commission's Special Hearing into
Chemical and Biological Warfare. In itself this is not particularly damning, but in a book
constructed out of the authors' submission to the Commission's Special Hearing into the
Health Profession, the thinness of this section stands out. Similarly to that in Plague
Warriors, the discussion of Project Coast seems grafted onto an otherwise compelling
and detailed argument -- a graft that only serves to again emphasise the programme's
exceptionality and to further de-contextualise and de-historicise its actual operations.
Neither of the two works that engage more seriously with the weapons research
programme's operation fall into these traps, if only because both works are far more
firmly grounded in the available primary sources. Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt's
monograph, The Rollback ofSouth Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare
Programme, relies heavily on interviews conducted by the authors with various senior
members of the South African Defence Force.24 Their access to these sources was
undoubtedly eased by their institutional affiliations with the US Air Force and Navy,
respectively, and with the clearly limited frame of their research: despite a brief account
of Project Coast's foundation, the monograph is almost entirely focussed on analysing the
way in which the Project was dismantled after the beginning ofpolitical negotiations.
For this period, between 1990 and 1994, this monograph is superb: closely-researched,
clearly-argued, and exhaustive. It describes the process by which the international
political community began to express its belief that the research conducted by Project
23 Laurel Baldwin-Ragaven, JeaneIle de Gruchy and Leslie London, An Ambulance ofthe Wrong Colour:
Health Professionals. Human Rights, and Ethics in South Africa. (University of Cape Town Press, Cape
Town: 1999) pp 125-129 in particular.
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Coast could be distributed to dangerous states -- most notably, Gaddafi's Libya -- and
that the country's transitional state should control the possibility of contravening its
proliferation agreements by closing the programme. The role of the Defence Force in
keeping this process quiet, and in brokering between the remains of the late Apartheid
state and the newer African National Congress-led government, is closely studied by the
two authors. The study of how these institutions distanced themselves from their
research programme is fascinating, and revealing of many tensions underlying the public
face of the transition to democratic government. Nonetheless, it does not speak to the
actual operations of the research programme, nor indeed to the motives of the state for
continuing it through the 1980s.
A similar absence bedevils the other major work published on Project Coast,
Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould's Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South
Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme.25 Despite the exceptional
thickness of the information presented in their book, derived both from the authors' close
relations with the Truth Commission's investigations and daily attendance at Wouter
Basson's criminal trial, the interpretation of this information is distorted by the authors'
tight focus on the way in which that information was made public. In other words, the
large quantity of information that the authors have collected is rendered uninterpretable
through their organisational scheme: their book becomes a chronicle of their discovery of
the existence and then extent of Project Coast rather than a history of the programme
24 Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Ro//back ofSouth Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare
Programme. (USAF Counterproliferation Centre, Maxwell Air Base, Alabama: 2001)
25 Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and
Biological Warfare Programme. (Zebra Press, Cape Town: 2002)
19
itself. This criticism should not be allowed to disguise the richness of the book, the depth
of information gathered, or the intelligence of the authors' critiques of both the Truth
Commission's Special Hearing and Basson's criminal trial: for this, the period after the
rollback of Project Coast examined in Burgess and Purkitt's monograph, the book is
indispensable. There is no better account of these events. But, despite the presence of
enough data to answer these questions, it is not an account of how the state's chemical
and biological weapons research programme came to be structured as part of the military,
how it operated through the 1980s, or whether it ultimately failed or succeeded. It is a
rich source, and an exciting book, but it does not attempt to explain Project Coast.
Without a sense of the changing history of the Apartheid state, and without "a
close examination of the way in which the state and the programme interacted through
the period of Project Coast's operations, none of these works can explain either the
foundations or the continuance of the research programme. When they do attempt to do
so it is by accepting the self-serving explanations given by the scientists and
administrators of the research programme in their own defence: that they were working
within the context of the Total Onslaught, to protect their nation. As even the brief
historical overview I have presented above shows, this explanation is deceptively simple.
These quick-fire summaries of the other work conducted on Project Coast are
perhaps more useful in illuminating the areas of my own interest than in illustrating the
breadth of interest embodied in these books. The point of difference between my
readings of these works, and the readings of the programme that they provide, can be
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summed up in a semantic shift: from the "chemical and biological warfare programme"
that inhabits the titles and subtitles of both of the two major books on Project Coast to
the "chemical and biological weapons research programme" that inhabits my own title.
This difference in focus is, on my part at least, premised on two observations: the
first being that, despite its institutional base within the armed forces, Project Coast was
not in fact concerned with "warfare", the practice of conducting armed engagements.
Instead, it was concerned with chemical and biological weapons, discursively stripped of
their utility, if not ideological purpose. For the scientists and administrators of Project
Coast, the ways in which the weapons that they were developing were to be used was -- if
not exactly irrelevant -- somebody else's department. Bureaucratic divisions were
.eagerly embraced by these scientists and administrators and, whatever the ethical status
of such a stance, their refusal to consider the practical uses of their work makes it
difficult to describe Project Coast as a ''warfare programme" -- because it was not. It was
a weapons programme.
And, more precisely, a weapons "research" programme. This is the second
observation that underlies the particular nomenclature I have chosen: that for all its
rhetoric of weapons production, very few chemical or biological weapons were actually
produced. Instead, the isolation of the programme from the international history of
chemical and biological weapons research meant that the programme's scientists had to
spend the vast majority of their time re-inventing the wheel: re-developing older
techniques of weapons production in addition to attempt to create new forms of those
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weapons. Project Coast was thus in fact organised around the exigencies of research,
rather than those of a factory-like production line. The dissonance between this necessity
and the ambitions of the Defence Force is therefore a productive force for the analysis of
the Apartheid state's chemical and biological weapons research programme.
Together with the argument outlined at the beginning ofthis introduction then,
these two observations underlie the structure and focus of my attempt to study that
weapons research programme. As with the overall argument, these observations will be
fleshed out and illustrated in the body of this thesis. It is sufficient to assert here that they
are essential to understanding the difference between my argument and those that are put
forward in either Burgess and Purkitt's monograph or Burger and Gould's book.
The first chapter of this thesis therefore begins with an account of the founding of
Project Coast and an examination of the ways in which its founders, both those from
within the South African Defence Force's military structures and those recruited for the
research programme from civilian and academic institutions, sought to explain that act of
founding to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission during its Special Hearing into
Chemical and Biological Warfare. I propose an unusual explanation for the form that the
weapons research programme took, and attempt to suggest how that form reflected the
growing contradictions in the institutional structures of the late Apartheid state.
Chapter Two takes up these contradictions, and examines them through a closer
focus on a particular part of the Project Coast's institutional apparatus: the chemical
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weapons research conducted at the Delta-G Scientific laboratories, a nominally-
independent front company for the military's research programme. Within the confines
of that institution, I study a single research project in depth, that aimed at creating a new
form of tear gas. My intention in this study is to show the ways in which the scientific
practice of Project Coast's scientists defined the political implications of their research.
Chapter Three, in turn, picks up these same questions and transplants them into a
slightly different context: the biological weapons research conducted on the premises of
Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, another military front company set up for Project
Coast's convenience. The particular research project that I examine in this chapter was
concerned with the creation of a new from of contraceptive, one that would operate like a
vaccination. The implicit subjects of this research are expanded upon, and then
compared with those defined through the research examined in the previous chapter.
The fourth chapter extracts common threads from the two preceding chapters.
The core of this ~ommonality is a temporal coincidence: within the space of six months
in the middle of the 1980s both front companies underwent a major institutional shift, a
managerial reorganisation that was followed by a decline in the research practices studied
in the two preceding chapters. To explain the impact of these institutional changes, I
return to the explanation for the original structures offered in the first chapter.
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In conclusion, then, I return to the arguments offered in this introduction in the
light of the primary research presented in the body of this thesis and propose avenues for
further research that could bind this work into the broader tapestry of my research.
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Chapter One
The Formation OfProject Coast
In the Introduction to this thesis, I argued that the institutional structure of Project
Coast was a product of the period during which the entrenched bureaucratic modernism
of the grand Apartheid state was beginning to make way for the increasing militarisation
of the late Apartheid state; the programme began as this process began, and ended as the
state began to mutate into the contemporary post-Apartheid South African state. This
chapter is an examination of the ways in which that institutional structure came to be
constructed. It begins in the 1970s, with the first proposals for some kind of chemical
and biological warfare programme, and ends in the early part of the 1980s, at the first
moment when the structures of a chemical and biological weapons research programme
began to operate. It covers a period in which no weapons were produced, and little
research was done. Instead, many committees met and discussed the proposed
programme. As few records of these meetings are currently available, the information
presented here is instead reconstructed from accounts offered to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission by the administrators and scientists ofProject Coast.
These accounts are riddled with the efforts ofthose scientists and administrators
to exonerate themselves of any implication of misconduct. Much ofthe scientist's efforts
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-- those that are relevant to this chapter, at least -- were dedicated to arguing that they
themselves, as individuals, were not aware that there was any possibility that the products
of their work could be used within the borders of the country. Instead, as one scientist
after another testified, they were told that Project Coast was intended to produce a
weapons technology for use outside the country, as a defence for the South African
troops in Angola against the possibility of chemical and biological warfare taking place
in that conflict.! One scientist testified that he had acted on this belief even after the
Defence Force had completely withdrawn from Angola.2 The majority of these
exculpatory efforts, however, were concerned with the specific scientific work conducted
by each researcher, rather than with the institutional setting in which that work was done.
The testimony presented by the senior administrators of Project Coast, however,
remains more problematic. Several of the directors of Project Coast's laboratories were
principally researching scientists, and so the bulk of their testimonies focused on their
research work rather than their administrative work. The three testimonies that did
concentrate entirely on the institutional framework of Project Coast were also three of the
most troublesome: one was given by the current Surgeon General, D.P. Knobel, another;
that of Philip Mijburgh, the director of one of Project Coast's front-companies, Delta-G
Scientific, was compelled under threat of subpoena; and the third, that of Wouter Basson,
the central figure in Project Coast's organisation, was compelled by a court order.3 All
J A single example: Testimony of Schalk van Rensburg to the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 9 June 1998.
2 Testimony of Johannes Matteus Koekemoer to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 9 June 1998. .
3 See the Testimony of Lt-Gen D.P. Knobel to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 18 June 1998; the Testimony of Dr Philip Mijburgh
to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological
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three testimonies must therefore be approached with caution, and with a certain degree of
scepticism. Nonetheless, the conditions in which they were given should not be allowed
to obscure the information that these testimonies do in fact contain. My task has been to
evaluate this information, and to extract that which remains meaningful and convincing
even after the partiality of the testimonies has been acknowledged. In doing this, the
techniques of Weberian institutional theory have been most useful: by abstracting several
complex and partially-contradictory histories of modem institution building into a model
description of the ideal-type of institution that each of these real institutions aspired to,
Weber was able to focus on the similarities between apparently dissimilar processes.
That same process of abstraction, the sifting of sometimes-contradictory evidence to find
the similarities and points of convergence, has animated my own argument in this .
chapter, and this thesis as a whole. The institutional ideal-type that structures Project
Coast can be discerned through a close reading of the testimonies presented to the Truth
Commission, even if the details of any given part of that institutional structure given in
those testimonies are of doubtful value.
It is my contention therefore that, while this chapter's examination of the process
through which the institutional order of Project Coast came to be constructed, and thus of
the form that order took, has begun with a description of the evidentiary problems it
faces, those problems cannot be allowed to forestall interpretative attempts such as this. I
argue, later in this chapter, that it is this lack of hard evidence that has forestalled such
Warfare, 18 July 1998; and the Testimony of Dr Wouter Basson to the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 31 July 1998. Also:
Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and
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interpretative attempts on the parts of both the major works written on the state's
chemical and biological weapons research programme, allowing them to dismiss its
particular institutional order in various ways.4 Instead, as I argue that understanding this
institutional order is essential to understanding the relationship between Project Coast
and the broader state institutions in which it was located, I want to place the process of
institutionalisation at the centre of this chapter, by beginning with a brief historical
account of the Project's proposal, approval, and institutionalisation. I then go on to
describe this institutional order in more detail, before addressing the objections that the
two major works mentioned above raise. Finally, I present my particular argument about
the institutional order of this chemical and biological weapons research programme.
That account must begin with the first moves towards the creation of ProjeCt
Coast, which came early in the 1970. Senior officers in the South African Defence Force
asked the country's Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research to put together a report
exploring the feasibility of setting up a chemical and biological weapons research
programme. The report argued that such a programme would be both impractical, both
economically and scientifically. It recommended against the creation ofa weapons
research programme at the time ofpublication, at least. The Defence Force seems to
have accepted the report's recommendations and dropped whatever plans it might have
Biological Warfare Programme (Zebra Press, Cape Town: 2002) contains an account of these various
subpoenas.
4 Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback ofSouth Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare
Programme (USAF Counterproliferation Centre, Maxwell Air Base, Alabama: 2001); Marlene Burger and
Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare
Programme (Zebra Press, Cape Town: 2002).
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considered. It is probable that these plans were resurrected at the end of the decade, and
may have formed the basis of the attempts to propose Project Coast to the Force.s
In 1978, the same year that PW Botha became Prime Minister, the Surgeon
General of the South African Defence Force, General Nicol Nieuwoudt, was making
fresh enquiries as to the possibility of setting up such a research programme. Although at
least one of his enquiries was rebuffed, his plan seems to have found the support of
Botha's newly-appointed Minister of Defence, a former head of the Defence Force,
General Magnus Malan.6 By 1981, Nieuwoudt was confident enough in his plan to
approach Dr Wouter Basson, a subordinate officer under Nieuwoudt's command within
the Defence Force's Medical Services division, and commission him to head the
proposed research programme. According to Basson, in his testimony to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission during its Special Hearing into Chemical Warfare, he was
selected because he was both a doctor and an officer: he understood research practice
because of his graduate specialisation, and he was trained to obey Nieuwoudt's orders.?
Basson, however, was testifying under duress and eager to deflect the Commission's
attention away from his own role in the structuring and operation of the research
programme. His role in its institutional beginnings seems larger than he would admit.
5 Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Ro/lback, pp 19-21.
6 Burgess and Purkitt, The Ro/lback, pp 24.
7 Testimony of Wouter Basson to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 31 July 1998.
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Between 1981 and 1982, Basson spent several months travelling between military
trade fairs and scientific conventions in the US and Taiwan.8 When he returned the
institutionalisation of Project Coast began in earnest. The programme was split into
several operating branches, separating chemical and biological research, and offensive
research from defensive work.9 Each of these branches would be given a front company
of its own, to disguise the involvement of the South African Defence Force in the design
of a chemical and biological weapons research programme. The first ofthese front
companies, Delta-G Scientific, was registered in 1982. The second significant front
company, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, was registered in 1983, a year notable also
for being the culmination of Botha's constitutional transformations. Several more front
companies followed after the formation of these two initial companies, continuing
steadily throughout the remainder of the decade, and throughout the period of Project
Coast's operation. Counterbalancing this proliferation of front companies, in the early
years of the research programme's operations, was the programme's practice of recruiting
its administrative and scientific staff from within the Defence Force itself. 10 This limited
pool of initial recr:uits -- superseded later in the programme's operations -- bound these
early front companies together. These recruits were moved from one front company to
the next, according to the immediate needs of the research programme. I discuss some of
the implications of this, together with more detailed descriptions of the career-paths that
this practice entailed, later in this chapter. At this point, I want to emphasise instead that
8 Basson, 31 July 1998.
9 Testimony ofD.P. Knobel to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special Hearing
into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 18 June 1998. Knobel was Nieuwoudt's
successor as Surgeon General and head of Medical Services, and thus of Project Coast.
10 Testimony ofDr Jan Lourens to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 8 June 1998.
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the majority of these recruits, like Basson himself, from one particular section of the
Defence Force: its Medical Services, under the command of the Surgeon General. At that
time, Nicol Nieuwoudt, one of the architects ofthe state's chemical and biological
weapons research programme, was still Surgeon General.
The Defence Force's Medical Services division had a somewhat ambiguous
relationship to the practice of war, intended as it was to provide medical support to South
African troops in the field rather than to provide troops that would act in combat itself.
Its primary staff complement was therefore made up of men (and some women) who had
trained as medical professionals rather than as professional soldiers: doctors, nurses, and
dentists. Most of these 'soldiers' would have been trained to handle weapons, but most
were unlikely to have ever had to use them. Those who worked in the field would
nonetheless have a very good idea of the consequences of their use. 11 As with the other
divisions of the military, however, not all of its staff worked in the field, or would ever
see combat. Instead a large number of its bureaucratic staff was entrusted with the
responsibility of ordering and providing material support, in the form of surgical
equipment, medication, and so forth, to the troops in the field. The staff hired to
administer Project Coast's institutions, as well as those originally hired to conduct its
weapons research, were therefore constrained by their own particular experience of
warfare and weapons -- an abstract, rationalised, and distant experience, in general. The
dependence of Project Coast on this branch of the military's institutional structure -- the
11 Testimony of Sean Mark CalIaghan to the South African Truth and Reconciliation's Special Hearing into
the Health Sector, 17 June 1997. Callaghan was conscripted out of school and sent to Angola in 1982 to
work as a medic in the field. He testified to the Commission that the result of this experience was more
than ten years of struggling with a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
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original impetus for the programme's development having come from its commander, its
chief administrator being based within its command structure, its funding largely routed
through its offices, and its staff largely recruited through its departments -- may have
gone some way towards explaining why Project Coast became a weapons research
programme rather than a chemical and biological warfare programme, as it is often
assumed to have been intended to become. It does not, however, explain the way in
which Project Coast's institutional structure developed, or what it developed into.
Project Coast's institutional structure was marked by two unique components, the
first of which being the proliferation of front companies; and of company directorships,
outside of the military's institutional framework. The second component of Project
Coast's institutional structure was the role claimed for Wouter Basson, as the mediator
between the various front companies and between those companies and the military. The
relationship between these two components helped to define what set Project Coast apart
from any other military research programme and thus helped to define its own particular
institutional identity. That relationship has been at the centre of all attempts to describe
the nature of the Project's operations, and will also be at the centre of my attempt. It
needs to be explored at a certain length, therefore, before being explained.
The first of the front companies, Delta-G Scientific, was created early in 1982. It
was intended to provide a set of facilities within which the chemical component of the
weapons research programme could be advanced. Its laboratories were to be geared
solely towards chemical testing and research, while another company was to be geared
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towards the biological components of the programme. 12 This intention was complicated
by the fact that, between 1982 and 1985, Delta G Scientific had no physical premises.
The building of its facilities, laboratories and offices, was only completed in 1985. In the
three years of operation prior to that date, Delta-G operated out of a small laboratory
located within the South African Defence Force's Special Forces Headquarters in
Pretoria. All the early chemical research of Project Coast was thus done within a military
laboratory.13 Nonetheless, the intention of setting up the front company was to separate
that research from the military, and so Delta-G was moved as soon as possible. It was
regarded, in fact, as one of Wouter Basson's first great administrative successes by his
immediate superiors, and therefore set the pattern for the front companies that followed.
The most significant of these following companies was the second established,
Roodeplaat Research Laboratories. Where Delta-G's laboratories were intended to be
used for chemical research, those housed under Roodeplaat's banner were intended to be
used for biological research. Included under this banner was a laboratory dedicated to the
testing of both chemical and biological agents on animals. 14 This not only resulted in
Roodeplaat having a facility dedicated to breeding and maintaining these animals, but
also in the first signs of a certain instability in the segregated institutional structure of
Project Coast. All ofDelta-G's testing was done at Roodeplaat, immediately establishing
12 Testimony ofDr Wouter Basson to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 31 July 1998. Also see the testimony ofBarry Pithey at
Basson's criminal trial, as reported by Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Basson Trial Report 34, 6-10
November 2000.
13 Testimony ofDr Jan Lourens to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 8 June 1998. Lourens, it is worth noting here, was one of
the only men to apply for amnesty before the Special Hearing. His application formed the basis for the .
Commission's original enquiry. I return to this in the final chapter.
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a connection between two supposedly independent, unconnected research companies. IS
An even earlier coincidence established this connection, one unrelated to the actual
process of research at the two companies: the laboratory facilities of both Roodeplaat and
Delta-G were constructed at the same time, between 1983 and 1985, and used the same
individuals, recruited from within the Defence Force, to oversee their construction.
The particular ex-soldier who oversaw construction on both companies' premises
was Dr lan Lourens, an engineer affiliated first with the South African Air Force between
1982 and 1984 before being recruited by the medical wing of Special Forces. He
remained in this wing for a year, before moving across to Delta-G in 1985. Despite being
on Delta-G's payroll, he spent most of that year working at Roodeplaat, where he .
"assisted a number of scientists in manufacturing various types of equipment" while, at
the same time, working as "a site engineer on the construction phase" of both facilities. 16
When these two facilities were fully built, Lourens was offered ''the opportunity
of staying on as a site engineer, or leaving." Instead, as he told the Truth Commission
during its Special Hearing, he approached Wouter Basson, in his role as Project Coast's
Project Officer, and requested that he be allowed to leave with a part of the project" and
set up his own front company "that looked at the chemical defence side" of the research
programme. Basson acquiesced, and the company that Lourens formed in 1986, Systems
Research Development, was fully funded by the South African Defence Force. Lourens
14 See the testimony offered by Surgeon General Knobel at Basson's trial, as reported by Marlene Burger
and Chandre Gould, Basson Trial Report 6, nd. (November 1999)
IS Testimony ofDr Daan Goosen to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 11 June 1998.
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was thus the director of a third front company, after having been in the employ of another
while working on the premises of yet another front company. The blurring of the
boundaries between the front companies that his career, between the end of 1984 and the
beginning of 1986, illustrates was even more confused by his later career. Because, in
1987, Systems Research Development split into two and, while he remained a director of
that company, Lourens left to found still another front company, named Protechnik
Laboratories. 17 Although neither of these two companies operated on the scale of either
Delta-G or Roodeplaat, they both worked with each other, and with the other front
companies that constituted Project Coast's institutionalstructure. The incestuous nature
of these operations made it impossible for the separations between the various front
companies, and between those companies and the Defence Force, to operate neatly.
Much of this confusion can be perceived in the fact that neither Lourens's
directorships in several other companies, nor his employment history as a member of the
Defence Force and several front companies was in any way unique. Dr Philip Mijburgh,
the managing director of Delta-G from 1985 onwards, was also recruited out of the
Defence Force. He held at least seven directorships in Project Coast's front companies,
in addition to his role at Delta-G. 18 He was also connected directly to Lourens: they were
old friends from their military days, and Mijburgh had in fact been instrumental in
recruiting Lourens for Project Coast. It was Mijburgh who, in 1984, had introduced Jan
16 Lourens, 8 June 1998.
17 Lourens, 8 June 1998.
18 Testimony ofDr Philip Mijburgh to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 7 July 1998. Mijburgh, unlike Lourens, had to be coerced
into testifying to the Commission under threat of subpoena. Unlike Basson, however, Mijburgh was not
compelled by a court order. I return to this in the final chapter.
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Lourens to Wouter Basson -- the officer in direct command of Lourens during his time at
Special Forces. 19 Mijburgh and Basson, too, were also old friends: they had met in the
late 1970s, when Mijburgh was a medical student at the University of Pretoria and
Basson had returned there to complete his graduate work, after completing his national
service and enrolling in the Defence Force. "Over the years," Mijburgh reluctantly told
the Truth Commission, "we became friends and we shared an interest in road-running and
we ran together in the mornings and we also played squash, and socialised." Indeed,
almost all of the first circle of men employed in a senior position by one or another of
Project Coast's front companies felt that they shared a friendship with Wouter Basson:
another example being Dr Daan Goosen, the first managing director of Roodeplaat
Research Laboratories. He worked with Basson on a separate research project in the
early 1980s, and claimed to have been convinced of the need for chemical and biological
weapons research by the military through his conversations with Basson?O And while it is
possible to doubt the sincerity of each man's testimony, given as they were in a loosely
juridical context, it seems impossible to doubt that Basson occupied the centre of each of
their webs ofjustification.. He was their reference point.
And not merely the reference point for the justifications of the scientists and
administrators that fell beneath him in the chain of Project Coast's command. Basson
was also the reference point for the decisions regarding Project Coast's operations made
by his superior officers in the chain of military command. That chain of command, on
which Basson was but a rung, began with the State Security Council, the body which had
19 Lourens, 8 June 1998.
20 Goosen 11 June 1998.
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been instituted by Botha to operate as the ultimate head of all military and police
structures. The Council does not seem to have taken especial interest in the research
programme, and it left Project Coast largely alone. Instead, it delegated the authority to
run the research programme's operations further down the chain of military command.21
This authority was passed downwards from the office of the Minister ofDefence
on towards the office of the Chief of Military Command. This position was allocated on
the basis of a revolving five-year term. The general that occupied this office when
Project Coast was being planned, the general who occupied it while Project Coast was
being commissioned, and the general who occupied it when Project Coast was being
decommissioned were all, therefore, different individuals. General Constand Viljoen
occupied this office between 1980 and 1985 and, rather than take a direct interest in the
administration of Project Coast, appointed a co-ordinating committee to the task. He
chaired this committee but, unlike his successor, seems to have given it little concem.22
This committee was also too unwieldy to meet more often than once every two
months. Its decision-making powers were thus absolute, but its ability to gather the
information upon which those powers depended was limited. As a solution to this
dilemma, the committee decided to give Wouter Basson the title of Project Coast's
21 See the 1986 report of the State Security Council quoted during the testimonies of Dr Schalk Van
Rensburg, 10 June 1998, and Wouter Basson, 3I July 1998, to the South African Truth Commission's
Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare. In his testimony, Basson denied receiving any
detailed instructions from the Council. See also the Truth Commission's Special Hearing into the State
Security Council, 14 October 1997.
22 Burgess and Purkitt's monograph, The Rollback, pp 17-21, details the creation and composition of the
committee in more depth than is necessary here. Much of their information is based on interviews with the
ex-Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, and as such seems more comprehensive than that presented in the
Truth Commission's Special Hearing.
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"Project Officer" and appoint him to gather information on the Project's operations. He
would be expected to present this information to the committee at their regular meetings.
The committee would base their decisions on the information Basson presented, and then
would delegate him to process these decisions. The particular way in which the
committee went about gathering and interpreting data -- one of the central tenets of
modernist statecraft -- thus resulted in an unusual centralisation of power in the figure of
Project Coast's Project Officer, Wouter Basson. Indeed, it seems to indicate a further
delegation of the administrative responsibility for the Project away from the committee.23
Basson was the Committee's point of reference for every decision it made. He
was its only source of information, and the only agent it deputised. While Basson
claimed to have worked closely under the command of Surgeon General Nieuwoudt,
there is no evidence to support his contention that he operated under the Surgeon
General's close surveillance.24 Nieuwoudt, in fact, had died nearly ten years before
Basson told the Truth Commission that he had received all his orders from him. It seems,
therefore, as if Basson acted without constraints or limits throughout the period in which
Project Coast operated. He was at the exact centre of the Project's institutional structure:
he acted as mediator between senior officers and the scientists at work in the laboratories.
His was the only route through which information and instructions passed.
23 See the Testimony of Lt-Gen D.P. Knobel (Nieuwoudt's successor as Surgeon General) to the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 18
June 1998, for an inside account of this process. Describing Basson: "His word was accepted not only by
me but also by the co-ordinating management committee."
24 Basson, 31 July 1998.
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It is not surprising then that, given the autonomy Basson seemingly possessed, as
Project Officer of Project Coast, his role has attracted much of the serious attention given
to the chemical and biological weapons research programme. Stephen Burgess and
Helen Purkitt, in their monograph, described Basson as "a highly charis"matic and
effective recruiter who was apt at identifying and enlisting some of the most promising
and highly skilled medical researchers..." He was also a "master manager ofpeople.,,25
It was his ability to inspire and manipulate his researchers and administrators that held
Project Coast's unwieldy institutional structure together. The entire institutional order of
the chemical and biological weapons research programme therefore revolved around his
charisma, his authority, and his ability to motivate the men and women he employed.
The efficiency, and efficacy, of the research programme also depended on his ability to
focus this ability towards the production of quality research and weapons development.
This also meant, however, that Basson was not only unsupervised from above, but also
unquestioningly obeyed from below: a combination ofcircumstances that allowed him,
according the Burgess and Purkitt; to get away with substantial financial embezzlement.
The account ofBasson's actions that emerged during his criminal trial, these authors
stated, illustrated "the complex ways that CBW project managers may be able to exploit
transnational financial flows and international corporate instruments to quickly move,
launder, and house large sums of money for either political or personal motives.,,26 The
way in which Project Coast was ordered, aided this exploitation by removing all checks.
Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, in Secrets and Lies, make a similar argument. They,
25 Burgess and Purkitt, The Rollback, 16.
26 Burgess and Purkitt, The Rollback, 79
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too, describe Basson as occupying the center of Project Coast's institutional web, as the order of
their sub-title makes clear: "Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare
Programme".27 His influence shaped the limited successes enjoyed by the chemical and
biological weapons research programme; it also shaped the way in which the programme
degenerated into a spectacle of corruption and profiteering. This, at least, is how Burger and
Gould characterize the last days of Project Coast's operations, the period in which the various
front companies established at the beginning of the 1980s were rapidly and systematically
privatized. I cover this period more comprehensively in the fourth chapter of this thesis; it is
sufficient to say here that this characterization does not seem far from the truth. At question,
however, is the role played by Basson in this spectacle. Burger and Gould imply -- argue would
be too strong a characterization oftheir position -- that a tradition of financial corruption and
mismanagement was instituted by Basson and thus, because of his central position, was
disseminated through the institutional network of Project Coast. The structural order of the
chemical and biological weapons research programme, whatever the original intent behind its
particular formation, was thus so ideally suited to the institutionalization of corruption, and
misappropriation of resources that it could have been designed to abet it.
Both these works, The Rollback ofSouth Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare
Programme and Secrets and Lies, derive much of the information underpinning their
arguments from the same source: the case made by the prosecution during Basson's
criminal trial. Some words need to be said about the basis of this case, also dealt with
more closely in the final chapter of this thesis: the most important of which is the fact that
the charges laid by the prosecution, unlike those implicit in the Truth Commission's
Special Hearing, did not refer to Basson's "human rights violations." Instead, Basson
27 Burger and Gould, Secrets and Lies.
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was charged on several counts of murder and, more relevant to this chapter, of financial
embezzlement.28 The prosecution chose not to argue that Basson's actions as head of
Project Coast were in themselves reprehensible, as the Truth Commission's Final Report
itself implied, but rather that, in the course of those actions, he had abused the
institutional system of the research programme to enrich himself. The absence ofany
checks or balances on his autonomy had made this a relatively straightforward process.
The common bond between all three of these accounts is their description of the last
years of Project Coast. Basson is described as financially corrupt, as implicated in vast
mismanagement, and as having enriched himself at the state's expense; Project Coast's
institutional structure, and institutional order, made this a simple process, as Basson!s
actions were unchecked by any senior authority. His orders were also followed
faithfully, regardless of their implications. This picture seems to fit the evidence
gathered by the Prosecution in Basson's criminal trial, as well as much of that given in
testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.29 It does not seek to explain how
it was that Project Coast's particular institutional structure came to be designed; rather, it
short-circuits such explanation because it describes how that structure came to be used as
a tool to enable financial embezzlement. This becomes, in all three of their accounts, the
sole and only purpose of the particular structure, the particular order, of Project Coast. It
exists to make corruption possible; and therefore has always existed for this.
28 Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould's series ofBasson Trial Reports offers a sympathetic reporting of
the Prosecution's argument, as does the same authors' Secrets and Lies.
29 See Chapter Four of this thesis for a more detailed engagement with this period.
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But there is an alternative to describing the institutional structure of Project Coast
as nothing more than a smokescreen for corruption. This is to show that Project Coast's
structure - while certainly eccentric given its institutional setting - can in fact be
described in the more rigorous language of the Weberian ideal-types of institutions. This
language undergirds this thesis's descriptions ofthe state's long-standing bureaucratic
order. Although this language is evoked in the introduction to this thesis, it is worth
beginning this attempt to describe Project Coast through those types with a more detailed
portrayal of the ideal-type that animated that bureaucratic order. Central to this argument
is the fact that, for Weber, modem bureaucracies are only one ideal form of state order.
They are particularly modem, but exist besides others with older roots. I argue that it is
from one of those other orders that Project Coast derives its own order.
According to Weber, the bureaucratic institutions of the modem state derive their
claim to legitimacy from "a belief in the' legality' of normative rules and the right of
those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.,,3o These rules, in turn,
are rendered legal through an apparent and perceptible process of rational formulation
that begins with the self-consciously scientific collection of data, through censuses,
statistics, surveys, questionnaires, and so forth. 3l This information is interpreted by
experts, people trained to be knowledgeable in the subject under examination, and then
passed on from these experts in interpretation to those people who have been elected to
30 Max Weber, "The Pure Types of Legitimate Authority," extracted from his Theory ofSocial and
Economic Organization, translated by A.R. Henderson and Talcon Parsons (Macmillan, London: 1947) and
reprinted in Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago: 1968) pp 46.
3\ See Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," (1978) in Essential Works ofFoucault 1954-1984, vo!. 3:
Power edited by lames D. Faubion. (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 2000)
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political office as experts the field of public service: politicians. These politicians then
combine and, through an equally transparent and rational process, draw up the laws that,
in turn, legitimise the authority of the state's information collecting and processing
bureaus, as well as those bureaus that then apply the actions legitimised by this process.
These bureaus, classically, would include those responsible for the issuing of passports
and identity documents (and thus the issuing of citizenship itself) and those responsible
for the administration of public health, providing vaccinations, public hospitals, and
clinics.32
Essential to the rationality of these broadly legalistic grounds for state authority is
the impersonality ofthis order. The individuals who occupy decision-making positions
within this bureaucratic order, whether minor functionaries or senior politicians, are
expected to conduct themselves without personality, or partiality: their personal opinions
and beliefs do not enter into their decision-making equations, only the information
presented and interpreted by experts and their own expertise should determine their
decisions. Any sufficiently trained expert could fill the same position and, ideally, come
to the same decision on any action. The ideal bureaucrat is therefore anonymous in the
conduct of his or her job. The ideal bureaucrat is nothing other than his or her position.33
32 Weber, "The Pure Types of Legitimate Authority." Also see Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
o/Capitalism , translated by Talcott Parsons. (Alien and Unwin, London: 1930) for his account of the
historical origins of this fonn of authority. Foucault, "Governmentality," provides a different history
underlying a very similar description. The historical debate as to the origins of this modernist authority is
secondary to my aim here, which is simply to describe an ideal-type of bureaucracy.
33 See Michael Warner, The Letters o/the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth
Century America. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1990) shows how, in the American context, this
anonymity and impartiality developed: this provides yet another historical explanation for the rise of a
modem state structure, separate from both Weber and Foucault's explanations.
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Connecting these various layers of bureaucratic authority is a set of assumptions
about the nature of knowledge. The most crucial of these assumptions, for the purpose of
this section of the chapter at least, is that an individual can become an expert in a subject
through rigorous academic training, and that an expert acquires a body of abstract
knowledge through study, and then applies it in practice. This academic training does not
fully replace learning through practical experience; but it is preferred, at least when
appointing individuals to bureaucratic positions. This expertise allows them to replace
their personal beliefs with a rational examination of the evidence, because it allows these
bureaucrats to claim an understanding of the information presented to them by other
experts. This rationale underlies the management practice of all modern institutional
structures, including those that make up the modem state. The ideal-type manager has a
MBA, and the ideal-type researcher a post-graduate science degree.34 The practical result
of this kind of knowledge, of expertise in general, is specialisation. The manager is not
trained to be a researcher, and vice versa. The divisions between offices, so important to
the rationality of bureaucratic order, are kept clean and distinct.
It is also important to again emphasise, as Weber consistently does, that this
description is of an ideal construct rather than of the actual workings of any given
institution. Each of the ideological elements that make up this ideal construct can be
traced through various institutions, and through time, but the sum oftheir parts has
almost never existed in reality. It is the pattern against which modern institutional
structures have been measured. It has no space for historical contingency nor, to point to
34 Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited and translated by H.H.
Gerth and C. Wright Mills. (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1946)
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the simplest level of criticism, does it have any space for human incompetence - which,
as illustrated in the section above this, forms the core of the explanations presented by the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as well as by both major works published on the
subject, for the way in which the order of Project Coast was formed. And, while I would
certainly not argue against the importance of incompetence in the way in which Project
Coast's programmes worked over time, I do want to argue that incompetence cannot be
sufficient to explain the particular institutional structure of Project Coast. Rather, that
structure is an attempt to capture a different ideal-type of order; a particular order
grounded on what Weber has termed a "charismatic authority."
Charismatic authority does not derive its legitimacy from any rational system of
normative rules, practices, or precedents. Instead, it rests on a "devotion to the specific
and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of
the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.,,3s The exemplary charisma
of such an individual is not derived from a particular position in either a social or an
institutional order, nor is it derived from some kind of special expertise. Instead, it is
revealed at a specific time, and in a specific circumstance, to be present within one
individual. At this time, and in these circumstances, that individual is recognised by the
men and women who will come to follow him as possessing an inarguable authority.
Charismatic authority cannot be learned, or earned; it can only be revealed, and obeyed.
It should be clear that charismatic authority differs fundamentally from the legal,
normative, order undergirding modern bureaucracies. It does not rely on either the
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collection of information, or upon the expert interpretation of that information to
determine its priorities: they are revealed instead by the person possessed by charismatic
authority. It is also neither impersonal nor impartial: instead it is defined by both its
personal ity and its partial ity. Its reasoning is the antithesis of legal reas'oning.
Its institutional order, too, is opposed to the structures of bureaucracy. Where
bureaucrats are recruited for their expertise, their knowledge and the rational proof of
their competence, "the prophet has his disciples; the warlord his selected henchmen; the
leader, generally, his followers." These men and women are "not chosen on the basis of
social privilege nor from the point of view of domestic or personal dependency." Instead,
the men and women who surround a charismatic leader are chosen in terms of their own
charismatic qualities. From this arises the whole structure of charismatic authority: there
is no such thing as '''appointment' or 'dismissal,' no career, no promotion. There is only
a 'call' ... ,,36 Without possessing expertise, without following career paths either to rise or
to fall, the followers of a charismatic leader organise themselves by their own charisma.
Just as important as these individuals' own charisma, however, is the fact that
they organize themselves. Charismatic authority, it is important to remember, is not
constructed through the efforts of the charismatic leader: rather, it is recognised by the
men and women who choose to become that leader's followers as inhering in him or her.
The structure that emerges from a charismatic authority is thus constructed in a silent
3S Weber, "The Pure Types of Legitimate Authority," pp 46.
36 Max Weber, "The Nature ofCharismatic Authority and its Routinization," extracted from his Theory of
Social and Economic Organization, translated by A.R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Macmillan,
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collaboration between a leader and his or her followers. The leader's revelation is at the
centre of a web of unspoken instructions, authorization, and decisions. Both the leader
and his or her followers are complicit in the creation of this web. A charismatic leader's
follower follows out of a sense of his or her own duty to the leader's vision, ideals, and
quest. That duty cannot be given, Weber tells us, but can only be received and
recognised -- and so, in a way, that duty is constructed by both follower and leader.
There is no unbending structure to a charismatic order; only mutual complicity in action.
Project Coast's institutional order depended on the legitimising authority of this
ideal-type of institutional order, and of charismatic authority. Wouter Basson was the
charismatic leader at its heart. Burgess and Purkitt's description ofhim as a "master
manager of people" is thus at once accurate and far off the mark: Basson could inspire
and animate people, and his followers would rush to obey any instructions he might
verbalize, but he was not in any strict, Weberian sense a manager. He had no expertise,
no training, and no knowledge of managerial techniques. He was a charismatic leader,
not a gifted bureaucrat; and, if so, the style and structure of Project Coast's institutional
order grew organically around him. It certainly, to connect this briefly with the other
descriptions of that order offered in the other works on Project Coast, gave him the
autonomy to commit as many acts of financial appropriation as possible, but it gave him
that autonomy not as a flaw in its structure, and not because of bad management on any
particular individual's behalf, but rather because of the very particular ideal-type of
legitimate authority and order on which it was premised. Basson's word was absolute,
London: 1947) and reprinted in Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1968) pp 50.
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even if his position in the military's command structure was uncertain, because --
circularly -- his word had to be absolute. Its absoluteness was the rock on which the
authority of Project Coast was founded; the absolute and fundamental rightness of
Basson's charismatic authority legitimised any actions taken in his name.
And so, the institutional order of Project Coast must be seen as being as much
constructed by the efforts of Basson's disciples to fulfil his vision as it was constructed
either by him, or by the military institutions within which Project Coast found itself. Jan
Lourens's career within the institutional order of Project Coast serves as an illustration of
this mutual complicity in construction: after spending several years in various
engineering positions within the Defence Force, he was introduced into Basson's
charmed circle and came under his charismatic authority. Lourens then left the Defence
Force to join Delta-G, while at the same time working at Roodeplaat. When that work
was completed, he approached Basson with his own proposal for a new front company,
one that would fill an absence he had identified within the two principal research
companies. Lourens identified that absence; Lourens drew up the plans; Lourens
proposed the front company; and Lourens ran the company himself. Basson was only
consulted in this process -- but that consultation was essential to the smooth progress of
the process ofputting Lourens in charge of his own front company within Project Coast.
Without the legitimisation offered by that consultation, Lourens's companies, Systems
Research Development and the later Protechnik Laboratories, would not have been any
part of Project Coast. And yet, beyond that initial act of legitimisation, Basson played
very little role in the actual running ofeither of Lourens's front companies. He was on
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neither of their Boards of Directors. He did not regularly visit the companies' premises.
And, according to Lourens's own testimonyto the Truth Commission, Basson gave
Lourens few instructions on what technologies to investigate, or what product to make.37
Instead, he left those decisions to Lourens -- perhaps confident that Lourens would
understand the vision of a chemical and biological weapons research programme that he
shared with his followers, and also that Lourens would attempt to live up to that vision
without any additional prompting, management, or supervision. This confidence can be
seen as central to Weber's analysis ofthe mutual complicity of charismatic authority in
that it provides the self-reinforcing mechanism through which Basson's authority could
legitimise any action taken in his name by his followers, whether he ordered it or not.
But Wouter Basson, for all the particularity of his charismatic authority, was part
of a larger military structure. The military's institutional order was a cousin of a pure
bureaucratic order, also legitimised by a strict set of rationalised rules of tradition, of
expertise, and of technical knowledge that structure its chain of command. Unlike a
bureaucracy, however, the power that animated the military chain of command is strongly
centred in its executive core, the General Staff. (When South African scholars spoke of
the militarisation of the country, this concentration ofpower in a strong executive was
always invoked as illustration.38) Both military and bureaucratic orders required a strong
chain of command: each command given by a manager was not only legitimised by his or
her expertise, seniority, and position, but also by the records that were created to
37 Lourens, 8 June 1998.
38 See Cock and Nathan, War andSociety.
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explicitly position that command within the bureaucratic structure. 39 The same goes for
the military: each command was legitimised not only by the commanding officer's
superior understanding of the situation, but also by his or her ability to position that order
within a broader tactical strategy. In both these situations specific orders were given for
each specific situation, and the purpose of the traits of bureaucratic order -- expertise,
records, technical knowledge -- was to enable any given manager, or officer, to make
legitimate decisions. The purpose of charismatic authority is to do the same thing: to
enable Basson's disciples, his followers, to make legitimate decisions at any given time.
Differences lie in the absence of records, in the absence of expertise, in the absence of
consultation: Basson's charisma legitimised actions taken in his name. He was not called
on to administer each decision-making process; nor was he called upon to make those
decisions work; his implicit approval was sufficient to allow their making. Basson, in
other words, might have been a soldier; but his being a soldier was irrelevant to the way
in which his charisma operated. Basson's followers may have been largely soldiers,
liberated from the Defence Force; but their military training and rank was irrelevant to
the way in which each was invested with his legitimate charismatic authority.
An inevitable conclusion then is that the location of Project Coast within the
institutional order of the South African Defence Force was equally irrelevant to its
internal operations. We cannot explain the actions taken by the managers of each of
Project Coast's front companies by their position within the military's hierarchy; nor can
we explain the development of the research programme at Project Coast's core by
reference to the military's strategic aims. But no more can we explain these actions, and
39 Weber, "Bureaucracy."
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this development, by recourse to a bureaucratic ideal: the rationales for these were not set
at the beginning of Project Coast's operation, nor were they based on rationalised, and
recorded, principles. Instead, the late Apartheid state's chemical and biological weapon
research programme, as well as the institutional structure in which it was located,
developed over time, in response to internal pressure of Wouter Basson's charismatic
authority. The way in which the research programme developed is only explicable in
terms of the development of the institutional structure of Project Coast.
The next chapters of this thesis, then, must describe this development as it
unfolded over the decade-long period in which Project Coast operated. The second
chapter, immediately following this, focuses its narrative on the development of one front
company, Delta-G Scientific, and on the principal research project carried out under its
aegis, a project that resulted in the production of a new form of tear gas. The chapter
following that, the third chapter of this thesis, uses the same structure to examine a
different front company, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, and a different research
project, this one aimed at the production of a new form of contraceptive. These two
institutions were the earliest and largest of Project Coast's front companies, and the two
research projects described in detail were the largest such project carried out at these
institutions. The development of the institutional order of the chemical and biological
weapons research programme, Project Coast, and the development of the ambitions
underlying that research programme are intertwined, and will be studied in this way.
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Chapter Two
Chemical Weapons Research and "Crowd Control"
Once the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission had completed its
Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, it placed its conclusions into its
Final Report. In this work it became clear that the Commission had great difficulty in
accepting the triumphalist narrative presented by Dr Wouter Basson, and others. Project
Coast, the Commission concluded, had been an overwhelming failure. The only
exception to this rule, the Report admitted, was the production of a new, stronger and
more efficient, form of tear gas at Delta-G, the first of Project Coast's front companies to
be established. The new tear gas was named "CR" and had successfully been designed as
a replacement for the gas then in use, "CS."!
This chapter therefore is first an attempt to describe the one successful research
project carried out under the aegis of the state's chemical and biological weapons
research programme: That project, aimed at producing a new form oftear gas, was
noteworthy not only for is unusual success, but also for the unusual history of its
development. The research that allowed Project Coast's front company, Delta-G, to
produce a new form oftear gas did not originate within any of the structures of the late
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Apartheid state's chemical and biological weapons research programme. The initial
research was instead conducted under the command of Lothar Neethling, the head of the
South African Police's forensic laboratories. The second aspect of this chapter must
therefore be an attempt to describe the special relationship that existed between Lothar
Neethling, as a representative ofthe Police, and Delta-G, a front company for the South
African Defence Force. The final aspect of this chapter's examination of the chemical
weapons research project that ended in the production of a new form of tear gas is thus an
attempt to determine whether the particular institutional history of the project's
development had any impact on the product, or on the way in which it was to be used.
The tripartite ambition structuring this chapter requires a similarly broad use of
the theoretical perspectives already proposed in both the Introduction and the previous
chapter. The militarisation of the state's institutions may help to explain how it was that
Lothar Neethling, as the head of the Police's forensic laboratories, came to begin his own
chemical weapons research programme. The tensions between this militarisation, the
bureaucratic order of scientific research, and the charismatic authority undergirding the
larger structure of Project Coast, surely help to describe the conflicting ambitions that
helped to determine the nature of the research project. But, despite these theoretical
influences, any account of the development of this research project, and of its underlying
implications, must begin with a history of Delta-G Scientific, the institution within which
the late Apartheid state's chemical and biological weapons research programme
succeeded in producing a new form of tear gas. This account can be no exception:
I South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Special Investigation into Project Coast: South
Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme," Final Report, Volume 2, Chapter 6, Sub-Section
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Delta-G Scientific was founded early in 1982, the first of Project Coast's many
front companies. It was designed to provide a set of laboratory facilities within which the
chemical side of the state's chemical and biological weapons research programme could
be developed. Only chemical weapons research was intended to take place at Delta-G;
all other sides of the research programme were to be developed in other institutions.2
This foundational attempt helped to determine the institutional structure ofDelta-G, but
no more than the financial, administrative, and material constraints that surrounded the
front company during its first years ofoperation. The most notable of these constraints,
and perhaps the most important, was the lack of a separate research facility: for the first
three years of its operation, between early 1982 and early 1985, Delta-G Scientific, a
nominally-independent front company, operated out of a small laboratory located in the
Headquarters ofthe South African Defence Force's Special Forces division. 3 For the
first years of its operation, Delta-G Scientific was limited in the scale of research it could
embark upon within the cramped, borrowed, laboratory facility available. It was also
constrained in another way by its location within Special Forces Headquarters: for the
first years of its operation, Delta-G Scientific could only employ members of the Defence
Force's various operational branches as its researchers, administrators, and managers.
(c).
2 Testimony ofDr Wouter Basson to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 31 July 1998. Also see the testimony ofBarry Pithey at
Basson's criminal trial, as reported by Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Basson Trial Report 34, 6-19
November 2000.
3 Testimony ofDr Jan Lourens to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 8 June 1998.
54
The most pressing of the reasons underlying this constraint is also the most
obvious: the illusion of Delta-G's independence, and of the distance between the military
and its research programme, could not be maintained as long as the company operated
out of a laboratory located within a military building. It could not convince commercial
researchers to work for it as long as it was so clearly dependent on the military's support,
not without completely blowing its own cover story. Instead, the institution recruited
loyal scientists from within the military and produced, for the same reasons, as few
commercial products as possible.4 This is not to say that no research was conducted in
this period: indeed, the research into a new form of tear gas -- the focal point of this
chapter -- was begun in this period. But until the construction ofDelta-G's new
laboratory facility was completed, the reseach work conducted by the front companY's
staff was constrained by the circumstances in which it was forced to operate.
These constraints may explain why, in 1985, when Delta-G moved to its new
location and began to recruit commercial and academic scientists to its staff, the first
wave of its new employees found "a horror show in incompetence" on display.5 Not all
of the scientists entering the company -- such as, for example, Dr Hennie Jordaan, the
man who gave the quote above -- were informed of its role within the Defence Force.
Despite their ignorance of this particular matter, this infusion ofprofessionalised science
that these commercial scientists brought with them seems to have revitalised the
4 See the testimony ofGerald Caldwell at Basson's criminal trial, as reported by Burger and Gould, Basson
Trial Report 34,6-10 November 2000, for background to this period.
S Dr Hennie Jordaan quoted in Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and
South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Zebra Press, Cape Town: 2002) pp 22. See
also Jordaan's testimony at Basson's criminal trial, as reported by Burger and Gould, Basson Trial Report
25, 11-17 August 2000.
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company. By the middle of the next year, 1986, Oelta-G was flourishing. Its first major
research project, the research into a new form of tear gas, was bearing fruit and it was
about to embark on a highly ambitious research project that would build on this early
success.6
In the same period Oelta-G had also undergone an administrative transformation.
The founding Managing Director, Or Willie Basson (not a relation of Wouter Basson, but
merely a colleague in the Medical Services of the South African Defence Force), was
replaced by Dr Philip Mijburgh. Mijburgh, like Willie Basson, had previously been a
medical doctor working within the Defence Force's Medical Services under the operative
command of Wouter Basson. Mijburgh was also a good friend of Wouter Basson's from
'their shared period at the University of Pretoria, during the late 1970s.7 His appointment
was justified by vague allegations of mismanagement on Willie Basson's part, but none
of the testimonies to either the Truth Commission or to the bench in Wouter Basson's
criminal trial have addressed exactly what that mismanagement involved. It seems
instead as if Mijburgh was appointed to provide a new face for the front company. If so,
his appointment served its purpose: Delta-G remained undetected as a front company.
And so, in 1986, Delta-G's confidence was at a height. It was proving successful
both as research institution and as way ofdistancing the Defence Force from the weapons
research that it had initiated. It should have been on the verge of realising the ambitions
6 Testimony ofDr Johannes Matteus Koekemoer to the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 9 June 1998.
7 Testimony ofDr Philip Mijburgh to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 18 July 1998.
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of the Defence Force. Instead, the next few years of its operations were marked by a
steady degradation in the quality of the research produced in its facilities. The scientists
employed in 1985 gradually left the company. No new products were developed. In
1991, Delta-G was privatised by the late Apartheid state, at a large loss. 1986 was
therefore in fact the height of Delta-G's operations -- a height which it never regained.
Its subsequent collapse is studied in the fourth chapter of this thesis. This chapter is
concerned with the research work conducted during its brief productive period.
The focus of my examination of Delta-G's research work is the research
conducted within its laboratories into developing a new form of tear gas. Any study of
this particular research project must be grounded in an examination of the remainder of
the front company's research work. As Delta-G was designed to provide a space for
Project Coast's chemical weapons research, it goes without saying that the framing
context for all the research conducted was that form of chemical research. Within that
framing context, the kinds of chemical research conducted can be split into two parts:
offensive research, aimed at developing weapons, and defensive research, aimed at
developing protection against these weapons. It was the repeated contention of all the
scientists and administrators at the Truth Commission's Hearing that Delta-G's principal
purpose was to provide defensive research.8 Ofall these scientists and administrators,
however, only one could testify to direct involvement in such work -- and the bulk ofhis
8 Some examples: Koekemoer, 9 June 1998. Mijburgh, 18 July 1998. Basson, 31 July 1998.
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work was done outside the institutional structure of Delta-G.9 It is therefore more likely
that the bulk of the work done at Delta-G was directed at producing chemical weapons.
Nonetheless, a certain amount of defensive chemical research was conducted at
Delta-G during its period of operations. It is difficult, as Wouter Basson and his lawyers
repeatedly argued during his criminal trial, to tell the difference between research
intended to produce weapons for use in warfare, and research intended to produce
weapons for use in testing newly-developed protective measures. lO Some of the
chemicals produced within Delta-G may have been used to test the protective suits
developed by Dr Jan Lourens's two researching front companies, Systems Research
Development and Protechnik Laboratories. In neither of his testimonies to the Truth
Commission and to the bench in Basson's criminal trial did Lourens mention witnessing
such a test. 11 This does not rule out the possibility that it occurred. Delta-G also
possessed analytical capabilities, and there is some evidence that they were used in
attempts to identify possible chemical substances that might have been used against
troops in Angola i~ the early part of the 1980s.12 Despite the protestations of the
company's managing director, Dr Philip Mijburgh, it does not appear as though this
aspect of Delta-G's operations was ever the largest part of the research work conducted.
9 Lourens, 8 June 1998. Lourens's companies, Systems Research Development and Protechnik
Laboratories, both manufactured protective suits for the Defence Force.
10 An example is reported in Burger and Gould, Basson Trial Report 20(a), 12-24 May 2000.
11 Lourens, 8 June 1998. Also the reported testimony of Jan Lourens in Burger and Gould, Basson Trial
Report 20(a), 12-24 May 2000.
12 Koekemoer, 9 June 1998.
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Instead, that dubious honour was reserved for a particular branch of offensive
chemical weapons research conducted by the company's scientists, that which involved
the production of a variety of chemical gases aimed at controlling insurgent crowds. This
research itself had two major components, of which the first was the production of a new
form of tear gas. The second was the production of a range of gases intended to alter the
mood of an insurgent crowd, to pacify the individuals within that crowd without the use
of armed force by temporarily altering their brain chemistries. 13 The chemicals that
Delta-G's scientists proposed to use included methaqualone, the active ingredient in the
street-drug Mandrax, as well as MDMA, the active ingredient in the street-drug Ecstasy,
and THe, the active chemical in marijuana. Between 1987 and 1991, experiments were
conducted on placing each of these drugs into tear gas grenades. Animal tests were also
conducted, in an attempt to determine the effects of these drugs in this form. The
experiments, and the tests, bore no immediate fruit. And, instead of continuing with the
research, the administrators and scientists working on this particular research project
seemed to part ways: the administrators pushing for newer, and more expensive,
approaches to the task while, at the same time, the scientists lost all interest in
continuing. 14 This approach was a failure, but the earlier attempts by the same group of
scientists to produce a new form of tear gas were successful. These two projects
accounted for the bulk of the chemical weapons research conducted at Delta-G's labs.
13 Testimony ofLt-Gen (Dr) Lothar Neethling to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 9 June 1998.
14 Koekemoer, 9 June 1998, provides a detailed overview ofthis process from his perspective as a scientist
who believed in the project's utility and possibilities. See also Mijburgh, 18 July 1998, for the
administration's perspective. Although their stories diverge predictably on the issues of responsibility, the
narrative offered above draws on the convergences between their stories.
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And, although the research into various forms of crowd controlling gases was
never the only work conducted at Delta-G, it was the most successful chemical weapons
research project conducted within the company. While the attempt to create a crowd
controlling gas out of street drugs did not produce a final agent, the attempt to create a
new form of tear gas did in fact bear fruit. IS The later attempt to turn street drugs into
chemical weapons was founded on this success, even to the extent of using the same
researching scientists. 16 The success of this particular research project is problematic,
however, because it was also the only research project not to have been initiated within
the confines of Delta-G, Project Coast, or the South African Defence Force. Instead, as I
stated at the beginning of this chapter, the initial research work for this project was done
under the aegis of the South African Police's forensic laboratories. The problem that this
fact poses is theoretically simple: the purpose of a police force, in any given state, is
separate and distinct from the purposes of a military force. The one is concerned with the
policing of the law of a state within its territory, and takes as its object that state's
subjects; the other is concerned with the imposition of one state's power onto another
state's territory, and takes as its object that other state's own military forces. In practice,
however, this distinction is always harder to make; and in South Africa, in the 1980s, and
at the height of the militarisation of the state's institutional order, that distinction is still
harder to make. I? Despite this practical caveat, the origins of this form of chemical
weapons research within the institutions of the South African Police is still a problem for
15 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Volume 2, Chapter 6 (c).
16 Koekemoer, 9 June 1998.
17 Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, War and Society: The Militarisation ofSouth Africa (David Phillip,
Cape Town: 1989) remains the best overview ofthis argument. Nathan's article, "Troops in the
Townships" in that volume, details some ofthe ways in which the separation between the tasks of policing
and of waging war was eroded in the mid-1980s.
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the argument of this thesis about the nature of the state's weapons research programme.
For this reason, as well as for the purpose of describing the development of Delta-G's
own tear gas research project, the origins of this research must be detailed.
The South African Police's limited chemical weapons research programme was
begun at the initiative of one man, Lothar Neethling, the head of the Police's principal
forensic laboratories in Pretoria. Although Neethling rose to the rank of General in the
Police soon after beginning this project, he never saw himself as a career officer, or a
natural policeman -- during the Truth Commission's Special Inquiry he emphasised his
training as an agricultural scientist, and called himself a "pseudo Policeman."
Nonetheless, he rose rapidly through the ranks of the Police, at least in part due to his
enthusiasm for his work: it "suited my temperament very well" as he told the
Commission. ls Significantly, Neethling seems to have been allowed to conduct his work
without much interference. Indeed, the structure of the Police's forensic laboratories
seems to have been largely separate from the ordinary command structures. This gave
Neethling the autonomy to turn his laboratory structures away from the simple provision
of forensic analysis to the production of a new form of tear gas, intended to provide the
Police with a tool to use against insurgent groups. It is worth noting here that, at the
beginning of his research at least, Neethling claimed to have worked without any support
from the institutional structures of the South African Police, or from his commanding
officers. His own ignorance of the work of policing, as he described it, seems to have
separated him from the institutional order within which he was working. The similarity
18 Testimony of Lt-Gen Lothar Neethling to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 11 June 1998.
61
between the order of his own research programme, and the charismatic order of Project
Coast under Wouter Basson, is notable, ifnot particularly revealing. It is possible to
describe Neethling as a charismatic leader in his own right -- which may explain the
process by which his work came to be integrated into the ambitions of Project Coast.
Neethling began his research "without," as he later told the Truth Commission,
"any awareness on my side that there would be any possible interest from the Defence
Force." Some of this ignorance may be explained by the fact that Neethling began to
conduct his research into tear gas in 1977, three full years before the South African
Defence Force initiated Project Coast. And it was not until three years after that, towards
the end of 1983, that Neethling received any indication of the Defence Force's interest,
when he was summoned to a meeting between himself, the Commissioner of the South
African Police, the Minister of Law and Order, and the Surgeon General. In his account
of that meeting, Neethling claimed to have been asked to "assist... in providing Dr
Basson, who had a firm with the name of Delta-G, with substances... for the combating of
unrest, and [for] crowd control...,,19 Neethling went on to tell the Truth Commission that,
as this stated aim dovetailed with his own conviction, forged in the aftermath of the 1976
Soweto Uprising, that the Police needed to use less lethal weapons if it wanted to control
similar insurgencies, he fully acquiesced to this request. This meeting, held in 1983, is
the only evidence Neethling, or anyone else, presented to the Truth Commission for the
existence of an official connection between the military and the Police. This suggests
that, for much of its existence, the work Neethling initiated was not driven by an
interdisciplinary drive, but rather by Neethling's technical interest in the use of tear gas
62
within the context of policing. His ignorance of the daily work of policing may also help
explain why it was that "riot control" occupied so much of his attention. Even if this is
an over-interpretation, one thing is clear: the research that Neethling began was intended
for use by the South African Police up until 1983, when it was handed over to Wouter
Basson, Delta-G, and the South African Defence Force.
This process began in the aftermath of the 1983 meeting, when Neethling allowed
the Surgeon General to set up a meeting between him and Wouter Basson, in which he
would pass over the results of his own research to Basson. The meetings following this
are not recorded in any of the available sources, but at least one aspect of them is clear
from the later records: the pretence that Basson was simply a representative of the firm,
. Delta-G, did not last long. Within the next years, Neethling became a constant presence
within the corridors of that company, as well as appearing in several other of the front
companies.2o He also assisted in conducting tests of the chemical agents produced at
Delta-G throughout the remainder of the decade. But, despite this later relationship with
Basson and Project Coast, at the time of the meeting Neethling was in no way a part of
the Defence Force's research order. The constraints that shaped the way in which he had
conducted his research up until 1983, and the aims that had suggested the approaches he
had followed up to this point, were not those ofthe state's chemical and biological
weapons research programme, and neither were they those of the Defence Force itself.
The foundation upon which Project Coast's research into producing a new fonn of tear
19 Neethling, 11 June 1998.
20 See Koekemoer, 9 June 1998, for Delta-G, and the testimony ofDr Schalk Van Rensburg to the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 9
June 1998, for an account ofNeethling's presence at Roodeplaat.
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gas rested, then, was formed by the requirements of the Police, and particularly by the
requirements of the Police's "riot control" unit. The most important aspect of this
foundation, for the purposes of this chapter, is also the most basic: the South Africa
Police, and its "riot control" unit, worked within the borders of the South African state.
The subjects upon which its authority was exercised were the subjects of the South
African state. Due to its institutional location within the Defence Force, Project Coast's
scientists were expected to create products that would be used outside of the border of
South Africa, and on the armed forces of other states, other countries. The way in which
the scientists employed at Delta-G addressed this core contradiction helped to determine
the nature of the only success the p.roject enjoyed. To understand that nature, then, the
history ofthe research programme needs to begin with Neethling's own research; and
thus with the problem that animated his initial work, the efficacy of tear gas as a crowd
control agent.
In the late 1970s, when Neethling began his research, the South African Police
were using grenade-like canisters to release tear gas. These canisters were either lobbed
into the crowd by hand or fired into the air, from which they would then fall into the
crowd. They worked by igniting a portion of the CS compound which then burned into a
thick gas. The canisters would, ideally, be within the bounds of the crowd as the gas was
released - thus saturating the crowd with the gas, rather than the police attempting to
flush the crowd out.21 This mechanism had been in common use internationally for some
decades and, according to Neethling's testimony, had recently been superseded by a new
21 Eric Croddy, with Clarisa Perez-Amendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A
Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (Copemicus Books, New York: 2002) esp. pp 116-123.
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distributive mechanism. This new mechanism was not based on the explosive force of
grenade-like canisters, but rather on the steady pressure exerted by an aerosol spray. As
far as Neethling was concerned, these tear gas aerosols were the wave of the future and
would, if he could just develop them, immediately address the most pressing of the
problems he had identified: namely, that the tear gas used by the South African Police
was inefficient, both in its formulation and in its actual use. He told that Truth
Commission that " .. .if you put it [tear gas] into a smoke formulation you destroy the
active ingredients, and that's a big problem... 85% is being burned. It's as good as taking
a roll of money and burning it.,,22 An aerosol, unlike a tear gas c·anister, did not burn a
portion of the chemical compound at its core. For Neethling, these aerosols were the first
step towards improving the efficiency of the Police's use of tear gas against an insurgent
crowd. Some explanation illustrates why.
If the technology underlying the tear gas canisters in use could be likened to that
underlying grenades, then that underlying aerosol dispensers could be liked to that of
household sprays:. cooking sprays, deodorants, and insect repellent. Like those sprays, the
tear gas aerosols worked by suspending CS powder into a liquid solution, and then
pressurising that solution. When the pressure was released - in a household spray by
depressing a button or, as in this case, releasing a seal - the liquid would be rapidly
expelled from the aerosol. The stream of liquid would almost immediately evaporate into
its gaseous form, which would then saturate the crowd at which the aerosol had been
aimed. The rate of release, as well as the efficiency of that release, was substantially
faster than that produced by a tear gas canister. Aerosols, too, since they did not rely on
22 Neethling, 11 June 1998.
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the partial consumption of the active material, were cheaper. The final advantage of
aerosol dispensers over the grenade-like canisters oftear gas was simple in theory, if
rather less so in practice: aerosols, unlike canisters, could be aimed, controlled, and shut
down if they threatened their wielders. Tear gas aerosols were therefore not only more
efficient in that they consumed less of their chemical compounds in the distribution of the
tear gas, but also in that they were less of a danger to the officers that wielded them.23
Neethling therefore began his attempt to modernise the South African Police's use
of tear gas by developing an imitation of the aerosol system he had seen other countries
use in "riot control". The introduction of these aerosols would, he argued, increase the
efficiency of an officer's response to an insurgent crowd by both increasing the volume
of gas in circulation and by allowing that officer to direct the flow of the gas away from
his or her compatriots. The success of this initial project was rapid and significant: by
1982 tear gas aerosols were standard equipment for Police use during attempts to control
insurgent crowds. But the success of this project should not be allowed to obscure the
other project Neethling had embarked upon when he began his research work in 1977, the
project in which he aimed to develop a new form of tear gas. For all its efficacy, the
development of tear gas aerosols was never intended as anything other than a stop gap
measure. The true improvement in the efficiency of the Police's operational use of tear
gas would come through the development of a new gas that would be both a more
efficient chemical formulation, and also a more effective weapon.24 The rationale that
23 Croddy et ai, Chemical and Biological Warfare. See also: Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher
Form ofKilling: The Secret Story ofGas and Germ Warfare (Chatto & Windus, London: 1982) Neethling,
11 June 1998, details how he explained these technical differences.
24 Neethling, 11 June 1998.
66
lay beneath this second branch ofNeethling's own chemical weapons research
programme was the same as the rationale that lay beneath his production of aerosol
sprays: to modernise the Police's "riot control" units by developing products that would
work more efficiently, more effectively, and with a greater degree of precision.
There is no evidence that, when the research conducted by Neethling in the
Police's forensic laboratories was handed over to the military researchers at Delta-G, at
the end on 1983, the rationale constraining Neethling's research was replaced by any
rationale more suited to the possible military use of tear gas. There is little information
about the period between 1983 and 1985, during which Delta-G's scientists were located
within the Special Force's Headquarters in Pretoria, except that these scientists
succeeding in extending Neethling's research into the production the first test quantities
of a new tear gas.25 For the period after the front company had moved into its new
premises, and had begun to hire researchers from outside of the military, however, more
sources of information are available. The most revealing of these sources is the
testimony given during the Truth Commission's Special Hearing by Dr Johannes
Koekemoer, the scientist who headed Delta-G's research into the refining, and then
production, of this new form oftear gas. Like Neethling, he also claimed to have never
had any doubts as to what his research was intended to produce: "a riot control agent."
The only difference in his testimony was environmental: that riot control agent was not
necessarily designed for use within South Africa. He told the Truth Commission that he
had joined Delta-G in the belief that his research was going to benefit South African
2S Lourens, 8 June 1998. Also the testimony of Gerald CaldweII during Basson's criminal trial, as reported
in Burger and Gould, Basson Trial Report 34, 6 - 10 November 2001.
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soldiers stationed in Angola. Therefore, he argued, all of his work was intended for use
outside South Africa's borders, even including the research into a new form of tear gas.26
The actual process of Koekemoer' s research, at least as he described it, did not
require him to give much regular thought to the purpose underlying his work. The
conceptual framing had been already completed when he entered Delta-G, initiated by
Neethling and then cemented by the military researchers under Dr Willie Basson's
directorship. Instead, Koekemoer's principal task was to refine the experimental batches
of the new tear gas already produced. This, in itself, would not necessarily prevent a
scientist from closely considering the targets against which the new form oftear gas
would be used, if only so as to determine what exactly a refined version of the gas would
be required to achieve. Koekemoer, however, claims to have given little thought to this
aspect of his work. He chose to focus his attention, instead, on simply improving the
efficiency of the chemical reaction: making the tear gas work faster, and more violently.
The closest his research seems to have come to considering the physical impact of this
new form of tear gas on its targets was a series ofexperiments conducted on baboons.27
Dr Jan Lourens witnessed one of these experiments, and described it to the Truth
Commission. He began by warning the Commission that "it wasn't a fantastically
scientific experiment in the sense of particular measurements or blood samples being
taken." An open wire cage was used to house a single baboon. Lourens told the
Commission that he did not know whether it was male or female, adult or juvenile. Once
26 Koekemoer, 9 June 1998.
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the baboon had been locked in and the observing party withdrawn to a judicious distance,
a grenade-like tear gas canister was "chucked into the cage." Once in the cage, the
canister "released the tear gas" and the observing scientists watched its effects on the
baboon. As far as Lourens was concerned, "that really was the extent of the
experiment.,,28 The scientists present watched as a heavy grey fog of tear gas poured out
of the grenade-like canister. The gas would in fact have consisted of a fine grey powder
that would have settled on the baboon's exposed skin, in its open eyes, and in its open
mouth. The tear gas compound would then proceed, in Koekemoer's phrase, to "bum the
blue devil out" of anything it had touched. If the baboon had tried to wash itself in an
attempt to cool the burning, one of the new innovations that Neethling, the military
scientists, and Koekemoer had included in this particular form oftear gas would kick in.
The new form of tear gas developed by Delta-G would not be diluted in the presence of
water, but rather reactivated once more. Washing would only enhance and prolong its
effects.29 At no point did either Lourens, or Koekemoer, attempt to associate the effects
of the new tear gas on the experimental baboon with the effect it would have in the field.
Instead when Koekemoer, during his testimony to the Truth Commission, turned
his attention to the effects of this new tear gas, he once again spoke only of these effects
in impersonal terms: while being "about 10 times as active as CS", the new tear gas was
also "about one third as toxic" -- it's "toxicity level on inhalation" being "about seven
27 Koekemoer, 9 June 1998. See also Koekemoer's testimony during Basson's criminal trial, as reported in
Burger and Gould, Basson Trial Report 04, 29 October - 1 November 1999.
28 Lourens, 8 June 1998.
29 Koekemoer, 9 June 1998.
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point five grams per kilogram.,,3o This meant nothing more than that the newer tear gas
was less poisonous than the older tear gas, which was only an indication that the long-
term effects of exposure to this form of tear gas would be less serious than those brought
upon by exposure to the older CS tear gas, which include blindness and asthma.3!
Koekemoer had no more to say about the effects of the new tear gas upon human
subjects. Instead, he indicated to the Truth Commission that he had in fact had some
doubts about the advisability of the gas's use. "It has a very persistent effect on the
environment," he told the Truth Commission, "that's why I can't see that it can be used
as a riot control agent, because if you've contaminated an area for the next five years
anything -- if you come into contact with soil it will still have an irritant effect on you."
This he believed was why he would not have recommended its use in action.32
Koekemoer's reservations seem to have been heard, ifnot necessarily accepted.
When Lothar Neethling testified to the Truth Commission, two days after Koekemoer,
the Commission's representative asked him to respond to this part ofKoekemoer's story.
Neethling's response was simple: "Mr Koekemoer doesn't know much about this." His
assessment, Neethling went on to say, was unfounded and untested. As far as he was
concerned, he told the Commission, "I had no concern whatsoever that there could
possibly be traces of CR in the environment after I had thrown a CR or tear gas grenade.
It would not hurt anybody, it wouldn't make a frog sing..." He knew this, he continued,
because he had been part of a team that had, in fact, tested the environmental impacts of
30 Koekemoer, 9 June 1998.
31 Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form ofKilling. Croddy et ai, Chemical and Biological Warfare.
32 Koekemoer, 9 June 1998. .
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the new form of tear gas that Delta-G had produced: "we saturated areas with CR in
Malierskop where a week later we operated, and nobody even complained of an itch...,,33
This was not the only operational experiment conducted on the new form of tear
gas developed at Delta-G. Neither was it the only such experiment conducted without the
participation ofKoekemoer, and his research team. And nor was it the only such
experiment conducted with the integral participation of Lothar Neethling -- who was,
after all, a senior general in the South African Police and played no official role within
any of Project Coast's institutions. Neethling's testimony to the Truth Commission
revealed his participation in a second operational experiment, designed to test the
effectiveness of the new tear gas, CR, in action. The immediate cause for Neethling's
disclosure of this experiment was a desire to discredit Koekemoer's claim to scientific
authority: he could not understand the effects of the gas he had refined, Neethling
claimed, because he had "not yet walked through the smoke ofa [tear gas] grenade"
whereas Neethling himself had done just that. He told the Truth Commission that he had
walked through a sealed chamber filled with the tear gas and found that "there were no
ill-effects afterwards." It was for this reason, he said, that he believed that CR was
perfectly safe for use against human targets. He had survived it unscathed; so too could
other exposed individuals.34
Beyond providing further illustration of the extent to which a close working
relationship existed between Neethling, as a senior general in the South African Police,
33 Neethling, 11 June 1998.
34 Neethling, 11 June 1998.
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and the administrators of Delta-G, as a covert part of the South African Defence Force,
this particular experiment also points towards the problem of separating the use of tear
gas in policing from the use of tear gas in warfare. Neither the stated ambitions of
Neethling -- to produce a more efficient tear gas for the use of the Polic'e -- nor the stated
ambitions of Koekemoer -- to refine "a riot control agent" for use in Angola -- included
any interest in the effect of the new tear gas on isolated individuals. Nonetheless, the fact
that such an experiment was conducted illustrates something of the bifurcated vision of
the targets of the tear gas produced by Delta-G: on the one hand, it was intended to be
used against large groups of people; on the other hand, the majority ofexperiments
recalled for, and recounted at, the Truth Commission's Special Hearing were designed to
test the effect of the chemical agent on isolated individuals. To be sure, tear gas is
intended to forcibly separate individuals from each other within a crowd, thus allowing
the Police, or the Defence Force, to arrest or otherwise forcibly control those individuals.
Nonetheless, none of the tests described at the Truth Commission's hearing tested this
particular means: except for one test, all of these experiments tested the chemical
compound's effec~ivenessagainst lone individuals. The one exception to this rule was
the tests conducted as Malierskop during a large-scale troop manoeuvre. But even then,
the test's purpose was not so much to determine the efficacy of the gas in splitting a
crowd, but rather to determine what its long standing effects on the environment would
be. These tests, at least as recounted to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, seem
to reveal a deep-seated uncertainty as to CR's use.
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A brief examination of the environmental tests conducted at Malierskop, as
described by Lothar Neethling, may help resolve this problem. While the importance of
these tests for both Koekemoer and for Neethling's testimonies to the Truth Commission
seemed to lie in their different claims to expertise, the existence ofthese tests also reveals
a particular assumption underlying both of their work on tear gas. First, a note of
clarification: tear gas is not sprayed onto the soil, but rather into the air around a group of
people standing on the soil. The group of people is the primary target of a normal tear
gas manoeuvre, the air around them is the medium in which the gas is released, and soil
beneath them is irrelevant. CR tear gas, like any other chemical weapon, saturates the
soil when it filters down from the air in the same way as it saturates the exposed surfaces
of individual bodies in a crowd -- it does not, however, react with the soil under normal
circumstances. It is therefore possible that a film of reactive chemical could persist in the
soil after the tear gas has ceased to react on the skins of the individuals in a crowd; that
chemical film could react on the skins of any person who then happened to come into
contact with that soil.35 The purpose of the Malierskop tests, as described in Neethling's
testimony to the Truth Commission, was to determine for how long the chemical residue
remained active in inert soil, and for how long an area would have to be quarantined
before it was safe.36 Implicit in such an experiment is the assumption that the land above
which tear gas is used will be lived on soon after the gas has been used; and, also, that the
South African state, as the users of the chemical agent, was responsible for the safety of
that land's occupants. These are perfectly ordinary assumptions for the Police to make,
in that the land over which they would release tear gas would be the territory of the South
35 See Koekemoer, 9 June 1998, as well as Croddy, et ai, Chemical and Biological Warfare.
36 Neethling, 11 June 1998.
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African state, and in that the targets of their original tear gas attack would be subjects of
that state, as would be the affected occupants of that land. But the Defence Force would
not, ideally, have to make the same set of assumptions: rather, the land over which their
forces would use tear gas would not be sovereign territory of the South African state; nor
would the affected occupants of that land be South African citizens. This is doubly so in
regards to the conflict in Angola, where no territorial gains were either implemented or
expected. The problem of Project Coast's uncertain intentions thus become not merely a
problem of how the new gas was to be used; but also of who was to use it -- the Police or
the Defence Force -- and, most importantly, where was it to be used. Was the new form
of tear gas developed by Project Coast designed to be used inside South Africa's borders?
Although the process of research and testing seems to indicate that this use inside
the country was in fact what was intended for this particular chemical weapon, the newly-
developed CR tear gas, the evidence is not enough in itself to state this with any certainty.
There is, however, a second line of reasoning that ends in the same tentative conclusion,
one based not on the processes of research but rather on the development of the
institutional structures in which that research was conducted. In the last chapter, I argued
that the development of the ambitions of the chemical and biological weapons research
programme embedded in the charismatic institutional order of Project Coast could only
be explained through an account of how that order itself developed. The possible
. ambitions of the research programme were, in other words, productively constrained by
the institutional location of the programme. The possible uses of the weapons technology
by either the South African Police or the South African Defence Force are part of the
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explanatory framework for how that technology came to be researched, but they are only
part of that framework -- much of it lies within the internal order of Project Coast itself,
an order deeply opposed to the rationalised bureaucracies that characterised both of these
other institutions. To explain the particular development of the research into tear gas, a
description of the development of charismatic authority through the particular institutions
in which that research was conducted is thus required.
At the heart of Project Coast was its charismatic leader, Dr Wouter Basson; at the
heart of the South African Police's forensic laboratories, and its own chemical research
programme, was Lothar Neethling. It takes no stretch of the imagination to describe
Neethling himself as a charismatic individual, and it thus should come as no surprise to
learn of his closeness to Basson -- lan Lourens told the Truth Commission that he had
believed that there was "a close relationship between Dr Basson and General Neethling",
before adding that he had felt obliged to honour this relationship by following
Neethling's instructions as if they had come from Basson himself.37 This can be
explained by the tendency, noted by Weber, of charismatic leaders to attract followers
possessed of their own charisma.38 Neethling can be characterised as one of those
followers, a member of the inner circle of Basson's disciples, and therefore as having
been -- without any official, bureaucratic affiliation -- a senior member of Project Coast's
charismatic structure, and a powerful force within its institutional order. The primary site
37 Lourens, 8 June 1998.
38 Max Weber, "The Nature of Charismatic Authority and its Routinization," extracted from his Theory.oj
Social and Economic Organization, translated by A.R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Macmillan,
London: 1947) and reprinted in Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1968)
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of his influence, of course, was the research conducted within Delta-G Scientific's
laboratories and aimed at the production of a new form of tear gas, CR.
And so when Neethling, during his testimony to the Truth Commission, laid claim
to an authority over the research into tear gas that Koekemoer, for all his expert
knowledge, did not possess he was not only referring to a superior scientific knowledge,
but also to a visionary authority legitimised by the charismatic institutional order of
Project Coast. It was this charismatic authority that allowed him to continue to supervise
the process of testing CR, both against individuals, himself included, and the
environment in which it would be used, years after he had officially handed his
responsibility for the research over to another institution within the bureaucratic state's
order. It allowed him to give instructions both to soldiers and scientists employed by
Project Coast without possessing either a rank in the Defence Force and without a
position within any of the front companies -- the latter absence also shared by Wouter
Basson, who never held a single directorship in any of Project Coast's front companies.
And, finally, the charismatic authority Neethling held over Delta-G's research into a new
form of tear gas allowed, and perhaps even obliged, him to set productive constraints on
the development of the research programme; to, in other words, set the limits within
which the research would be conducted and therefore to set the end uses for which it
would be designed. And so, from this institutional framework, it is possible to conclude,
too, that the research conducted towards producing a new form of tear gas was in fact
conducted as a research programme designed to produce a new form of tear gas that
would be used within the borders of South Africa, on its insurgent citizens and subjects.
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This chapter, then, must conclude on a somewhat ambiguous note. The
contentions of both the first chapter and the Introduction to this thesis have been
deepened and strengthened by a closer study of one of the chemical and biological
weapons research programme's branches, and its institutional grounds. It is increasingly
clear that Project Coast operated in the context of an increasing militarisation of the
South African state, where it was hard to distinguish between the activities of the Police
and the Defence Force. Both could contemplate the use of chemical weapons in the
various conflicts, both could use extreme force in the course of their duties, and the
command structures for both were increasingly centralised in the State Security Council -
- as evidenced by the high-ranking meeting between the Minister of Law and Order, the
. Commissioner of the South African Police, the Surgeon General, and Lothar Neethling
himself that brought this particular research agenda under the aegis of Project Coast. The
one difference between acts of policing and acts of military force that could still be
invoked, often in protest against its collapse, was territorial: the Police operated legally
inside the country; the Defence Force legally outside its borders.39 The production of a
new, more effective and more efficient, tear gas took place firmly within this context, and
its intended use was influenced by these policies of state power..
At the same time, however, the institutional order ofProject Coast did not take its
cue from either of these institutions: it was neither a product of the Defence Force nor of
the Police. Instead, it was a charismatic institution operating through its own internal
order, one that bore little reference to the world outside -- even to its own financial and
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administrative setting within the South African Defence Force and late Apartheid state.
Even the justifications offered by scientists such as Johannes Koekemoer appear to use
the conflict in Angola, and other definitive icons of the late Apartheid state, as iconic
images. These images bear no relation to the actual conflict in Angola, nor to the practice
of public state power in the period. And following this, the practice of scientific research,
the productive constraints on the process by which a new form oftear gas was developed,
came from within the charismatic order of the Project Coast's institutional structure,
rather than from any particular pressure exerted by the Defence Force, Police, or late
Apartheid state's needs. The research into tear gas conducted at Delta-G was therefore
insulated from its militarised context, to some still-undetermined extent.
The problematic relationship between this militarised state context and the
practice of scientific research within the chemical and biological weapons research
programme lies at the core of this thesis's examination of Project Coast's operations.
This chapter has given some depth to that animating problem, but has certainly not
answered it. To do so, more information and a still-richer portrait of the operations of
Project Coast is required. The next chapter aims to provide that through a similar study
ofDelta-G's sister front-company, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, and the primary
research project carried out under its aegis, an attempt to manufacture a new kind of
contraceptive that could be used on a mass scale, and that worked like a vaccination.
39 See Cock and Nathan, War and Society, for several uses of this distinction in protest.
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Chapter Three:
Biological Weapons Research and "Population Control"
Unlike the research conducted at Delta-G Scientific towards the production of a
new form of tear gas, the research conducted at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories aimed
at the development of a new form of contraceptive did not result in the successful
manufacture of the intended product. No new contraceptive was ever produced. Instead,
for a five year period between 1985 and 1990 a group of scientists affiliated with the
front company began a process of researching and experimenting with the intention of
eventually, at some point in an indefinite future, producing a new form of contraceptive.
None of the scientists involved at the research level seem to have believed that such a
product could be.produced in fewer than twenty years.! Perhaps because of the absence
of any material product, this research project has received relatively little attention in the
literature produced, either explaining or condemning Project Coast.2 Another possible
reason for the lack of attention paid to this project might be that contraceptive research
does not seem to fit into any definition of either chemical or biological warfare, not being
I For this date see the Testimony ofDr Schalk Van Rensburg to the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 9 June 1998.
2 This research rates no more than a paragraph in both Marlene Burger andChandre Gould, Secrets and
Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Zebra Press, Cape
Town: 2002) and Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback ofSouth Africa' Chemical and
Biological Warfare Programme (USAF Counterproliferation Centre, Maxwell Air Force Base, Virginia:
2001).
79
a particularly efficient weapon to use against an invading or defending army. Part of the
purpose ofthis chapter of this thesis is therefore to try to explain why it was that this
research came to be conducted as part ofthe state's chemical and biological weapons
research programme; and what the implications for my larger examination of Project
Coast's animating design and purpose might possibly be.
This task is rendered easier by one other unique characteristic of Roodeplaat's
research into contraceptive technology. Simply put, the scientists and administrators
seem to have talked incessantly about the role of their own work within the larger
framing ambitions of Project Coast. At the very least, the two principal administrative
scientists representing Roodeplaat who testified during the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare spent much of their
testimonies attempting to explain why they had been convinced at the time that the
contraceptive research they had performed had been a legitimate part of the state's
chemical and biological weapons research programme.3 Although these two testimonies
present two quite different explanatory accounts, a series of underlying assumptions
about the nature of races, populations, and individuals in South Africa binds the two
accounts together. These assumptions then, in turn, allow me to venture a description of
the animating vision that these scientists and administrators perceived; as well as
allowing me to describe the way in which contraception fitted into biological weapons
research, and the late Apartheid state's notion of chemical and biological warfare. Before
I can do that, however, the position of the two administrative scientists, Dr Daan Goosen
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and Dr Schalk Van Rensburg, who gave these accounts to the Truth Commission, within
the institutional structure of the front company, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, needs
to be established, as does the company's nature itself.
Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, Project Coast's second major front company,
was founded in 1983. Like Delta-G Scientific, Roodeplaat was designed to provide a set
oflaboratory facilities within which a single aspect of the state's chemical and biological
weapons research programme could developed. Where Delta-G's laboratories were
intended to be used for chemical research, however, those housed under Roodeplaat's
banner were intended to be used for biological research" Also, where Delta-G consisted
of one core set of laboratories, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories was an umbrella
organisation that included several sub-companies. Included under the broad heading of
"biological research" in Roodeplaat, thus, were companies not only dedicated to the
production of biological weapons research, but also companies such as Roodeplaat
Breeding Enterprises.4 This particular company was dedicated to the production and
maintenance of the animals upon which the chemical and biological agents produced by
Project Coast's various laboratories were tested. It was at Roodeplaat Breeding
Enterprises, located on the same plot of land as the remainder of Roodeplaat Research
Laboratories, that Delta-G tested its new form of tear gas on a baboon subject.s The
implications of this for the separation of the various front companies from each other and
3 Van Rensburg, 9 June 1998, and the Testimony ofDr Daan Goosen to the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 11 June 1998 are the
two testimonies referred to here. See later in the chapter for more details.
4 Testimony ofDr Daan Goosen to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 11 June 1998. .
5 Testimony ofDr Jan Lourens to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 8 June 1998.
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from the Defence Force have been described in the Introduction to this thesis; at this
point it is only necessary to emphasise the interdependence of Roodeplaat and the
remainder of Project Coast's front companies. The extent to which this interdependence
defined Roodeplaat's operations over the course of the decade is still open to question.
The testimonies of two of the company's original directors to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission argue against the importance of Project Coast's other front
companies for Roodeplaat's longer-term ambitions. For Dr Schalk Van Rensburg, the
company's Director of Laboratory Services between 1984 and 1989, Roodeplaat was
designed as "a model contract research company." While its initial support would come
from Project Coast's other front companies, it was expected to soon branch out and make
its facilities -- both those designed for laboratory work, and those designed for the testing
of chemical and biological agents on animals -- available for commercial use.6 Dr Daan
Goosen, the founder and, between 1983 and 1986, the first Managing Director of
Roodeplaat, agreed.7 This may be explained by the fact that, while Goosen had entered
Project Coast through his connections with Basson and the military, both Goosen and
Van Rensburg were employed in the commercial and academic spheres before coming to
work for Roodeplaat, Project Coast, and the Defence Force. Unlike the senior staff of
Delta-G, for example, they were not trained soldiers -- and, beyond the patriotic duty that
both men referred to in their statements to the Truth Commission, neither did they
possess any particular loyalty to the South African military. The third ofRoodeplaat's
significant original directors, Dr Andre Immelman, the Director ofResearch and
6 Testimony ofDr Schalk Van Rensburg to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 9 June 1998.
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Development, had been trained by the military, but was not without academic experience
himself. 8 The commercial and academic backgrounds of the company's original
directors, and particularly the entrepreneurial training of Daan Goosen, helped to define
the path the Roodeplaat was intended to take, towards an increasing normalisation of
commercial operations -- at least as far as Goosen and Van Rensburg's testimony was
concerned. This normalisation of its operations, however, did not occur.
Instead Daan Goosen was replaced, in 1986, by a new Managing Director, Dr
Wynand Swanepoel. While Goosen had been trained as a researching scientist,
Swanepoel had been trained as a dentist and had no research experience; and while
Goosen had developed his professional expertise through working on commercial and
academic research projects, Swanepoel had spent the years before he was recruited as a
member of the South African Defence Force's Special Forces. He himself admitted,
during his testimony to the Truth Commission, that he had no expert knowledge of the
processes and practices of research, nor was he interested in continuing to turn
Roodeplaat into a commercial contract research company. Rather, he told the
Commission, he was appointed as a managerial specialist to sort out certain unspecified
problems caused by Goosen's management practices. The intended result of his reforms,
as he told the Truth Commission, was to bring the institutional order and managerial
practices of Roodeplaat back in line with those of the military's other front companies.9
Swanepoel seems to have succeeded in accomplishing this task, as he remained
7 Goosen, 11 June 1998.
S See the testimony Immelman presented during Basson criminal trial, as reported by Marlene Burger and
Chandre Gould, Basson Trial Report 20(b), 25 May - 1 June 2000.
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Managing Director of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories from 1986 until its privatisation
and dissolution in 1991. Throughout this later period, the majority of the time during
which Roodeplaat operated, this militarist managerial order ran through the company's
institutional structure. The most notable effect of this order, dealt with in the next
chapter rather than in this, was a steady decline in the production of original research on
the part of Roodeplaat's scientists. Swanepoel himself acknowledged this. Nonetheless,
despite this decline, the biological weapons research projects begun under Goosen's
management, from 1983 to 1986, continued into Swanepoel's management.
While the most notable of these projects, the research conducted into the
production ofa new form of mass contraception, is the focus of this chapter's study, it
.remains important to place it in the context of the other work done under the umbrella of
Roodeplaat Research Laboratories. That work could, according to the testimony of Daan
Goosen, be divided into four principal research sections. ID The research into the
production of a new contraceptive was only one of these four, although it received the
single largest part of the institution's funding.!! The first ofthese sections was the one
that least engages this particular chapter of this thesis, the breeding and maintenance of a
small population of animals for the purpose of testing the agents produced at Roodeplaat
and Project Coast's other front companies. This company seems, from Daan Goosen's
testimony, to have been the core of the original plans to turn Roodeplaat into a contract
research company; the descriptions offered of its operations, in testimony to the Truth
9 Testimony of Dr Wynand Swanepoel to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 10 June 1998.
10 Goosen, 11 June 1998.
I1 Van Rensburg, 9 June 1998, estimates this as a third of Roodeplaat's research funds.
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Commission, emphasised the squalor, neglect, and mismanagement that forced
Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises to remain within the structures of the military. 12
Nonetheless, as the evidence presented in the previous chapter suggests, this branch of
the company had a purpose within those structures. Its products, animals bred for the
purposes of chemical and biological testing, can be seen to have been effectively used.
Such a statement is harder to make for the second of Roodeplaat's principal
research sections, that which dealt with the production of biological toxins. This section
operated under the management of Dr Andre Immelman, who had previously combined a
period in the Defence Force with a·career in academic toxicology. Unlike the other
senior directors, Immelman did not testify to the Truth Commission -- rather, he sent a
lengthy affidavit that included a particular document, the "verkope lys" or "shopping
list", that rapidly gained notoriety. This document simply listed a range of biological
agents, some toxic, that Immelman claimed to have used in his research. 13 Daan Goosen,
when describing the work Immelman conducted, described these agents as "dirty tricks" -
- a term, which emerged in the early 1990s during the trials of ex-Special Forces
operatives, for the tools ofassassination, poisoning, and espionage employed by the
"Third Force", itself a covert government-sponsored group of military operatives. 14 In
their testimonies, respectively to the Truth Commission and during Basson's trial, both
Goosen and Immelman said that they believed that this work had been intended for some
12 Lourens, 8 June 1998.
13 This list is reprinted in full in Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback ofSouth Africa's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (USAF Counterproliferation Centre, Maxwell Airbase,
Virginia: 2001).
14 See Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart ofDarkness: Confessions ofApartheid's Assassins (Jonathan Ball,
Johannesburg: 1997) for an account of these trials.
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kind of extra-legal use. As such, they could report little infonnation that might show how
this section of Roodeplaat had been used, and whether its operation was effective or not.
A similar difficulty surrounds the account Daan Goosen offered to the Truth
Commission of the third ambition that motivated Roodeplaat's research division. The
research that came under this particular structural umbrella was concerned with the
production of re-engineered biological agents. This re-engineering was intended to be
both genetic and molecular, depending on the particular agent. An example, offered by
Goosen and the primary researcher employed, Dr Mike Odendaal, of this research was
the production of a penicillin-resistant strain of anthrax. IS (Penicillin was not the primary
means of treating anthrax but, if given in large enough quantities and speedily enough,
could have been an effective treatment, 16) A second example of the ambitions underlying
this section of the company's research programme, and the most detailed example given
by Goosen, was of a failed attempt to acquire a "drug effective against pigmented people
only" -- a drug, in other words, that would serve as the vector for a bacterium, virus, or
other toxic biological agent that the combined expertise of Roodeplaat's scientists could
produce to infect and affect only non-white-skinned men and women. Although Goosen
believed that it was possible to produce such a drug -- against, it is important to note, the
received wisdom of the majority of population geneticists at the time17 - neither he, nor
any of the other scientists employed by Roodeplaat, had any notion of how to begin to go
15 Testimony ofDr Mike Odendaal to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 10 June 1998.
16 Eric Croddy, with Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A
Comprehensive Surveyfor the Concerned Citizen (Copemicus Books, New York: 2002) pp 69 details the
various treatment options for Anthrax infection.
17 See Luigi Luca Cavalli-Svorza, with Paolo Menozzi and Alberto Piazo, The History and Geography of
Human Genes (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.: 1994)
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about producing such a substance. At the end of the first year of Roodeplaat's
operations, however, an event both fortuitous and fortunate, at least for his ambitions as
described to the Truth Commission, occurred. Wouter Basson presented Daan Goosen
with a document he claimed to have received via the South African military attache in
London. The document offered, in Goosen's words, "a product, a bacteria, which has
got the possibility ofaffecting, making sick, and killing pigmented people.,,18 The author
of this document was either pseudonymous or anonymous, but his location was
understood to be somewhere on mainland Europe. According to Goosen, Basson
requested him to travel to London to meet with this mysterious author and ascertain the
plausibility of his proposal. Basson himself denied that he had made any such request, or
gave any similar order; instead, he told the Truth Commission, even at the time he
believed that "there is no biological, genetic, no physical base on which one can develop
an ethnic weapon," and so could hardly have treated such a project as worthy of interest.
The Commission's representative, questioning Basson, was conspicuously unconvinced
by Basson's denials. 19 Whether he did make such a request, or not, Basson's testimony
did not rule out the possibility that some experiments might have been performed on
similar lines at Roodeplaat. These possible experiments were motivated by the failure of
this original proposal to pan out: a week before Goosen was due to leave for London, he
testified, "some people from Armscor were led into a trap in Paris and arrested by a
similar kind of bait." And so, suddenly mindful of the risks involved, he did not make
the meeting. This branch of Roodeplaat' s research plan was thus snapped off at its root,
early in its evolution.
18 Goosen, 11 June 1998.
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Daan Goosen, then recalling the period in which he had been the Managing
Director of Roodeplaat between 1983 and 1986, told the Truth Commission that it was
soon after he had been recruited to head the front company that he had been "directly
instructed" by Wouter Basson to initiate the fourth section ofRoodeplaat's research
programme, a research project with the intention of developing "a product to curtail the
birth rate of the black population of the country." Goosen, according to his testimony,
was at first uncertain as to the utility of such a research project, and pushed Basson to
give him an explanation. He repeated this explanation, as he remembered it, in his
testimony to the Truth Commission. The first element of this explanation was statistical,
and conventional: the black population of the country was increasing at a rate faster than
that of the white population. The second element of Basson's explanation was
conspiratorial: that the Apartheid state had, in fact, chosen to conceal the true rate of that
population's increase to prevent wide-scale panic. Goosen told the Truth Commission
that Basson had then backed-up his claim by telling him that the state had falsified the
last national census results: while ''the figure of about 28 million was made known" to
the public, the state had in fact "stopped counting the black people when they reached 45
million" and had then decided cover up the real figures because it was "not feasible to
make known to people that there was 45 million blacks. It was just too many." The
conclusion that Goosen claimed to have been offered by Basson was that the rate of
increase in the black population of South Africa threatened the stability of the state, the
economy, the environment, and the security of the country's white population itself. For.
19 Testimony ofDr Wouter Basson to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 31 July 1998.
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this reason, then, the chemical and biological weapons research programme, like every
other branch of the state, had a patriotic duty to prevent this impending disaster from ever
happening.2o
Goosen's account built on a long-standing paranoia within the Apartheid state's
structures. Even from the earliest days of the Apartheid state, the modernist notions of
population, population growth, population welfare, and population control that marked
the segregationist policy of the pre-Apartheid state in South Africa were linked to the
older, apocalyptically religious notions ofrace, race war, and race degeneration.21 By the
beginning of the 1970s, this combination of demography and apocalypse had begun to be
nearly hegemonic in the state's rhetoric. This situation only intensified in the ten years
between the foundation of the state's Department ofNational Health and Population
Planning in 1974 and Basson's successful attempt to convince Goosen of the necessity of
contraceptive research in 1984.22 Through this period an argument made by J.L. Sadie, a
demographer affiliated with the University of Stellenbosch, gained credence among the
leaders of the National Party, and the late Apartheid state. This argument proceeded as
follows: while the overall population growth of the country was growing, bolstered
particularly by the rapid demographic increase in the black percentage of the population,
20 Goosen, 11 June 1998.
21 See Saul Dubow, Racial Segregation and the Origins ofApartheid in South Africa, 1919-36 (Macmillan,
London: 1989) and Saul Dubow, SCientific Racism in Modern South Africa (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge: 1997) are both superb overviews of this period. T. Dunbar Moodie's The Rise of
Afrikanerdom: Power, apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion (University ofCalifornia Press, Berkeley
and Los Angeles: 1975) details the way in which Calvinism influence the formation of the Apartheid state.
Deborah Posel, The Making ofApartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise (Clarendon Press, Oxford:
1991) details the modernist influence on the Apartheid state. See also the Introduction of this thesis for.
references.
22 Barbara N. Brown, "Facing the 'Black Peril': The Politics of Population Control in South Africa,"
Journal ofSouthern African Studies (VoI13, No 3: April 1987)
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the rate of economic growth was at the same time slowing down. The result of this
twinned process would in any other society be a rapid increase in unemployment across
all the country's population groups. Apartheid South Africa, however, was marked by a
somewhat different economic organisation, one that would amplify the effects of this
demographic shift, given the conditions of the international modernising economy.
These conditions were twofold: first that international economies were coming to rely
increasingly on intellectual labour and less on manual labour. And second, the
intellectual training in South Africa had historically been restricted to the white
population, while manual work had historically been the domain of the black population.
Therefore, if the demographic trend Sadie had identified -- the increase of the under-
educated black population coupled with the decrease of the educated white population--
was allowed to continue, then not only would the economy of the country collapse, but so
too would its political order and even, as Sadie's followers implied, its environment.23
State policy, in the years leading up the initial conversation between Goosen and
Basson that set Roodeplaat's contraceptive research programme in motion, had been first
to accept the validity of this argument, and then to use several different tactics to attempt
to mitigate its conclusions. The most significant of these tactics was also the longest-
running: between 1960 and 1972, as a direct result of state policies, South Africa
experienced a surge of white immigration, offsetting some of the already-apparent
23 See, amongst many publications, Sadie's "Some Notes on Bantu Demography," Journal ofRacial Affairs
(Vol 2: 1955); "Population and Economic Development in South Africa," South African Journal of
Economics (VoI39, No 3: September 1971); Labour Force 2000 (Bureau ofMarket Research, University
of South Africa, Pretoria: 1981); as well as A Reconstruction and Projection ofDemographic Movements in
the RSA and TBVC Countries (Bureau of Market Research, University of South Africa, Pretoria: 1988) for
an outline of his thought, and the field within which he worked.
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demographic slide. At the same time, the state began to limit the availability ofjobs
awarded to black foreigners. But by the mid-1970s, when the economic downturn and
increase in political violence both began to play a role in the decline of immigration,
these measures were no longer sufficient. In 1974, the Department ofNational Health
and Population was formed, with a significant section: the Family Planning Department.
By the beginning of the 1980s, this was one of the best funded, best staffed, most
efficient, and fastest growing public institutions within the state's overall structure.24 The
particular modernity both of these institutions, immigration controls and family planning,
as well as that expressed through Sadie' s neutral statistical language serves to obscure the
pervasive and naturalised racism that saturated the state's euphemistic population
policies, based as they were on a single assumption: black South Africans were, in the
words of an earlier scholar, "probably the most prolific people on the face of the earth.,,25
This assumption was central to the South African eugenicist movement of the
early Twentieth Century.26 Echoes of that movement's rhetoric can be heard in the
language used by the Apartheid state to describe the country's black majority population
throughout that state's period of political dominance. The same echoes can be heard in
Goosen's account of the motivation Basson had offered him. Nonetheless, there are
some substantial differences between the early eugenicist movements and the later
population policy of the Apartheid state. For the purposes of this chapter, the principal
difference lies in the attention given by the eugenicist movement to the "purification" of
24 Brown, "Facing the 'Black Peril"'; Barbara Klugman, "The Politics of Contraception in South Africa,"
Women's Studies Int. Forum (Vol 13, No 3: 1990) as well as Carol E. Kaufman's "Reproductive Control in
Apartheid South Africa," Population Studies (Vol 54: 2000)
25 Theal, quoted in Dubow, Scientific Racism, pp 168.
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the white population of the country: much attention was paid in the early part of the
century to the reproductive habits of "poor whites" within the white population itself.
However some of the earliest legislation passed by the Apartheid state was concerned not
with reproduction within either the white or black populations of South Africa
(statistically pseudo-scientifically defined by the state's own information-collecting
agencies, as I argued in the Introduction to this thesis) but rather with reproduction
between the two populations: the Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act
(1950) both prohibited sex, and reproduction, between population groups?7 To simplify
a complicated subject, eugenicist ideology was primarily concerned with the internal
purification of a particular racialised population group, while Apartheid ideology was
more concerned with the separation of racialised population groups from each other. The
eugenicists of the earlier part of this century were not nearly as concerned with the threat
of racial intermixture posed by the perceived profligacy of reproduction among the black
population of South Africa as the early Apartheid state was. The eugenicist interpretation
of the threat implicit in that population boom was, instead, primarily moral. The black
birth rate was understood.. to be a bad influence on the degenerate members of the white
population; the lack of reproductive constraints, as perceived to exist among the black
population of South Africa well into the early part of the Twentieth Century, could be
imitated by degenerate specimens of the white population, thus contaminating them
26 See Dubow, Scientific Racism, for a detail account of this movement.
27 See Posel, The Making ofModern South Africa. For an account more focused on the internal politics of
the National Party government in this period see Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and
the Politics ofthe National Party, 1948-1994 (Ohio University Press, Cleveland: 1998)
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further -- not through intermarriage, but through a moral contagion.28 It should be clear
that this differs in more than its details from the material prohibitions of Apartheid.
By 1984, when Goosen and Basson began to plan their contraceptive research
programme, these material prohibitions on sexual intercourse between racialised
population groups were no longer central to the late Apartheid state. Two years later, in
1986, both the racial sections of the Immorality Act (1950) and the Mixed Marriages Act
(1949) were abolished.29 The Apartheid state's population policies, as expressed through
the Department ofNational Health and Population's Family Planning Department, still
depended on the internalised, hegemonic notions of racial segregation, and of the ills of
miscegenation, that had become part of a "common-sense racism" that pervaded the
South African state as well as the country's society.3D The hegemonic assumptions of
intrinsic racial difference, particularly those tied to sexual intercourse and to what was
perceived as profligate reproduction, are clearly discernable in the threat of black "over-
population" described in Goosen's account of the explanation that he remembered
receiving from W~uter Basson. The sexualised common-sense racism running through
this account, tied too to a particular patriotic impulse, was not however the only form of
the hegemonic common-sense racism of the late Apartheid state: not only was black skin
a mark of sexual profligacy, but it was also a mark ofabsolute, essential, and possibly
28 Laura Anne Stoler, Race and the Education ofDesire: Foucault's History ofSexuality and the Colonial
Order ofThings (Duke University Press, Durham Ne: 1995)) teases some of these complex points out, not
always in the direction which I identify here. Dubow, SCientific Racism, gives more time to those
eugenicists in the 1930s and 1940s who did make prohibitions against "inter-racial" reproduction. It is not
the purpose of the argument above to deny the validity of this, but rather to emphasise that, for mainstream
eugenicism, inter-racial reproduction was a largely unspoken sub-set of a broader, more pressing issue:
purifying, and purging, the "white race".
29 William Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2001) 268.
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even genetic difference. This particular form of common-sense racism was present in the
other research project singled out by Daan Goosen in his testimony to the Truth
Commission, the research project aimed at the production of a biological agent that could
act as a race-specific vector for a biological weapon's use.
That research project, designed to produce or discover a biological agent that
would only work on people with a specific skin-colour, in this case black, was shaped by
a hegemonic notion of racial difference closely related to that which animated Goosen's
explanation of why he had come to work on contraceptive research at Roodeplaat. The
similar set of foundational assumptions on which these two projects were built was
noticed during the Truth Commission's Special Hearing, in which Goosen had recounted
his understanding of both research projects. During the hearing, the Commission's
representative asked Goosen if the two projects were in any way connected in his
opinion. Goosen's answer was lengthy, and somewhat circular, but can be simply
summarised: he agreed that the two were connected. The research into a race-specific
biological agent was also research intended to produce the vector through which the new
form of contraceptive could be introduced solely to the black population of South Africa.
"To come back to your question, is it possible?" Goosen replied to the Truth
Commission, "Scientifically, yes, I believe it is possible." Nonetheless, as he also told
the Truth Commission, "the mechanism to get it to the people was the last thing you
would research." The scientists would have to first produce the contraceptive agent itself
and then determine whether "it would be viable to give it in the beer or in the maize or in
30 See Deborah Posel, "Race as Common Sense: Racial Classification in Twentieth Century South Africa,"
African Studies Review (Vo144, No 2: September 2001) pp 87-113.
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the vaccinations..." 31 The dietary and other assumption about black South Africans
barely encoded in this statement also feed into the common-sense racism underlying all
of Goosen's explanatory statements. More importantly, however, the phrasing of
Goosen's statement separates the process of contraceptive research from the common-
sense racism of its framing explanation. While he claimed to have believed that it would
be possible to create a contraceptive that could be limited in its use to only black South
Africans, he did not claim to have instructed his researchers to produce that agent.
Nor did those researchers claim, in testimony to the Truth Commission, to have
received any instructions to that effect. Dr Schalk Van Rensburg, Roodeplaat's Director
of Laboratory Services and the most senior scientist involved in the contraceptive
research project, told the Commission that he had been given a different explanatory
rationale all together. The only surface similarity between his account and Goosen's
account was that they both claimed to have received their instructions from Wouter
Basson. Van Rensburg repeated, for the benefit of the Truth Commission, the initial
conversation he had had with Basson, in which Basson had laid out the reason for
beginning a contraceptive research programme under the aegis ofa chemical and
biological weapons research programme. Its use was to be of strategic military import
during the conflict in Angola, outside the borders of South Africa. At no point in this
explanation did either of these two men refer to the black population of South Africa.32
31 Goosen, 11 June 1998.
32 Van Rensburg, 9 June 1998.
95
Van Rensburg claimed that, instead, Basson told him that Jonas Savimbi, the
leader ofthe Angolan armed movement UNITA, and South Africa's ally in the Angolan
conflict, had approached the South African Defence Force with a request for strategic aid
that would enable him to intensify his own armed effort. "His best troops were actually
the females," Van Rensburg recalled, "but the trouble was that they were pregnant most
of the time." No reason for this constant pregnancy was mentioned in the Truth
Commission's hearing -- perhaps because, as with Goosen's own account, this account
took a part in the hegemonic "common-sense racism" of the period. The reproductive
profligacy of black Africans was exactly as likely to be perceived amongst black soldiers
as it was amongst black families. But this account, unlike Goosen's, actually depends
more on a second set ofhegemonic ideas: that of the sexual profligacy of women. The
assumption that women are the sole objects of reproductive control has been a staple of
contraceptive research for as long as it has been scientifically possible.33 Where
Goosen's explanatory account is expressed in abstract terms -- demographics, statistics,
and "over-population" -- this account is expressed in physical terms -- the bodies of
specific women. That these women are black is not irrelevant, but neither is it the
determining factor in the scientists' perceptions of their bodies as sites ofconception.
Combined with these material notions of racial and sexual determinants, however, the
account Van Rensburg offers also adds a moral determinant, clear in his description of
33 Linda Gordon, Woman's Body, Woman's Right (penguin, New York: 1990) is a strong statement of this
position. These assumptions have also been encoded in South Africa population control and family .
planning ideology: see Klugman, "Reproductive Control," as a particularly import statement of this
position.
96
the second military use of a new contraceptive in Angola: ''there was a bit of a problem in
the refugee camps, where they [the women] were breeding too fast.,,34
The patronising tone of that last statement resonated with that underlying
Goosen's own account of the possible vehicles he would have considered for the delivery
of this new form of contraceptive to the black population of South Africa: "in the beer or
in the maize or in the vaccinations...,,35 Both accounts described black Africans purely
in terms of physical needs: either in need of sexual intercourse for the purposes of
reproduction, or in need of food and drink -- and not just any drink, but alcoholic beer.
These assumptions together fed into another, larger, assumption: that black Africans were
not capable either of deciding to limit their own fertility, or of desiring to do so. The
whole of Roodeplaat's contraceptive research programme was premised upon this
principle. The contraceptive agent it was expected to produce was not only intended to
be used on a mass scale to control the rate of increase among the black population of the
country, but was also intended to be used covertly, without the knowledge of the black
South African women on which it was designed to be used. The covert nature of the
product was required because -- as was clearly expressed through the common-sense
racism and sexism running through the explanatory rationales offered by both Goosen
and Van Rensburg -- those same black African women could not be trusted to control
their own fertility either willingly or effectively. Therefore, as both Goosen and Van
Rensburg claimed they had been instructed to, the late Apartheid state was responsible
for their behaviour insofar as it threatened either the security of the state within the
34 Van Rensburg, 9 June 1998.
3S Goosen, 11 June 1998.
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bounds of the country, as in Goosen's account, or outside those borders, as in Van
Rensburg's account. The basis of this research was a refusal of black women's
subjectivity, or agency; that was to be replaced with the agency of the Apartheid state.
It seems almost redundant to point to the fundamental inaccuracy of such a series
of assumptions, and so I shall not belabour the point here. It is sufficient to state that,
firstly, black women, both in South Africa and across the remainder of the continent,
have always controlled their own fertility, at least throughout any of the periods for
which we have any recorded history. This control did not always take a mechanical,
technical, form. Often, fertility control was expressed through post-partum taboos,
extended periods oflactation, and other loosely "cultural" means.36 And, secondly, since
.the introduction of modem technical, chemical, means ofcontraception in the mid':'
twentieth century, these contraceptive technologies have been widely used by black
women.37 The rich sources of evidence for these two conclusions should be sufficient to
demonstrate that the racist assumptions of the Apartheid state, and more specifically of
the trio of Goosen, Van Rensburg, and Hasson, had no basis in reproductive practice. As
I have argued above, these assumptions had their roots not in material evidence but rather
in a long history of an intemallly self-reinforcing ideology of "common-sense racism".
But, despite the lack of material evidence for these assumptions, the late Apartheid state's
chemical and biological weapons research programme set out to make a new form of
contraceptive that would address these assumptions, no matter how false.
36 Angus McLaren A History o/Contraception: From Antiquity to The Present Day (Blackwell, Oxford:
1990) as well as Catherine Bums, "Sex: Lessons from the Past" in Agenda: A Journal o/Women and
Gender (VoI29, Autumn: 1996)
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According to Van Rensburg's testimony, there was a technology already being
developed in several countries across the globe that could address the exact constraints
that the assumption ofthis "common sense racism" produced. Basson, Van Rensburg
continued, was aware ofthis technology and had in fact proposed that Roodeplaat's
contraceptive research project begin by investigating it. To kick-start Van Rensburg's
research, Basson presented him with "a little book by an Indian expert on immunological
control of fertil ity." This form of contraceptive technology based on the stimulation ofa
body's immune system was, according to Van Rensburg, ''the State of the Art" and the
most exciting, most promising, form of contraceptive research then being practiced. It
had even been "pinpointed", he assured the Truth Commission, by the World Health
Organisation as ''the future effective way to control populations.,,38 And, although Van
Rensburg claimed that Basson had proposed that the technology would only be designed
to be used on female Angolan soldiers and refugee-camp inhabitants, this coincidence of
intention could hardly have gone unnoticed. Indeed, population control was the raison
d'etre of immunological fertility control, the reason for its development.
Immunological contraception, the grail towards which Van Rensburg and the rest
of his research team at Roodeplaat quested, had originally been developed in India, at the
end of the 1960s, for use solely on animal subjects. Within a decade, however, it was
37 Catherine Bums, "Contraception" The South African Women's Health Book, edited by Margaretha
Goosen and Barbara Klugman (Oxford University Press, Cape Town: 1996)
38 Van Rensburg, 9 June 1998.
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being proposed for use on human subjects.39 The technology was premised on the notion
that it was possible to stimulate the body's immune system in such a way that it would
interpret certain of the chemical effects of reproduction as attacks on the body's integrity
that must be dealt with if the body is to survive. There are two principal immunological
methods of fertility control: one that induces an immunological reaction to the presence
of sperm and thus acts as a contraceptive, and one that induces a reaction to the presence
of an embryo in a woman's uterus and thus acts as an abortifacient. Both methods use the
female body as the site of action, utilising that body's immune system as the primary
means of fertility control. Both operate by convincing that immune system that the
presence of either sperm, in the first method, or an embryo, in the second, is analogous to
the presence of a disease within the body, and as dangerous to the health of the whole
human organism. The second method described here, the one in which a newly implanted
human embryo is spontaneously aborted in response to an immune reaction, was the
approach favoured by the field's most distinguished figure, Gursaran Prasad Talwar, and
of almost all the programmes that followed his example. Talwar first developed a
vaccine by bindi~g beta-heG (human chorionic gonadotropin), a hormone that aids in the
implantation ofan embryo in a uterus, with a tetanus toxin. "The result was a vaccine
against pregnancy and tetanus," according to his press, a vaccine that fooled the immune
system into treating the effects of conception as analogous to the effects oftetanus.4o
39 see Judith Richter, "Beyond Control: About Antifertility 'Vaccines,' Pregnancy Epidemics, and Abuse,"
in Power and Decision: The Social Control ofReproduction (Harvard School ofPublic Health,
Cambridge, Mass.: 1994) for a polemic, but detailed, account of this history. See also a brief article,
Ganapati Mudur, "Indian women's groups question contraceptive vaccine research," British Medical
Journal (317: 14 November 1998)
40 Madhusree Mukeljee, "Gursaran Prasad Talwar: Pushing the Envelope for Vaccines," SCientific
American (July 1996)
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This was also the method chosen by Roodeplaat's research team, after some debate
between the scientists involved.41
As the work of the feminist reproductive health specialists and medical ethicists
already referenced have demonstrated, in many articles and books over several years, all
contraceptive research is fraught with the possibility of abuse, both material and
ideologica1.42 In many ways the possibilities of abuse inherent in this particular form of
contraceptive research are even more visible than in most forms of such research.
Perhaps the outstanding ideological problem posed by immunological fertility control is
that thrown up by the description of conception as a disease to be vaccinated against.
The dear implication of this description is that a large part of a woman's body, and the
entirety of her reproductive practice, is not only a danger to herself, but also a matter of
public health, best dealt with through a policy of mass vaccination. This particular set of
ideological abuses coincided with the patronising common-sense sexism and racism that
animated Project Coast's research into this form of contraception: black women, in the
discourse outline above, were so incapable of controlling their own fertility that they
were a danger not only to themselves, but to the nation as a whole. This coincidence of
racism, sexism, and the unique technical possibilities offered by immunological
contraception was not unique to the late Apartheid state's chemical and biological
weapons research programme, however, but apparent also in the other societies where
4\ Van Rensburg, 9 June 1998.
42 Gordon, Woman's Body, Bums, "Contraception", and Klugman, "The Politics ofContraception" are only
a small selection of the works I have consulted for this chapter of the thesis.
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this research has been conducted, most notably in India.43 The scientists and
administrators of Roodeplaat' s own contraceptive research, Van Rensburg in particular,
later claimed to have been sensitive to this coincidence. "There was no question," Van
Rensburg told the Truth Commission that he had earlier told Basson, "of developing a
vaccine that only works in black or that's colour or ethnic based" because
"biochemically, blacks, whites, Chinese, whatever are identical." The only way to use
this technology on a single specific population group would be to only give the vaccine to
that group. And as Van Rensburg also believed that the agent would be "very easily
detectable" and impossible to use "covertly", that limited application could only be
public and obvious.44
It is possible to discern in these concerns, raised by Schalk Van Rensburg two
days before Daan Goosen's similar testimony to the Truth Commission, traces of the
rationales given by Goosen for the third of the four principal branches of Roodeplaat's
research programme, the research aimed at producing a biological agent that would only
react with a specific racialised population group. This agent, Goosen testified, was
intended to provide a vector for other biological agents: possibly viruses and bacteria that
would be capable of infecting large, but racially distinct, populations. It could also be
possibly used as a delivery mechanism for other biological agents, such as an
immunological contraceptive. This would allow the contraceptive to infect only the
black population of South Africa which was, in fact, its only desired target. And, Goosen
continued, if it proved impossible to do this, the contraceptive could be delivered to the
43 Dorothy Roberts's Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction and the Meaning ofLiberty (Pantheon
Press, New York: 1997) polemically studies this coincidence in North America.
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target in other vehicles: "in the beer or in the maize or in vaccinations...,,45 While the
third of these vehicles would be difficult to hide, it would not have been impossible; the
first two of these proposed vehicles could have been intended to be hidden. Goosen,
whenever he spoke of the delivery of an immunological contraceptive, therefore intended
its use to be covert -- an intention that was clearly commonly-enough held for Van
Rensburg to feel the need to explain to his leaders that it was scientifically impossible.
These two research projects, into engineered race-specific biological agents and
into immunological contraceptive technology, were thus linked not only by their shared
acceptance of a set of common-sense racist assumptions but also by their shared use as
covert weapons to be used against the entire black population of South Africa. The
rationale for immunological fertility control in any country in the world rested in part on
the implicit characterisation of pregnancy as dangerous not only for the fertile woman,
but also for the nation at large. In South Africa, in the 1980s, this rationale was explicitly
linked to a description ofthe late Apartheid state as being under the threat of social,
economic, and environmental destruction as a consequence ofan increasingly rapid rise
in the country's black population. As a result of this, the state's chemical and biological
weapons research programme was deputed by its charismatic leader, Wouter Basson, to
produce a set of biological weapons capable of addressing and controlling this threat.
Somewhat circularly, therefore, contraceptive technology became defined as a weapon,
and conducted as part of a weapons research programme, when Basson, Goosen, and the
other leaders of Project Coast began to define conception itself -- or more accurately,
44 Van Rensburg, 9 June 1998.
45 Goosen, 11 June 1998.
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defined the more abstract "rate of population increase" -- as a weapon used by the black
majority population to destabilise the late Apartheid state and government.
-
The vision that animated these two research projects, a vision embedded in a
history of the Apartheid's state population policies and adoption of a "common-sense"
racist ideology, was conveyed to both Goosen and Van Rensburg, according to their
testimonies, by Wouter Basson himself. The charismatic leader's presence at
Roodeplaat, and the depth of his involvement with its research projects, both contrast
with his relative detachment from the work conducted at Delta-G Scientific. The
chemical work conducted at that company, as I argued in the previous chapter, was in
part determined by the authority of Lt.-Gen. Dr Lothar Neethling, the head of the South
African Police's forensic laboratories. His role in the research projects conducted at
Delta-G was broadly analogous to the role played at Roodeplaat by Basson. And so
whereas the productive constraints on the development of the chemical agents produced
at Delta-G were derived from Neethling's ideological intentions, as I argued in the
previous chapter, the productive constraints on the development of biological agents at
Roodeplaat were derived from Basson's own visionary intentions. The "common sense
racism" that animated Roodeplaat's research projects was thus also an integral part of the
founding vision of the entire charismatic structure ofthe chemical and biological
weapons research programme. With this in mind, it is therefore necessary to return, at
the conclusion of this chapter and with the revelation of the nature ofBasson's vision, to
the intention that kick-started my own study of the weapons research programme.
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This thesis opened with the avowed intention of examining the workings of the
late Apartheid state's chemical and biological weapons research programme not only as
an end in itself, but also as a way of illuminating the possible relationship between the
workings of that programme and the workings of the late Apartheid state. In the last two
chapters I argued that the institutional structure of Project Coast, within which the
research programme took place, was not reducible to the normal institutional order of the
state's other institutions; rather, Project Coast required a separate kind of analysis, based
on its particular charismatic institutional order. In this chapter I have come to argue that,
despite these institutional divergences, the technological research conducted at
Roodeplaat, in particular, partakes of a broad "common sense racism" that has also
structured the Apartheid state's formation from 1948 onwards. This argument implied
.that the technologies themselves cannot be separated from their intended use, or from the
charismatic vision that structured the way in which these particular technologies were
addressed to the form of common-sense racism that determined that use. If we are to
address the relationship between the workings of the research programme and the
working of the late Apartheid state, we need therefore to examine the relationship
between the vision conveyed by Basson that animated of the chemical and biological
weapons research programme and the late Apartheid state's ambitious "Total Strategy".
The militarised late Apartheid state defined itself through its "Total Strategy", a
term borrowed from the work of the French general Beaufre, by way of the counter-
insurgency techniques developed to contain guerrilla uprisings in Vietnam, Malaysia, and
Algeria. This strategy emphasised that, in modern warfare, the whole society of any
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given country was involved in a perpetual struggle against destabilising forces both
within and outside that society. The state, to maintain the security of its continued
governance, should engage at every possible level with these perceived internal and
external destabilising forces. Traditional military tactics might be sufficient to address
external destabilising forces, but they were not in fact capable of addressing the internal
destabilisation ofthe society. Instead, the state would need to police the internal tensions
in the society while at the same time attempting to "win the hearts and minds" of its
subjects. It was only through this multi-faceted strategy that a state could maintain its
authority in the modern world. This strategy was adopted wholesale by the late
Apartheid state, under the State Presidency ofP.W. Botha. It was the ideological
framework within which the efforts of that state to maintain its power -- whether through
the public violence of the States of Emergency, the policing of insurgency, the political
compromises of the Tri-Cameral Parliament, or the political capitulations represented by
the state's abandonment of some of the foundationallegislation of the Apartheid state,
most notably the Immorality Act (1950) and the Mixed Marriages Act (1949) in 1988 --
was expressed. The Tota.l Strategy was, therefore, an attempt to meld together the
simultaneous problem of recognising the scale of political protest, both inside and outside
the county's borders, and ofjustifying the state's necessary institutional reforrn.46
46 Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, War and Society: The Militarisation ofSouth Africa (David Philip,
Johannesburg: 1989) remains my principal source of information on the Total Strategy. Williarn Beinart's
Twentieth Century South Africa (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2001) is a useful textbook study that
concisely summarises the complex issues in a clear manner. See also Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The
Apartheid State and the Politics ofthe National Party, 1948-1994 (Ohio University Press, Cleveland:
1998) for a superb account of the basis for this ideology.
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The Total Strategy certainly made use of some of the technologies developed
under the aegis of Project Coast. If we look first at the products of Delta-G Scientific, the
chemical branch of the weapons research programme, it is apparent that this use was
fraught with problems. The intended use ofCR tear gas, the subject of the previous
chapter, was as an enhanced, more effective crowd control agent -- which, while it could
possibly have been used a tactic with a broader Total Strategy, was not. Lothar Neethling
testified that CR was only used "twice operationally" in the decade after it was
developed.47 This was most likely in part due to its intended use as a complete tool of
crowd control, spoken of by Neethling as well as the other senior scientists involved in its
development. The consequences of this are perhaps more clearly seen in the context of
the (uncompleted) research intended to produce a set of crowd controlling agents out of
the active chemicals in street-drugs. The desired effect of these new forms of crowd
controlling gases would be to ''pacify'' insurgent crowds. The chemical effects of
Mandrax, Ecstasy, and Cannabis were particularly studied because of their calmative
effect on the human brain's chemistry. These gases were intended, in other words, to
provide a crude f<.?rm ofmind-control.48 This use was far more ambitious than anything
proposed by the Total Strategy, if only because it did not require any form of political or
social compromise. Instead it offered a vision of complete state control of insurgency. If
such a weapon had been produced, it could not have been used as a tactical part of the
state's Total Strategy. The production of the weapon would invalidate that Strategy.
47 Testimony of Lt.-Gen (Or) Lothar Neethling to the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 11 June 1998.
48 Testimony ofOr Johannes Matteus Koekemoer to the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 9 June 1998.
107
A stronger case can be made for the inability of the state's Total Strategy to make
tactical use of the weapons technology developed at Roodeplaat itself. The technologies
that seem to have been most used by the state's covert armed forces were both irritants
and poisons, both biological and chemical. The targets of these technologies were almost
always politically-active individuals, and almost never large groups ofpeople.49 This
pattern of usage contrasts strongly with the proposed subjects of the contraceptive
research conducted at Roodeplaat: intended as it was to affect a whole population, not
merely individuals. Likewise, the motives behind the proposed use of this contraceptive
technology and the motives behind the state's actual strategic practice are not
complementary: the research conducted at Roodeplaat was aimed at the complete control
of the· reproductive patterns of the entire black population of South Africa and not at
producing a series of stabilising demonstrations of force and political compromises. The
same can be said for Roodeplaat's other significant research project, aimed at the creation
of a race-specific biological agent. Neither of these principal research projects carried
out under the aegis of Roodeplaat's section of the chemical and biological weapons
research programme can be said to derive their justificatory ambitions from the Total
Strategy practiced by the late Apartheid state during the 1980s.
Instead, the same end objective linked together the technologies produced under
the aegis of the weapons research programme's various front companies. That end was a
vision of complete control, offered to the programme's scientists and administrators by
49 Pauw, Apartheid's Assassins, details many of these cases. Although at the time of publication the details
of Project Coast had yet to be made public, it seems clear that many of the cases he describes can be linked
to the programme. Certainly, the presence of Lothar Neethling in many of his accounts points towards a
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Wouter Basson, Project Coast's charismatic leader. At Delta-G the research intended to
produce that complete control took the form of a project aimed at the development of
gases that would be capable of affecting the brain chemistry of an individual within a
crowd and, in the short term while that chemical agent was sought, effectively and
efficiently controlling the dispersal of insurgent crowds with a newly-developed form of
tear gas. At Roodeplaat the research intended to produce that control took the form of the
two conjoined projects studied in this chapter, the first an attempt to create a biological
agent that would act as a race-specific vector for any other biological agent, virus, or
bacteria; the second project was an attempt to produce an immunological contraceptive
that would allow the state, whether covertly or publicly~ to completely control the rate of
the black population of South Africa's reproduction. This final project was perhaps the
most ambitious embarked upon by the weapons research programme and yet, as I argue
in this chapter, the close association of Wouter Basson, the programme's charismatic
leader, with this particular research project suggests that it can be taken as representing
the unadulterated charismatic vision of control that animated the chemical and biological
weapons research programme conducted under the aegis of the institutional structure and
charismatic institutional structure of Project Coast itself.
This conclusion to this chapter's examination of the weapons research conducted
at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories suggests a further conclusion, one that addresses the
problem that animated my own study ofthe programme, that of the relationship between
the workings of the research programme and the workings ofthe state. If the
connection; as does the certainty of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that Basson, at the very least,
had regular contact with CCB agents.
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examination ofDelta-G's institutional workings uncovered substantial discontinuities
between the charismatic order of the programme and the militarised bureaucratic order of
the state, this chapter's examination of the ideological workings of Roodeplaat's varied
research programmes has also uncovered substantial discontinuities between the
animating vision of complete control that drove the weapons research programme and the
political and military compromises that defined the late Apartheid state's Total Strategy.
Neither examination sustains an argument that could position the chemical and biological
weapons research programme, institutionalised through Project Coast, as an organic,
seamless, outgrowth ofthe later Apartheid state's strategy. The relationship between the
workings of the late Apartheid state and the workings of the weapons research
programme now appears strained and uncertain. The final chapter of this thesis picks up
on this discomfort, and thus returns to the theory-laden institutional examination that
marked the opening chapter in an attempt to describe this relationship.
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Chapter Four:
The Dissolution ofProject Coast
The first chapter of this thesis addressed the particular origins ofProject Coast's
charismatic institutional order, while the following two chapters each addressed one of
the front companies that helped to make up that order. This chapter returns to the broader
institutional frame of the first chapter but, instead of examining the origins of that
institutional order, this chapter examines its end. Or rather, to be more precise, it
examines the processes that began half-way through the operation of the chemical and
biological weapons research programme, between 1985 and 1986, and that culminated, in
the period between 1989 and 1991, in the complete collapse and privatisation of that
programme. The central period of transformation, however, is my focus in this chapter.
This builds on the groundwork laid throughout the length ofthis thesis. In the
opening chapter I argued that, in dismissing the institutional order ofProject Coast as
fatally flawed and open to corruption, the other work on the field had been blinded to the
historical shifts in the programme's institutional order. My rationale for studying Project
Coast as a charismatic institution was to attempt to describe the opening years of the
research programme without recourse to the explanatory powers of teleology. Here, in
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this chapter, I return to that end and try to show how it can be as well explained using the
Weberian framework as it had been by the more cynical works already published. The
groundwork for the dating of the transformation I identify has also been laid in the last
two chapters. As I noted in the second chapter, Delta-G Scientific underwent a change of
management in the second half of 1985; while, as I noted in the third chapter, Roodeplaat
Research Laboratories underwent a similar change in management midway through 1986.
This near-simultaneous managerial transformation did not immediately affect the
research projects I described in these two chapters -- but it is worth noting here that my
accounts of both those research projects ended around 1988. The changes of
management, I argue in this chapter, did in fact have effects that were not immediately
obvious during the period in which both research projects were underway. The
.conclusions reached in both these chapters are deepened and strengthened here.
The institutional framework around which the conclusions I reached in the first chapter
were structured was based on Max Weber's enumeration of the various types of
legitimate authority.] The institutional order of Project Coast, according to my
interpretation of Weber's theoretical outline, was founded on the charismatic authority
embodied in one man, Dr Wouter Basson. The whole structure that developed around the
chemical and biological weapons research programme was founded on the bedrock of
this charismatic authority; and so its development, too, was defined by that authority.
Charismatic authority "in its pure form" -- according to Weber -- however "may be said
I Max Weber, "The Pure Types of Legitimate Authority," extracted from his Theory o/Social and
Economic Organization, translated by A.R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Macmillan, London: 1947) and
reprinted in Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago: 1968)
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to exist only in the process of originating.,,2 It cannot remain stable, but must rather
perpetually reinforce itself through personal contact and the constant recognition of the
original charismatic vision. "But this only lasts so long as the belief in [the leader's]
charismatic inspiration remains.,,3 It is my argument in this chapter ofthe thesis that the
managerial transformation at both Roodeplaat and Delta-G between 1985 and 1986 was
part ofan attempt to address the range of problems posed by the instability ofcharismatic
authority, in general, and -- more specifically -- to address the crisis caused in such an
institution when the charismatic leader, Wouter Basson, withdraws from his own role in
the structure. To interpret the implications of such a withdrawal, however, we need to
begin this chapter with a brief examination of Weber's further theorising.
Charismatic authority in its purest form is antithetical to the routine structures ofa
bureaucratic institution, operating as it does instead through personal contact, visionary
revelation, and the exercise of faith. The power to make decisions is mediated strictly
through personal contact and charismatic revelation, and not through either expert
training or bureaucratic promotion. Nonetheless, despite the validity of this ideal
characterisation of charismatic authority, if an institution founded on such an authority is
to be anything other than a transitory phenomenon, and if it is to outlive the initial force
of the charismatic leader's vision, that institution must come to be organised in a way that
would ordinarily be more closely associated with a bureaucratic or hierarchical
organisation. Charismatic authority is not stable, nor are the institutions founded on it; if
2 Max Weber, "The Nature ofCharismatic Authority and Its Routinization", extracted from his Theory of
Social and Economic Organization, translated by A.R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Macmillan,
London: 1947) and reprinted in Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt
(University ofChicago Press, Chicago: 1968) pp 54.
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these institutions are to stabilise, they must either be traditionalised or rationalised.
Weber's work, on which much ofthe theoretical weight of this thesis rests, insisted that
this process -- contradictory as it may at first seem -- must occur if a charismatic
institution is to continue operation. Weber proposed two reasons for why a charismatic
institution would need to continue operation after the inevitable destabilisation of its
charismatic leader's authority, either through his discreditation or through his death. 4
The first of the two reasons that Weber proposed was that the continued operation
of the institution that had been founded on a leader's charismatic authority would benefit
"the ideal and also the material interests of the followers in the continuation and continual
reactivation of the community" that had been formed around that original charismatic
leader.s In the case of Project Coast, which after all is the charismatically founded
institution with which this thesis is solely concerned, those interests could have been
characterised as those related to the continued operation of the chemical and biological
weapons research programme. And, more exactly, with a continued commitment to the
principles that st~ctured the particular ambitions of that weapons research programme:
mainly, the production of a set of political technologies based on a "common-sense"
notion of racial difference and political behaviour. These technologies, studied in the two
previous chapters, were explicitly framed by the scientists and administrators of Project -
the "followers" referred to in Weber's more abstract characterisation -- in relation to the
broader project of the late Apartheid state, whether through reference to its involvement
3 Weber, "The Nature of Charismatic Authority," pp 52.
4 Weber, "The Nature of Charismatic Authority," is the primary source for this theoretical exegesis. See
Chapter One and the Introduction of this thesis for further references.
5 Weber, "The Nature of Charismatic Authority," pp 54.
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in the Angolan conflict or through reference to the political turmoil within the country. If
these ideal and material interests were to be continued as the base for Project Coast's
institutional rationalisation, then I would argue that its relationship with the late
Apartheid state would be clear, and clearly significant.
If, on the other hand, the institutional rationalisation of Project Coast followed
from the second of the two reasons that Weber proposed for the continued operation of a
charismatically founded institution, then that relationship would be somewhat different.
This second reason was described by Weber as benefiting "the still stronger ideal and
material interests of the members of the administrative staff, the disciples or other
followers of the charismatic leader in continuing their relationship." To be more specific,
Weber continued, this relationship would continue "in such a way that both from an ideal
and a material point of view, their own status is put on a stable every-day basis.,,6 In the
case of Project Coast's administrators, those interests would be primarily material. More
exactly, these interests would require the accumulation of material means -- cold hard
cash, to put it baldly -- sufficient to ensure that the programme's administrators continued
to possess a certain high standard of living that they could not otherwise have. The
achievement of these material interests was not dependent on the continued operation of
the chemical and biological weapons research programme, or the continued allegiance to
its animating ambitions. Rather, the achievement of material security could be achieved
more simply by maintaining the falYade of the research programme while turning the
institutional structures of its various front companies towards the production of profit.
And if it was these ideal and material interests that were proposed as a base for Project
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Coast's possible institutional rationalisation, then I would argue that Project Coast did not
in fact take its cue from the conduct and ideology of the late Apartheid state through its
period of operation, but rather from a particular source that had to be removed before the
process of the institution's eventual rationalisation could even begin.
That source of possible inspiration is, in the theoretical scheme that Weber
sketched out, the original charismatic leader of the institution that is now attempting to
stabilise itself in his absence. That absence, Weber simply points out, is inevitable:
sooner or later a charismatic leader will die, or otherwise be removed from the networks
of personal contact and discipleship that define a charismatic movement. The person in
question here, the charismatic leader of Project Coast, was Dr Wouter Basson. If! am to
describe a situation in which the institutional structure of Project Coast could be
considered as a candidate for rationalisation, then I need to describe first how Basson --
who remains among the living at the time of writing -- came to be removed from the
networks of personal contact and discipleship that determined Project Coast's decision-
making structures and, therefore, structured the development of the chemical and
biological weapons research programme that was conducted within those structures.
Fortunately, his testimony during his criminal trial provides exactly that description.
In his testimony during his criminal trial, Wouter Basson claimed that between
1984 and 1986 he had attended several meetings of an international group of arms
traders, specialising in chemical and biological weapons. Basson testified that he had
approached this group -- which he called, variously, the "CBW Mafia" and his financial
6 Weber, "The Nature of Charismatic Authority," pp 54.
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"Principals" -- under the guise of a simple sanctions-busting South African businessman
and arms trader. He told Judge Hartzenberg that, despite all the international resources at
the command of this shadowy group, his cover was never penetrated. Even in 1986,
when he testified that this group asked him to be their representative in several money-
laundering operations, he believed that all the members of the group believed him to be
nothing more than a businessman. He emphasised that he in no way represented the
South African state at these meetings. Instead, as he told the Court, he turned the
contacts he made through this group to the state's advantage. The various front
companies of Project Coast were used to launder the group's money while, at the same
time and quid pro quo, purchasing the latest in research technology for those companies'
use. This was all conducted with the approval of Surgeon General Nicol Nieuwoudt,
Basson testified, and, he continued, it was considered by that man to be in the greater
interests of the country that Basson continue his involvement with this Chemical and
Biological Weapons Mafia. Of course, Basson argued, this meant that that for years after
this first substantial interaction, in 1986, his attention was increasingly diverted away
from the development of the state's chemical and biological weapons research
programme, and from the institutional development of Project Coast. He was rather
concentrating, throughout this period, on an international world ofcovert action.7
IfBasson's testimony can be taken at face-value, his statements would certainly
constitute proof of his increasing detachment from the personal networks of charismatic
7 Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and
Biological Warfare Programme (Zebra Press, Cape Town: 2002) provides an overview ofthis period of.
Basson's testimony, drawing on their regular reportage of the trial in their Basson Trial Reports. The entire
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authority that constituted the original institutional order of Project Coast. The objections
raised against his testimony are substantial enough that they must be addressed before
this conclusion can safely be drawn. The first objection against this account is its
contradictory vagueness: Basson referred, throughout his testimony, to two groups as his
"Principals". One of these was the so-called Mafia, his financial Principals, and the other
was the Defence Force's General Staff itself, his ideological Principals. Although Basson
justified this by splitting the financial and ideological aspects of his work, the confusion
he demonstrated could easily cause doubts to fonn. The second objection against this
account, both harder to demonstrate and more damning if true, is that it serves only as
Basson's means ofjustifying the financial misconduct proved by the Prosecution in his
criminal trial. This would then explain why neither the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Mafia or the mysterious Principals appeared in Basson's earlier testimony to
the Truth Commission: his account was manufactured to address the Prosecution's
evidence and arguments. To distance Basson, in other words, from the financial
misconduct of which he was otherwise clearly guilty. This second objection comes
closest to my personal interpretation of these statements. Neither objection, however,
was accepted by the judge presiding at Basson's trial. Judge Hartzenberg's final
judgement found Basson innocent of all charges laid against him, explicitly stating that
Hartzenberg had given particular credence Basson's account of his financial dealings
with the so-called Mafia. His account was more convincing than that of the sceptical
Prosecution.8 Although the proof of Basson's increasing detachment from the personal
networks of charismatic authority that constituted the original institutional order of
run of reports between numbers 48 and 56, 23 July 2001 - 28 September 2001, contains fragments of this
argument, and were consulted.
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Project Coast would stand up in court, it is tainted by the legitimate objections to
Basson's accounts.
Nonetheless, whether Basson's attention was diverted by his increasing
involvement in an international world of illicit weapons trading or whether it was
diverted by the tempting possibilities of financial misappropriation, the fact remains that
the chemical and biological weapons research programme -- the supposed raison d'etre
of Project Coast -- occupied far less of his personal attention after 1987. He distanced
himself from the network of personal contacts that had built up and maintained his
charismatic authority. And, in doing so, he brought about the end of the charismatic
institutional order that had thus far worked to produce the structure of Project Coast, as
well as the research programme embedded in that structure. The chemical and biological
weapons research programme lost its charismatic leader, by his own testimony, neither
through his discreditation nor through his death, but rather through his increasing
inattention. This was as effective a loss of charismatic legitimacy as his death would have
been; and it allows us to argue about the project's possible routinisation.
Without access to the charismatic authority derived from Basson's presence to
legitimise the decisions made by Project Coast's administrators, those administrators
were faced with a dilemma. Either they could choose to continue in the patterns set by
the last several years of legitimised decision-making, allowing momentum to carry the
programme forward until such a time when Basson would return and reanimate the
programme. Or they could choose to begin to institute a series of far-reaching structural
8 Burger and Gould, Secrets and Lies, quotes at length from Hartzenberg's judgement.
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changes with the aim of ensuring the programme's continued operation after the complete
withdrawal of Basson' s legitimising charisma. According to Weber's scheme, this
second choice could either be motivated by a desire to extend and continue the
development of the chemical and biological weapons research programme in the interests
of the late Apartheid state, or it could be motivated by a desire on the part of the
administrators of the programme to enrich themselves into financial security. The
.process of re-organisation began before Basson' s charismatic authority turned in another
direction, however, when he appointed two new directors to the senior management
positions of both Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and Delta-G Scientific. The
implications of this change, and of Basson's role in it, can only be addressed through a
narrative account of these changes, and of the consequences they entailed.
The change in the institutional order of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories came
with the appointment ofDr Wynand Swanepoel to the position of the front company's
Managing Director, replacing the company's founder Dr Daan Goosen. Swanepoel had
been trained as a dentist, rather than as a research scientist, and had spent most his career
as an administrative expert rather than as a practicing medical technician. In his
testimony to the Truth Commission, Swanepoel explained much of the difference
between Goosen's managerial practice and his by recourse to this difference in training
and experience. He was not, in other words, recruited for his ability either to conduct
research, or to manage the practice of research within the company, but rather to resolve
"a management crisis". Swanepoel told the Truth Commission that Wouter Basson had
approached him, late in 1985, and told him that ''the management aspects and the co-
120
ordinating aspects in terms of personnel and finance" at the military front company,
Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, "had become a bit of a problem." Basson, according
to Swanepoel's later testimony, proceeded to ask him to take over the management of the
company, replacing Daan Goosen who was "out of hand" managerially. "They had
problems with the control thereof," Swanepoel recalled. He also recalled that he was
happy to accept, having been assured by Basson that his appointment was supported by
the front company's other senior directors, including Dr Andre Immelman and Dr Schalk
Van Rensburg. And so, by the middle of 1986, Wynand Swanepoel had become the
Managing Director of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories.9
Goosen, however, did not take this transformation lying down. He claimed to
have worked administrative miracles in his time as managing director ofRoodeplaat. In
under three years, from the end of 1983 to the beginning of 1986, he had supervised the
building of the laboratory facilities, the employment of the administrative and scientific
staff, and set the first research projects in motion. Two audits had been conducted in
those years, witho~t any signs of financial misappropriation. He had even had, he told
the Truth Commission in his testimony, a day after Swanepoel's, the trust and support of
the remainder of the front company's directors. lo Schalk Van Rensburg, speaking before
either Swanepoel or Goosen's testimony, certainly claimed to have supported him in this
period, and to have mistrusted the motives behind Swanepoel's appointment. ll Goosen
9 Testimony ofDr Wynand Swanepoel to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 10 June 1998.
10 Testimony ofDr Daan Goosen to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 11 June 1998.
11 Testimony ofDr Schalk Van Rensburg to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 9 June 1998.
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argued that his replacement was not motivated by the failure of his managerial practices,
but rather by a personal animosity held by Basson against him. Goosen testified to the
Commission that he believed that this animosity had led to Basson, and his circle of
disciples, to manufacture a series of accusations against him: that he had mismanaged his
front company, that he had misappropriated the company's finances for his own ends,
and, most seriously, that he had compromised the covert nature of the chemical and
biological weapons research programme by an unspecified major security breach. While
Goosen admitted in his testimony that each of these charges had some foundations in the
truth, he argued that in none of the cases were those foundations sufficient to require his
dismissal. The only explanation he could offer was that he believed that his ambition for
the front company -- to turn Roodeplaat into a "model contract research company"
independent from the Defence Force -- did not coincide with Basson's ambitions,
whatever they might have been. And so Goosen believed, as he told the Truth
Commission, that he had been replaced by Wynand Swanepoel, who admitted knowing
nothing of research, because Swanepoel was more pliable than him. 12
IfGoosen's somewhat self-serving argument is accurate in implying that Basson
had triggered the managerial transformation of Roodeplaat to prevent its impending
independent operation and to replace a competent administrator with a loyal one, then it
also implies that the inevitable rationalisation faced by Project Coast in Basson's absence
was constrained by a strong institutionalised discipleship. This means that, in the process
of rationalisation, the institution's rationalised interests were set by Basson' s lead even
after the central focus of his attention had shifted away from the chemical and biological
12 Goosen, 11 June 1998.
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weapons research programme. Before the further implications of this are examined,
however, the accuracy of Goosen's argument must be addressed. There are two
particular sources to turn to in support of his broader argument, even ifboth sources do
nothing to support the aggrieved tone of Goosen' s testimony. The first of these is the
testimony of Schalk Van Rensburg regarding the nature of the managerial transformation
at Roodeplaat, a source which deepens the details of Goosen's own testimony. The
second of these sources is not concerned with Roodeplaat, but rather with the roughly
contemporaneous managerial transformation that took place at Delta-G Scientific, the
other principal front company of Project Coast, between 1985 and 1986.
In his testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Schalk Van
Rensburg described his understanding of the replacement of Goosen by Swanepoel in the
phrase that gave this thesis its title: it was, he said, "the end of the future." Daan Goosen,
Van Rensburg told the Commission, had been a source of inspiration to him. They had
worked together to draw up the research agenda that Roodeplaat was to follow; they had
also worked together to draw up the agenda for the institutional transformation of
Roodeplaat into a commercial research company. He had known where he stood with
Goosen, and had admired the man's managerial ability. Van Rensburg testified that
when he had heard that he was to be replaced by Swanepoel, a dentist promoted out of
the military's Special Forces, he hadn't been able to believe it. "There people are not
suitable for administering a group of scientists," he told the Commission, claiming to be
repeating a statement he had made to Basson at the time. "Military people come with
their mythical super leadership style." And, he continued, while "this style is necessary if
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you want to convince a lot of otherwise sensible youngsters to become cannon fodder," it
was "not suitable in a scientific milieu." Indeed, Van Rensburg told the Commission, it
was antithetical to a scientific research company and so, in the absence of Goosen's
inspired leadership, the company was unable to continue in its planned path. Swanepoel,
in his opinion, was incapable of understanding the company's work and so contented
himself with passing on instructions from Basson. 13 Van Rensburg's account thus seems
to support the principal contention made by Goosen during his testimony: that he was
replaced not because of complaints about his management, but because his ambitions for
the company conflicted with Basson' s.
Goosen also argued that Basson chose to appoint Swanepoel in his place, because
ofSwanepoel's dependable loyalty, and ignorance. Because Swanepoel, Goosen argued,
was not capable of understanding the practices of research carried out at Roodeplaat, he
could be depended upon to simply follow Basson's orders. Swanepoel's disconnection
from the company's research practices was attested to not only by Schalk Van Rensburg,
but also by Swanepoel himself: he told the Truth Commission that he "did not have the
ability to do that.,,14 A similar ignorance was confessed to the Truth Commission by Dr
Philip Mijburgh. Mijburgh had been appointed as the Managing Director ofDelta-G
Scientific six months before Swanepoel was appointed to the same position at
Roodeplaat. He, too, was appointed to replace an earlier, founding, director who was
accused of unspecified managerial incompetence. Despite being pressured by the Truth
Commission's representative during his testimony, Mijburgh could not say exactly why
13 Van Rensburg, 9 June 1998.
14 Swanepoel, 10 June 1998.
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Basson had appointed him to this position. The closest he came to answering the
question was through reference to the long-standing friendship between Wouter Basson
and himself. They had become friends at the University of Pretoria, where Mijburgh was
studying medicine at the same time as Basson was completing his graduate research.
They "played squash" and went running together. They "socialised" together. And when
Basson went on to found Project Coast, his friendship with Mijburgh continued.
Mijburgh, however, did not remain in medicine: instead, after completing his degree, he
enrolled in an accountancy programme by correspondence from the University of South
Africa, "because commerce interested me more than medicine did." This commercial
qualification, combined with a medical degree, seems to have rendered Mijburgh the
perfect candidate for directorship of Delta-G -- it is worth remembering, however, that
his lack of interest in medicine meant that he did not continue to practice research after
qualifying and so, despite the relevance of his qualifications, he was no better equipped to
manage a research programme than Wynand Swanepoel, a dentist. Even in his sworn
testimony, Mijburgh acknowledged that he was more likely hired thanks to his friendship
with, and loyalty to, Basson than because of his qualifications, IS
The period between the end of 1985 and the beginning of 1987 was therefore a
watershed period for the institutional order ofProject Coast. Despite the self-serving
motives apparent in his testimony, Goosen's characterisation of the institutional
transformation that occurred during the watershed has been sufficiently corroborated by
the supporting testimonies of Schalk Van Rensburg and Philip Mijburgh to be used as a
15 Testimony ofDr Philip Mijburgh to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special
Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 18 July 1998.
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broadly accurate describe of this period. The detail of that description can be rendered as
an abstract series of events: first, Basson orchestrated the removal of the original
Managing Directors of Project Coast's two largest front companies, Delta-G Scientific
and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories. He then replaced these two directors with two of
his choosing, chosen both for their loyalty and their ignorance of research practice.
If this scheme is correct, then this same watershed period should also have seen a
transformation in the nature of the research conducted under by the state's chemical and
biological weapons research programme under the institutional aegis of Project Coast.
Indeed, given the two directors' experience, no substantial research project should have
been begun at either front company after the completion of the managerial
transformations at both Roodeplaat and Delta-G during 1986. This situation lasted" until
the privatisation of the two companies in 1991, and the effective end of Project Coast.
But, if this characterisation of the research programme is correct, the state's chemical and
biological weapons research programme could be said to have ended almost five years
before the institutional rollback of Project Coast, as detailed in Stephen Burgess and
Helen Purkitt's monograph on the subject. 16 This would mean that, since the period from
1987 to 1991 was marked by the Basson' s increasing detachment from the networks of
personal contact that had ensured the maintenance of the charismatic vision that had
originally animated weapons research programme, the chemical and biological weapons
research programme was purely a manifestation of Basson's charismatic authority and
not an intrinsic, structural, part of the late Apartheid state's racial ideology. Before fully
16 Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback ofSouth Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare
Programme (USAF Counterproliferation Centre, MaxwelI Air Base, Virginia: 2001)
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accepting this conclusion, however, we must be certain that the predicted decline in
research production did in fact occur at both of the two major front companies.
At Delta-G Scientific no large-scale research projects seem to have been begun
after 1986; and only one seems to have originated in the watershed period between 1985
and 1987. That research project, aimed at the production of a crowd-control gas derived
from common street drugs, rested however on an earlier proposal by Lothar Neethling,
the head of the South African Police's forensics laboratories. I? The initial progress of
this research project has been detailed in the second chapter of this thesis. That progress
climaxed in 1988, when Dr Johannes Koekemoer carried out experiments using a gaseous
form of methaqualone, the active chemical in the street-drug Mandrax. These
experiments were unsuccessful, as the gas had little or no noticeable effect on the test
subjects. Koekemoer was however unable to testify to any further tests conducted after
that year, either on the methaqualone gas, or on either the proposed gases formed from
the active chemicals in cannabis and Ecstasy. 18 Instead, as was revealed during
Koekemoer's testimony and then extended during Mijburgh's, Delta-G seems to have
turned towards the production and encapsulation of the drugs themselves. Mijburgh
claimed not to know of any controls his company had put into place to restrict the
possible disposal of these encapsulated drugS. 19 Wouter Basson, during his criminal
trial, testified that many of these encapsulated drugs were sold on the international market
to raise funds for Project Coast. These deals, he told the court, were approved by the
17 Testimony of Lt-Gen. (Dr) Lothar Neethling to the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 11 June 1998.
18 Testimony ofDr Johannes Matteus Koekemoer to the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission's Special Hearing into Chemical and Biological Warfare, 9 June 1998.
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state itself -- but, as with his earlier statements, the individuals he named as having given
their approval were dead at the time he testified.2° The reason behind the production of
drugs indistinguishable in chemical content or packaging from their counterparts
available on the streets remains a matter for speculation. Whatever that reason might be,
the fact is unaltered: the one substantial chemical weapons research project developed at
Delta-G after the successful production of CR tear gas degenerated from the production
of chemical agents to the production of street drugs. At this particular front company,
Delta-G Scientific, the transformation in managerial practices, combined with the
scientific ignorance of its new director, thus resulted in a collapse of its branch of the
chemical and biological weapons research programme.
A similar situation seems to have existed at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories.
All four of its principal research directions, detailed in the previous chapter, were set in
place before 1986. In none of the various testimonies offered by Daan Goosen, Schalk
Van Rensburg, Wynand Swanepoel, and Dr Mike Odendaal-- a scientist working on
creating viral cul~res for Roodeplaat -- was there any mention ofa new research project
being started after 1986. Instead Swanepoel informed the Commission that he was
utterly ignorant of any research projects that occurred under his management: "I can't
remember anything specific," he said.21 Van Rensburg, as has already been detailed, told
the Commission that this period was "the end of the future" and, by the end of the
decade, he had been driven to resign from the front company. The contraceptive research
19 Mijburgh, 18 July 1998. .
20 Reported in Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme. (Zebra Press, Cape Town: 2002) .
21 Swanepoel, 10 June 1998.
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project, of which he was the nominal head, made no substantial process in this period,
despite prompting from the company's management,22 Odendaal testified that, like Van
Rensburg, he "did not like the way we were being managed" in this period. This was
because he, and his division, were simply left alone to continue producing biological
agents at their own pace and in their own order of priority. They produced several agents
between 1987 and 1991, Odendaal testified, but their work seemed entirely
unappreciated, and ignored, by the company's management,23 The pattern running
through all these accounts is clear: after 1986 the research work done within
Roodeplaat's laboratories was quietly neglected by the company's management. It was
also, more exactly, neglected by the charismatic authority embodied in the company's
earlier administrative leaders, and expressed through the constant presence ofBasson in
Roodeplaat's hallways. The effect of this neglect was to cause the research work
conducted to either simply continue in its same old paths, or to grind to a slow halt.
Without the possibility of productive intervention by the management, and without the
animating vision offered by Basson's presence, Roodeplaat's branch of the chemical and
biological weapons research programme, like Delta-G's branch, withered away.
The speed with which the research programmes conducted at both Delta-G and
Roodeplaat abandoned the animating ideals of the chemical and biological weapons
research programme suggests that those ideals were never fully internalised by those
institutions, or by the individuals employed in those institutions to conduct that research.
Instead, the conviction that drove the way in which the research programme was
22 Van Rensburg, 9 June 1998.
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developing, from 1981 to 1986, was held quite lightly. The research conducted after this
period, as illustrated above, turned with ease away from the production of technologies
shaped by a hegemonic common-sense racism shared with the late Apartheid state. This
hegemonic racism seems, in the case of Delta-G at least, to have been replaced by what
can only appear to be an animating profit-motive. It is difficult to imagine what other
purpose the production of large quantities of street-ready drugs could have other than for
sale, and thus for profit. The transformation in the nature of the research conducted at
Project Coast's various front companies thus appears to have been determined jointly by
the collapse of the ideological interests animating the original research programme, and
by the material interests of the scientists and administrators involved in the later
institutionalisation of that programme. This is strikingly similar to the description
offered by Weber of a process of institutional rationalisation that, in the absence of a
continued charismatic vision, is driven by its administrators' material greed.
Indeed, the testimonies offered both at the Truth Commission's Special Hearing
and, in far more detail, during Basson's criminal trial detailed example after example of
financial impropriety on behalf the administrators ofProject Coast within the exact same
timeframe. These testimonies formed the basis of prosecution's case in the criminal trial
that Basson had committed gross financial fraud -- a charge which Judge Hartzenberg,
presiding at the trial, dismissed. Hartzenberg did make explicit in his judgement that,
while he believed the balance of evidence was in favour of Basson's innocence, he also
believed that most of the witnesses testifying to their own complicity in cases of
23 Testimony of Dr Mike Odendaal to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Special Hearing into
Chemical and Biological Warfare, 10 June 1998.
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corruption, embezzlement, and fraud were telling the truth in that regard. Financial
misconduct was rife in the institutions of Project Coast in its last years of operation,
Hartzenberg concluded?4 And, whether Hartzenberg was correct in judging Basson
untainted by this corruption or not, it seems clear that the pervasive appropriation of the
various front companies' finances by their administrators can be traced to the
destabilising effect Basson's withdrawal had on the organisation of Project Coast. As a
sign of this, it is apparent that the individuals who profited the most from the financial
reorganisation of Project Coast were those individuals appointed by Basson in the
watershed of its institutional transformation between 1985 and 1986, Philip Mijburgh and
Wynand Swanepoel. A single cluster of significant examples serves to illustrate this.
The decision to privatise Delta-G Scientific and Roodeplaat Research
Laboratories, the two largest front companies for the chemical and biological weapons
research programme, was taken in April 1990. In the following years, the directors of
these two front companies exercised the option to buy the controlling shares in their
companies. The principal stakeholders in each of the two companies were their
Managing Directors, Mijburgh and Swanepoel, and so they both gained the largest
percentages of their relevant shares. The approximate cost, calculated by Burgess and
Purkitt in their monograph, of the two purchases combined was R350 000 in the currency
of the period. (This was approximately US $120 000 in 1990.) Neither Mijburgh or
Swanepoel retained the shares that they had bought, however. Within two years of their
respective purchases, both Delta-G and Roodeplaat -- now privately owned by their
Managing Directors -- were sold once more, this time to foreign investors. The combined
24 See Hartzenberg's judgement quoted in Burger and Gould, Secrets and Lies, esp. pp 194-199.
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sale prices, again estimated by Burgess and Purkitt, totalled RSO million in the currency
of the period. (This was approximately US $17 million.) It hardly needs to be said that
the profit margin on these two transactions was remarkably large.2s (It was certainly
large enough to attract the attention of the Office of Serious Economic Offences, which
proceeded to launch an investigation into the deals that eventually resulted in the state's
covert chemical and biological weapons research programme becoming common
knowledge?6) It also hardly needs to be said that the two individuals profiting most
greatly from these transactions were the same two individuals appointed by Wouter
Basson during the transformation of Project Coast between 1985 and 1986.
Once these varied accounts have been weighed and considered, it seems clear that
the second reason for a possible rationalisation of a charismatic institution, as described
by Max Weber, better represents the way in which Project Coast came to develop after
the removal of Basson's originating charisma.27 The process of research come to an end
with the re-organisation of Project Coast's institutional structure, and was replaced by a
process of financial accumulation on the part of the research programme's administrators.
The transformation of Project Coast that occurred during the watershed period between
1985 and 1986 and then continued to develop in the five years following was motivated
not by an ideological commitment on the part of its administrators to the continuing
operation of the chemical and biological weapons research programme but rather by a
desire on their part to ensure the normalisation of the processes of financial accumulation,
and thus of a certain standard of living. These processes include both examples ofpetty
25 Burgess and Purkitt, The Ro/lback, pp 58-59.
26 This investigation is consistently referred to in Burger and Gould, Secrets and Lies.
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embezzlement and also examples such as the one given above of astonishing financial
misconduct. The implications of this recognition, at least as revealed by this chapter's
argument, for this thesis are twofold.
The first of these requires a return to the thesis's opening chapter. Three-quarters
of the way through that chapter, before explaining the theoretical ideal-type of
charismatic institution and showing how Project Coast could be described in its terms, I
argued that the descriptions offered by Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt's monograph,
The Rollback ofSouth Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, and more
particularly by Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould's book, Secrets and Lies: Wouter
Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, of the
institutional order and workings of Project Coast were to some degree anti-historic.28 I
. argued that this was because both accounts read the institutional order of Project Coast
backwards, assuming that the nexus of financial mismanagement, managerial disinterest,
and cynical deal-making that defined the institution's very final years did in fact describe
the entire period of its operation. I stated then that I believed that this was a
misapprehension, and that a historical examination of the earliest years of the chemical
and biological weapons research programme's operation, one that tried not to second-
guess its eventual outcome and thus produce a teleology of inevitable financial
corruption, would produce a very different description of Project Coast's institutional
order. The description that I proposed took Max Weber's enumeration of the possible
modes of legitimate institutional authority as its starting point, and derived from it an
identification of Project Coast with the ideal-type of institution founded on charismatic
27 Weber, "The Nature of Charismatic Authority."
28 Burgess and Purkitt, The Rollback. Burger and Gould, Secrets and Lies.
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authority. The conclusion that I took from this process was that, regardless of its final
collapse towards fraud, the institutional order of Project Coast was founded in a certain
sincerity, with the original intent to produce the chemical and biological weapons that it
was expected to develop. The charismatic institutional order, furthermore, helped to
define the ways in which the research programme itself developed, and the particular
kind of weapons technology that it tried to develop.
This chapter has now brought this thesis to the point at which the institutional
order of Project Coast can be said to have collapsed in on itself. While this was the
starting point for the other works' description of the institutional order of Project Coast, it
is the end of my history of that order's origin, transformation, and decline. The
complementary narrative of the research programme's development within that
institutional order has supported this history; and, considered together, they confirm my
original contention. The fact that Project Coast's institutional structure can be shown to
have undergone a period of transformation between 1985 and 1986, as I have detailed at
length in this chapter, and that the beneficiaries of that transformation were also the
beneficiaries of the later processes of financial mismanagement strongly suggests this
interpretation. When viewed beside the gradual abandonment of the ideals animating the
chemical and biological weapons research programme through the same period, this
interpretation of the institutional history of Project Coast gains yet more credibility. The
conclusion of this line ofargument can only be that the development ofProject Coast's
institutional was shaped most by the charismatic authority of Wouter Basson, and the
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corresponding genuine belief in the vision his disciples perceived him to represent. Its
origin was vouchsafed by his authority, and its decline lay in its gradual withdrawal.
The second implication of the recognition that Project Coast underwent a radical
transformation in the second half of the 1980s, a transformation that resulted in the
weapons research programme's collapse, is that that research programme's ideals were
defined internally rather than derived from the state's broader ideology of governance. I
have already argued, in the previous chapter, that the ideal of complete control that
animated the type of weapons research conducted at Project Coast was not compatible
with the Total Strategy practiced by the late Apartheid state through the 1980s. In this
chapter I have argued that the collapse of that ideal, after the watershed period of
institutional transformation between 1985 and 1986, suggests that the stimulating effect
of Wouter Basson' s charismatic authority was essential to the continued operation of that
ideal. The decline into financial misappropriation suffered by the institutional order
within which that research was developed only reinforces this, even when interpreted
through the lens ~f Weber's theory of the rationalisation of charismatic authority given
above. The conclusion that arises out of the examination, pursued through the length of
this thesis and culminating in this chapter, of the research programme's actual history of
development is unmistakable: the research practiced at Project Coast was determined
most by the perceived vision of its charismatic leader, and not by the state's practice.
This argument thus leads to one inevitable conclusion: that the chemical and
biological weapons research programme, despite being funded and sponsored by the late
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Apartheid state, did not derive either its legitimising rationale or its institutional structure
from the policies and ideologies of that state. Rather, the vision that animated the
research programme was a product ofthe reception given by the programme's scientists
and administrators to Wouter Basson's charismatic authority. The common-sense racism
that shaped the scientific ambitions of the research programme were filtered through his
vision, which in turn may have been derived from the same source as the common-sense
racism that pervaded the late Apartheid state. It was not of a piece with the animating
hegemonic racism of that state, however. This conclusion is vouchsafed by the collapse
of that animating force with the removal of Basson's personal charisma and vision while,
at the same time, the late Apartheid state was attempting to use the various products of
this weapons research programme, and others, to attempt to secure the continuance of
these hegemonic ideals. The weapons research programme was not a natural growth of
the late Apartheid state's militarisation of politics; but rather an aberration that exploited
an opportunity opened by that process.
The relationship between the workings of the chemical and biological weapons
research programme and the workings of the late Apartheid state that drove the concerns
of this thesis can therefore now be finally described. Although funded by the late
Apartheid state, and although situated within the institutional framework of the South
African Defence Force's chain of command, Project Coast did not derive its institutional
order from the militarised bureaucracies of both the state and the Defence Force. And,
although making use of a similarly hegemonic, and thus shared, set of notions around the
essential nature of race, sex, population, and difference, neither was the research
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programme itself simply derived from the requirements of either the state or the Defence
Force. The late Apartheid state provided the broader political context within which
Project Coast, and the chemical and biological weapons research programme, developed.
The state had little to no part, however, to play in the institutional workings of Project
Coast, or in the ideological development of the programme's research projects.
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Conclusion:
Discontinuities in the late Apartheid State
At the end of the final chapter of this thesis, I concluded that the relationship
between the workings of the chemical and biological weapons research programme and
the workings of the late Apartheid state was best described as coincidental. The state
helped to determine the broader context within which the programme operated, and also
provided the vast majority of the programme's funding; much of the programme's
material equipment and many of its original staff were also recruited from within the
state. And yet, nonetheless, there is no evidence to suggest that the state played any role
in determining either the way in which the weapons research programme was
institutionalised or the way in which the particular research projects it embarked upon
were chosen and developed. Indeed, as I argued throughout the length of the thesis, the
actual development and rhetoric of the programme's institutions and research projects
were utterly incompatible with those of the late Apartheid state. Certain similarities
between the state's practices of governance, and the practices of Project Coast's research
programme, such as their shared "common sense" racial ideas and their shared
commitment to rationalised violence, may have at first disguised the discrepancies
between the two. But, upon closer study, these discrepancies are hard to ignore. It is .
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worth using the largest part of this concluding section, then, to recapitulate the argument
that has led me to this final conclusion to the original question that animated the writing
of this thesis. I can identify five conclusions that lead to this point.
The first of the conclusions reached in the course of this examination of the state's
chemical and biological weapons research programme -- that is to say, the weapons
research programme approved and funded by the late Apartheid state through the
institutional structures of the South African Defence Force -- is to affirm that the research
programme had its own, unique institutional history. This is in contrast to the assumption
that has determined the way in which the two principal works that examine the weapons
research programme have addressed the institutional frame within which that research
was conducted.! These works both assume that the programme's institutional frame
remained unchanged from its beginning to its end and that, therefore, the development of
the research programme can be studied as if its institutional frame did not exist -- or,
rather, that the frame can be typified in the opening section of the work and then taken for
granted throughout the remainder ofthat work. Because the greater quantity of the
evidence currently made public describes the last years of Project Coast, the military's
code name for the chemical and biological weapons research programme's institutional
framework, these works impose the end of the programme's operation on its beginnings.
The first substantial portion of this thesis was devoted to successfully demonstrating that
the original institutional framework described by the scientists and administrators
I Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Ro/lback ofSouth Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare
Programme (USAF Counterproliferation Centre, Maxwell Air Force Base, VA: 2001) and Marlene Burger
and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare
Programme (Zebra Press, Cape Town: 2002)
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involved in its creation was not identical to the framework described by those involved in
its dissolution. On the basis of this demonstration, I argued that any examination of the
development of the weapons research programme must take into account the
simultaneous development of its institutional frame: namely, Project Coast.
The development of Project Coast in the decade from its origins to its end was
marked by a series of discontinuities, redundancies, and ruptures that marked it as
something other than a traditional bureaucratic structure. Two examples will serve to
illustrate this series here: one, that there seemed to be no way to determine the expertise
of the individuals appointed to positions of responsibility within the research programme,
and two, that there seemed to be no provision within this institutional frame for the
. promotion of component individuals. These particular institutional traits seemed, ·upon a
closer examination of the original structure of Project Coast, to be too regular and too
J..
consistent to be simply dismissed either as the product of bureaucratic incompetence, or
as the product of fraudulent intentions. Its internal consistency suggested that Project
Coast did indeed partake of a coherent institutional structure, even if that structure was
not the expected bureaucracy. To determine what that structure was, however, the
remaining halfof the first chapter of this thesis was given over to an examination of the
determining traits of an ideal modern bureaucracy, as presented in the theoretical writings
ofMax Weber.2 This led to an examination Weber's further theoretical writings, in
which I recognised a description that matched the structure of Project Coast, as it was
2 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons,
and edited by Talcott Parsons. (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1947)
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presented as being at the time of its origin. 3 The description offered by Weber was of an
institution founded on the legitimating authority of charisma, embodied in one particular
individual. That charismatic leader's followers were not, Weber explained, appointed for
their expertise but rather for their faith; and there was nO need for a system of promotion
in a charismatic institution as advancement through the institutional structures was solely
determined by the personal relationship between an individual and the programme's
charismatic leader. It seemed plausible, therefore, to tentatively identify Project Coast as
being of the type of institution formed by charisma.
The charismatic authority from which the institutional structure of Project Coast
took its legitimacy, and thus the legitimacy of the framework within which the chemical
and biological weapons research programme operated, was embodied in Dr Wouter
Basson. Basson represented the Defence Force to the scientists and administrators of
Project Coast, and vice versa, but did not derive his authority from his position as broker.
It came instead from the recognition of his unique charismatic vision granted him by the
men and women who came to be the scientists and administrators of the weapons
research programme. This recognition, according to Weber's analysis, cannot be sought
without being compromised: it must be given freely by the men and women who chose to
become a charismatic leader's followers. Because that recognition of duty, and
abdication of responsibility, that defines a charismatic authority is given freely the
followers of a charismatic leader must be accounted fully complicit in any decisions
taken within a charismatic institutional framework, such as Project Coast. Because the
3 Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt (Chicago University Press,
Chicago: 1968)
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visionary at the heart of a charismatic institution is only deemed a visionary because of
his reception, a charismatic leader's perceived vision is as much a creation of his
followers as it is a reflection of any individual's subjectivity. The accounts of Wouter
Basson's influence, then, reveals more about the complicitous nature of Project Coast's
organisation than it does about Basson's genuine, true, motives. Although the decisions
through which the chemical and biological weapons research programme developed its
particular form and focus were the products of several individuals acting separately and
in concert, their right to make these decisions was always legitimated by reference to the
special authority held by Wouter Basson. Because of this, then, and for the other reasons
listed above, the second conclusion derived from my examination of Project Coast is this:
the chemical and biological weapons research programme was best described as an
institution founded on a man's personal charisma.
The third chapter of this thesis picked up on the implications of this decision-
making process, and attempted to interpret the various explanations offered by the
programme's wo~king scientists and administrators for the particular form ofweapons
research that they had developed. Wouter Basson featured in all of these accounts, giving
legitimacy to the ideological claims of one scientist after another. His presence in these
accounts, as the description of Project Coast as a charismatic institution allows us to
determine, signalled the production ofa charismatic vision on the part of his followers. It
does not necessarily signal his personal acquiescence to any arguments made in his name.
Although these accounts were widely divergent in their details, they did all share a set of
assumptions beyond the simple legitimating presence ofBasson. This set of assumptions
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drew inspiration from a hegemonic, "common sense" form of racism rife in South Africa
for decades before the chemical and biological weapons research programme's origin.
4
The two core assumptions at the heart of this common sense racism were that, first, race
existed as a meaningful category, and second, that the differences between races were
essential, genetic, and unshakable. This presumed radical difference between races
therefore allowed the programme's scientists to consider the production of chemical and
biological agents restricted in their effects to only one race group, namely black South
Africans. This common sense racism was given legitimacy by the accounts that linked it
to the charismatic leader, Wouter Basson.
The research agendas that arose out of this nexus ofhegemonic racism and
Project Coast's self-legitimating institutional structure were aimed at producing
technologies of control. The chemical weapons branch of the research programme
produced an advanced form of tear gas, and attempted to produce a pacifying gas out of
the active chemicals in street-drugs. This proposed gas would work, in the same way as
the street-drugs on which its was based, and thus altering the brain chemistry of
individuals in a crowd. The biological weapons branch of the research programme
attempted to produce, first, a product that would work as a vector for infection in black
South Africans only and, second, a new form of contraceptive that could be administered
on a mass-scale, with or without the consent of its subjects. Both of these proposed sets
of technologies promised the ability to control the subjects of the late Apartheid state
more completely than ever before. But, as I demonstrated in the same chapter, this was
4 Deborah Posel, "Race and Common Sense: Racial Classifications in Twentieth Century South Africa,"
African Studies Review. (VoI44, No 2: September 2001)
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not the ambition ofthe late Apartheid state. The third conclusion that I then derived from
this examination was this recognition of the nature of the goal behind the programme's
research, as well as that goal's incompatibility with the state's ambition.
The ambition that stimulated the weapons research programme's development did
not, however, remain a constant presence throughout the programme's brief history.
Instead, that animating ambition changed with the changes in the institutional framework
in which its research programme was structured. In the fourth chapter of this thesis I
identifying the period between 1985 and 1986, almost exactly midway through the ten
years of Project Coast's operation, as the period in which this transformation began to
take place. The five years after this watershed period saw the changes made in this
period filter through to alter the institutional structure of Project Coast as a whole, and
thus to also alter the workings of the chemical and biological weapons research
programme. This transformation, I argued, was triggered by the increasing withdrawal of
the legitimating charismatic authority of Wouter Basson, a withdrawal that left the
institutional structure of Project Coast, and thus its network of visionary decision-makers,
without a central point of focus. After some years of floundering, the administrators of
Project Coast seemed to find their purpose again, this time in the accumulation of
material wealth. The ideological ambitions that had driven the earlier work conducted by
the scientists at the weapons research programme fell by the wayside, and was never
recovered. The most plausible explanation for this collapse, as detailed in that chapter,
was that the animating force of that ambition was Wouter Basson, and it was thus derived
from his presence rather than from the programme's location within the state. This was
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the fourth conclusion, then, that the examination of the historical development of Project
Coast has revealed: that the research programme derived its force from its location in a
charismatic institution, and was therefore susceptible to the changes that occurred at the
administrative level of that institution. This was how the programme can to appear, in
the studies of its ending, simply as a force for fraudulent financial dealings.
With this final chapter, my account of the historical development of the workings
of the chemical and biological weapons research programme came to the same point at
which the other published accounts of that programme have begun. The simple fact that
such a development can be traced across the short period that this thesis studies
demonstrates that Project Coast must be taken more seriously as an object ofhistorical
change than any ofthese works allow. That development also, when read against an
admittedly simplistic interpretation of Weber's historical sociology, allows the
programme's relationship with the larger institutional order of the late Apartheid state to
be studied. That relationship was the original animating force that drove this thesis. It is
thus fitting that the final conclusion that I propose here should address that relationship:
Project Coast, the institutional framework within which the state-sponsored
chemical and biological weapons research programme operated, was an aberration within
the institutional order of the state. A charismatic institution within a broader militarising
bureaucratic order, it did not partake ofany part the state's system ofexpertise, hiring,
promotion, accountability, or order. And neither, therefore, did the chemical and
biological weapons research programme that developed through that institutional
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structure, as demonstrated in the body of the thesis, partake of the state's ideological
order. Although its animating vision was founded on the same hegemonic notions ofrace
as that of the late Apartheid state, its intents and purposes were not the same as the
state's. The chemical and weapons research programme aimed to produce a set of
technologies that would make the late Apartheid state's strategies unnecessary. It was
not, therefore, a part of those strategies, despite its rhetoric.
The significance of this final conclusion lies in the fact that it can recognise the
discontinuities, redundancies, and plain oversights within the broad institutional frame of
the late Apartheid state itself. If it was possible for a well-funded, executive-approved
institution like that of the chemical and biological weapons research programme not only
to operate at a remove from the mainstream of the state's institutional order but also to
operate at a remove from the self-avowedly ''total'' ideological rhetoric of the state, then
it seems likely that several other institutions -- perhaps less ambitious, and less
conspicuous -- also operated within the context of the late Apartheid state without
partaking of its particular forms of institution and rhetoric. This possibility has not gone
unrecognised in other periods of South African history: the work ofDeborah Posel, in
particular, makes much use of the discontinuities, incompetence, and contradictions in the
early Apartheid state. Her work has done much to strip the Apartheid state of its self-
described sheen of totality, and rigorous efficiency. 5 For the period under study in this
thesis, the decade of the 1980s and of the late Apartheid state, however, the illusory
efficiency of the state remains a staple of both popular and academic histories. Although
S Deborah Posel, The making ofapartheid, 1948-1961: conflict and compromise. (Clarendon Press,
Oxford: 1991)
146
that state has been described as being in "crisis" through the period, the literature focuses
largely on the efficacy ofthe state in suppressing the various insurgencies of the period
through the mechanisms of the several States of Emergency, the South African Defence
Force, and the South African Police. This thesis's claim to having any significance for
the broader history of South African beyond the provision of a more detailed examination
of the operation of the chemical and biological weapons research programme, and its
institutional frame, Project Coast, lies therefore in this recognition that the late Apartheid
state, like its earlier manifestations, was not a total institution.
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